Naval War College Review

Volume 34
Number 2 *March-April*

Article 25

1981

March & April 1981 Review

The U.S. Naval War College



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

March - April 1981

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FOREWORD

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VOLUME XXXIV, Number 2/Sequence 284 March-April 1981

Cover: Photograph by PHC Joseph W. Ranieri, U.S. Navy.

PRESIDENT'S NOTES

About a year ago I wrote in these pages that before coming to the Naval War College I had heard some criticism of the curriculum's emphasis on the lessons of history to the neglect of preparation for the present. I found, I noted then, that a judicious balance has been struck between both needs. I went on to discuss our recurring themes as they illuminate problems that have historically taxed the genius of our statesmen and military men and that need continual resolution in every age. I described the way the study of these themes is integrated into, indeed constitutes almost half of, our 10-month curriculum. These themes are given depth by using case studies beginning with the classical prototype of Athens and Sparta, extending through the Napoleonic Wars, strategic theory, Europe and the balance of power, the roads to World Wars I and II, the lessons of those wars and the actions in Korea and Vietnam and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the events of the cold war, and the strategic and policy context faced by our armed forces today. I concluded with the observation that students here will continue to study the past so that they may serve well in the future.

Two issues ago I amplified this theme, remarking that I was confident that the range of questions and the depth of the analysis provided by our course of study was proper and effective education for military professionals.

Lest those critics noted earlier find confirmation here of their "too much history" claim, I have written, in other issues, of the emphases in our Defense Economics and Decisionmaking course, of the gaming experiences arranged for the students through our Center for War Gaming, of the research into newly emerging problems sponsored by our Center for Advanced Research, and, in the last issue, of the thoroughly professional tactical emphasis in our Naval Operations course. I have also stressed, as the curriculum itself stresses, the deliberately integrative nature of our core courses and electives.

This prologue is intended to remind readers of the professional value of a Naval War College education and to remind me that defensiveness is ill-becoming and unnecessary when I read several recent articles about what war colleges should be but allegedly aren't doing. Still, some comment is needed.

Three of the mentioned articles find fault with Service and DOD policies regarding education and use of personnel and those policy questions are outside the organizational competence of the War College to rebut even were we so disposed. That criticism then is extended to the educational philosophy of the Services. That, too, must pass without comment although I do have some strong personal opinions. But then the criticisms get specific.

One article says: ". . . . the war colleges [give] little attention to *ideas* about warfare." "We must give our officers a chance to think about warfare . . . ." "This means . . . much greater emphasis on military history and theory . . . ."[1] A second article states that "at the war colleges . . . management, politics and foreign policy are taught, but no tactics and little strategy . . . . [M]ilitary history is treated as if it were a marginal embellishment instead of being recognized as the very core of military education, the record of trial and error on which today's methods can be based." The author continues by calling for "drastic changes in the curricula of the . . . war colleges."[2]

It is with pride, not smugness, that I can say that the Naval War College does not need to change course to meet such criticisms. We immerse our students in ideas about warfare—I have given much detail in other Notes. We not only give officers the opportunity, we *require* them to think about warfare while they are students, both in historical terms and in contemporary terms. We do it to ensure that our graduates have a framework to guide them as they continue to think about warfare throughout their careers. Indeed, the grounding of our course in military history and theory is so solid that those without firsthand knowledge of the Newport curriculum (and that includes those both in and out of the Navy) have often confused the grounding with the overall course and thought that reason to criticize.

If the educational philosophy they propose promotes increased professional military competence (and I believe that it does), I invite the authors of these articles to consider our curricula. We do not consider them locked-in ideals for all military education but we are confident that their structure, their content, and the intellectual assumptions on which they are based already are what these two authors call for.

A third recent and widely read article does not so much criticize the War College as it does the Navy's institutional attitude toward the college and towards education (as opposed to training) in general. The author was more specific in detailing Navy-particular practices, attitudes, and results, warning that in his opinion "[o]ur officer corps could well become a group of highly skilled technicians who by default are forfeiting the destiny of the Navy to others who will do their thinking for them."[3] Well, maybe, but I am not so pessimistic.

I do not disagree with many of the premises and much of the discussion of any of these authors; I am, however, privileged to be involved with and thus able to observe closely a very significant exception to their generalizations—the Naval War College. I welcome the close scrutiny of our programs by these authors or by any of our interested readers. We don't claim perfection but are convinced that we give our graduates a head start along the proper route.

EDWARD F. WELCH, JR.
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

NOTES

1. Gary Hart, "The Case for Military Reform," *The Wall Street Journal*, 23 January 1981, p. 20.
2. Edward N. Luttwak, "Towards Rearming America," *Commentary*, September 1980, pp. 27-34 reprinted in *Survival*, January/February 1981, pp. 29-36.
3. Thomas B. Buell, "The Education of a Warrior," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1981, pp. 41-43.

Some insight into Soviet perceptions of its security interests, of the role of nuclear weapons in world politics, and of the European theater balance with respect to the worldwide balance can be gained by a careful consideration of the language used and the concepts included in Soviet public pronouncements. A rich source is the diplomatic and propaganda barrage loosed against NATO (and the Soviet public) before, during, and after NATO's 1979 decision regarding the deployment in Europe of a new generation of American long-range theater nuclear forces.

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE AND REACTIONS TO AMERICAN LRTNFS

by

Stephen M. Millett

On 6 October 1979, General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev launched a surprise diplomatic offensive against the West with a proposal to negotiate a theater nuclear arms control agreement for Europe. He offered in his speech at East Berlin to enter into immediate talks, but with the stipulation that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) must not upset the current balance of power in Europe by deploying a new generation of American-made long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNFs). He warned Western Europe of very grave consequences to the security of the conrinent if NATO rejected his offer. As a gesture of his sincerity, Brezhnev also announced the unilateral Soviet withdrawal of 20,000 troops and 1,000 tanks from central Europe.

Brezhnev's speech commenced an intensive Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign against NATO. The apparent objective was to discourage West European members of NATO from making a commitment at the minister's meeting on 12 December 1979 to deploy American *Pershing II* missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beginning in 1983. In the course of the propaganda flow, Soviet spokesmen said more about nuclear weapons, strategy, and the strategic balance than on any other occasion. While it is true that much of what the Kremlin had to say was intended for foreign consumption, many of the Soviet pronouncements were aimed at the Soviet people through principally internal information organs. If the numerous statements are taken at face value, they reveal several consistently expressed views that offer insights into Soviet

perceptions of the theater nuclear balance in Europe and the relative security of the U.S.S.R. in relation to the United States and Western Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to recount the principal Soviet arguments against American LRTNFs and to review Soviet proposals to negotiate arms control of theater nuclear weapons. An attempt will be made to balance these Soviet views with Western perspectives and to suggest some Soviet motivations behind their propaganda and diplomatic offensive from October 1979 through January 1980.

Soviet Objections to American LRTNFs. The most frequently mentioned objection to the proposed new generation of American LRTNFs deployed in Western Europe was that the *Pershing IIs* and GLCMs were a qualitative escalation in the nuclear arms race that would dangerously upset the existing balance of power on the continent. This argument was made even before Brezhnev's speech.[1] The General Secretary, referring to the Western "supporters of the arms race," claimed that "Their objective is to break down the balance of forces as it has been built up in Europe and attempt to achieve military superiority for the NATO bloc."[2] He contended that in the past 10 years the Soviets had not increased their nuclear weapon carriers in the western region of the U.S.S.R.; on the contrary, the Soviets had actually reduced the number of medium-range missile-launching installations, the nuclear power of these missiles, and the number of bombers.[3]

Soviet spokesmen repeatedly argued that the Soviets had done nothing to warrant American escalation of the arms race in Europe. They contended that it was the "warmongers" of NATO who were pushing for a new "Euro-strategy" and who were striving for military superiority over the Soviet Union in order to impose Western domination over the Socialist nations. A.P. Kirilenko, considered second only to Brezhnev in the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, made this point on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution: "NATO strategists are persistently urging on the arms race, are striving to break up the approximate balance of forces that has been formed and to violate the principle of equal security of sides, and are seeking to gain military superiority for themselves."[4]

The substance of this Soviet view was elaborated in detail in an interview in the Hamburg magazine *Der Spiegel* with Vadim Zagladin, the First Deputy Chief of the International Department of the Central Committee, and Valentine Falin, First Deputy Chief of the International Information Department. Falin made a major issue of the American forward-based systems (FBS) around the Soviet Union that, he claimed, consisted of 1,500 "means of delivery" of nuclear weapons against the U.S.S.R. Zagladin added an apology for the Soviet SS-20, a new intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that has caused great concern in NATO. He claimed that the SS-20 was not a qualitatively new weapon, but rather a replacement for older Soviet missiles of similar characteristics and mission. "The SS-20 is our answer to the U.S. 'forward-based forces' which, by the way, are modernized yearly," Zagladin said. "Our missiles have not changed the power ratio."[5] Falin presented the Soviet definition of strategic weapons as any capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union: "We regard U.S. weapons targeted on the Soviet Union—no matter where they are stationed, in the United States or in Western Europe or in Asia—as a threat to the Soviet national interest."[6]

The Soviets repeatedly pointed out that American calculations of the European balance tended to leave out

British and French nuclear deterrents as well as the American theater nuclear forces, like the *Poseidon* submarines off the European coast and the FB-111 fighter bombers. Mikhail A. Milshtein, a retired Soviet general and currently director of the Political-Military Department of the Institute of the USA and Canada, explained in an interview for *The New York Times* that in the 1950s the Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs/IRBMs) were developed in order "to preserve the balance in this component [nuclear weapons] in the European theater, as a counterpoise to the nuclear systems of France and Britain and the American forward-based systems in Europe." He continued to rationalize the SS-20 as merely a modernized replacement that did not change the strategic balance, although Milshtein, like most Soviet spokesmen, rarely if ever discusses specific weapon characteristics, yields, or numbers. The deployment of new American LRTNFs, he contended, was a different matter: "The strategic situation will undergo a qualitative as well as quantitative" alteration. The general did not say explicitly but he was undoubtedly referring to the American cruise missiles, which the Soviets do not have yet and which the Soviets probably fear as much as the West Europeans do the SS-20.[7]

Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko clashed precisely on the SS-20 issue with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in Bonn in late November. "The Soviet Union is operating on the principle that the existing balance is sufficient to guarantee full security," Gromyko proclaimed.[8] Genscher disagreed publicly with his Russian counterpart; he argued that the deployment of over 100 SS-20s targeted against Western Europe had upset the continental balance and that the proposed new LRTNFs for NATO were necessary in order to redress the balance that the Soviets had recently upset.[9]

The Soviet SS-20 (as it is called by NATO) was first deployed in 1977. In comparison with its earlier models, it is vastly superior. The 500 SS-4s were first deployed in western U.S.S.R. in 1959. They have a single one-megaton warhead. They have a fixed-sited launching base and a range of about 1,200 miles. The 90 SS-5s were first deployed in 1961. They are very much like the SS-4s, except they have a longer range of some 2,300 miles. (The distance from Moscow to London is about 1,500 miles.) The SS-20 has a range of 3,000 to 4,000 miles. It could be stationed east of the Urals and still hit targets in Western Europe. The SS-20 is a mobile missile with much greater survivability than the earlier missiles. It has three multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) of 150 kilotons each. It is assumed that these warheads are considerably more accurate than the earlier models. The extended range, mobility, MIRVs, and the operational sophistication of the SS-20 have therefore caused a great alarm in NATO. Also of concern is the Soviet TU-22M *Backfire B* bomber, which was introduced in 1974. It is believed that about 50 *Backfires* are currently deployed against Western Europe. With a range of 5,500 miles, the *Backfire* might even reach targets in North America. The United States is particularly upset by this new bomber, and it had limited success placing any restraints on it in the SALT II Treaty.[10]

Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany raised the specter of Soviet nuclear superiority in Europe as early as May 1977 at the summit of NATO heads of government. He warned that in a few years there would be strategic parity between the United States and the U.S.S.R. that would depreciate the political and military reliance of NATO on the American strategic nuclear deterrent. "...We must maintain the

balance of the full range of deterrence strategy," he asserted in a major address in the following October. Schmidt mentioned increases in tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces, but he did not specifically mention LRTNFs.[11]

A year later Presidential advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski traveled to Europe to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II and theater nuclear arms for Europe. President Carter discussed these issues with Schmidt, Prime Minister James Callaghan, and President Valery Giscard d'Esraing in January 1979. Because SALT II would not cover the SS-20 and place only moderate limits on the *Backfire* bomber, Carrer recognized a mission for American LRTNFs in order to close the "deterrent gap" in Europe. The President apparently insisted on careful political preparation for the decision to deploy LRTNFs in order ro avoid a repear of the embarrassment caused by the neutron bomb controversy in 1977-1978. The decision would have to be virtually unanimous by all the members of NATO at the joint ministers meeting on 12 December 1979.[12]

The argument between rhe U.S.S.R. and the West over LRTNFs illustrates the divergence of perceptions of the theater nuclear balance in Europe. The Soviets apparently believe that their new systems, the SS-20 and the *Backfire* bomber, were necessary to counteract existing imbalances caused by American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, the British nuclear arsenal of 64 *Polaris* A3 missiles and 98 nuclear bomb-carrying aircraft, the French *force de frappe* of 18 missiles, 64 sea-launched missiles, and 33 *Mirage-IVA* aircraft. In addition, the United States has assigned three nuclear submarines (with 48 *Poseidon* C3 missiles with 480 MIRVs) to NATO military command. Indeed, the Soviets count LRTNFs differently from the Wesr and exaggerate Western numbers while refusing to give numbers for the U.S.S.R. (See Tables I and II.) Citing their historical experiences in this century, the Soviets cannot feel secure with equal or less defense than their potential enemies. In Soviet military arirhmetic more forces is better and most is the best. On rhe other hand, Soviet numerical and recent technical advantages pose a serious threat ro Western Europe. The West fears rhat the Soviets could neutralize Western Europe by threatening to attack it while precluding American nuclear response because of the massive Soviet strategic arsenal. Without its own modernized

TABLE I—A SOVIET PERCEPTION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE U.S.S.R.

UNITED STATES
384 Tactical Aircraft in Europe
292 Tactical Aircraft from Carriers
5 Nuclear Submarines with 500 Poseidon Warheads

UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE
300 Nuclear Vehicles

U.S.S.R.
[No Numbers Provided]

From Leonid Zamyatin, "The World Needs Military Detente," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 26 December 1979, p. 14.

TABLE II—A WESTERN PERCEPTION OF LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR BALANCE IN EUROPE

Country	Weapon System	Delivery Launchers	Total Warheads	Approx. Range (Statute Miles)
U.S.	3 *Lafayette*-class SSBNs	48 *Poseidon* C3 SLBMs	480 MIRVs	2,880
U.S.	FB-111 E/F Bombers	156	312	3,000
U.K.	4 *Resolution*-class SSBNs	64 *Polaris* A3 SLBMs	192 MRVs	2,880
U.K.	*Vulcan* B-2 Bombers	48	96	4,000
U.K.	*Buccaneer* Bombers	50	50	2,300
France	4 SSBNs	64 M-2 & M-20 SLBMs	64	3,000
France	*Mirage* IVA Bomber	33	33	2,000
France	SSBS S-2 IRBMs	18	18	1,875
U.S.S.R.	SS-20 IRBM	120	360 MIRVs	3-4,000
U.S.S.R.	SS-5 IRBM	90	90	2,300
U.S.S.R.	SS-4 MRBM	500	500	1,200
U.S.S.R.	6 G-I Class SSBNs	18 SS-N-4 SLBMs	18	1,200
U.S.S.R.	13 G-II Class 7 H-II Class SSBNs	60 SS-N-5 SLBMs	60	2,300
U.S.S.R.	TU-22 *Blinder* Bomber	136	272	1,750
U.S.S.R.	TU-16 *Badger* Bomber	318	636	1,650
U.S.S.R.	TU-22M *Backfire* Bomber	50	200	5,500

From *The Military Balance, 1979-1980* (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 5-30, 86-91, 114-119; Robert Metzger and Paul Doty, "Arms Control Enters the Gray Area," *International Security*, Winter 1978-79, pp. 17-52. Operational numbers could be half to two-thirds of the maximum figures given here.

LRTNFs, the West felt caught in a "gap in the escalation spectrum." As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned in September 1979: "If there is no theater nuclear establishment on the continent of Europe, we are writing the script for selective blackmail in which our allies will be threatened, and in which we will be forced into a decision whereby we can respond only with a strategy that has no military purpose but only the aim of destruction of populations."[13]

The second Soviet objection to American LRTNFs was that they posed a dangerous new threat to the U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov was the leading spokesman of this view. He asserted that the proposed missiles represented a shift in American strategic doctrine in favor of a preemptive, counterforce attack upon Soviet missiles aimed at the United States.[14] Ustinov's logic was repeated in commentaries in *Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star)*, the official organ of the Ministry

of Defense, and in *Pravda*.[15] The commentators accused the United States of shifting the nuclear battlefield to Europe in order to minimize damage to North America and attempting to strike Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) aimed at the United States. Falin emphasized this point in his interview with *Der Spiegel*: "Strategic systems need about 25 to 30 minutes to reach the Soviet Union coming from the United States .... The weapon that is supposed to come to Europe as some so-called modernization, such as the *Pershing II*, needs only four minutes from the time it is launched until it hits its target in the Soviet Union."[16]

At the same time that Gromyko met with Genscher in Bonn, "an authoritative Russian" was reported to have told "a leading West German politician" that the Soviets viewed the proposed LRTNFs as even a greater threat to Soviet security than Operation Barbarossa in 1941. The German asked whether Moscow viewed Schmidt the same as Adolph Hitler. The Soviet responded "no" but the nature of the threat was nonetheless grave.[17]

It was Kissinger who raised the possibility, even desirability, that the new LRTNFs might be counterforce weapons. But counterforce against which Soviet military targets? Troop and tank concentrations, military command and supply centers, airfields, SS-20s, or ICBM silos? The answers depend upon technical characteristics and highly secret planning for the American LRTNFs. The 108 planned *Pershing II* missiles will be mobile, will have a single warhead, and will have a range of about 1,000 miles. They have a 30 minute order-to-fire to arrival on target response time. The 464 planned GLCMs (four missiles per carrier) are also mobile and also will have a single warhead (at least initially). They will have ranges of 1,500 miles, but their nonlinear flight path gives them an effective range of only 1,000 miles. They will have an order-to-fire to target-impact time of 2 or 3 hours. Neither system is expected to reach as far as Moscow. The relatively small number of these missiles that will be deployed by the mid-1980s does not appear (from the Western point of view) to pose a serious counterforce threat to 1398 Soviet ICBMs, 710 MRBMs/IRBMs, and 1028 sea-launched missiles. But undoubtedly, the American LRTNFs do indeed present a new nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, as indeed they are intended to do.[18]

The third Soviet argument against American LRTNFs was that they violated the agreements made by Carter and Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit in June 1979. Falin made this point as early as 14 October. He argued that the LRTNFs were strategic launchers as they could hit targets in the Soviet Union, and therefore the United States was circumventing the SALT II Treaty by increasing its total number of strategic weapons.[19]

Sergei Losev, director general of *TASS*, made this same argument in a letter to *The New York Times*. He asserted that the U.S. missiles would upset the balance of power in Europe and violate "the principle of equality and equal security." "From this standpoint," he wrote, "the plans for deploying new American medium-range missiles in Western Europe intended for strategic purposes and capable of hitting targets in the territory of the Soviet Union up to the Volga represent an attempt by the Pentagon to get around the strict SALT II limitations from the back door and gain unilateral military advantages in favor of the United States."[20]

The only Politburo member who made an issue out of SALT II in the context of LRTNFs was Foreign Minister Gromyko. Brezhnev, Kirilenko, and Ustinov mentioned that the American LRTNFs would upset the

balance in Europe and they alluded to the principle of equal security, but they never specifically mentioned the SALT II Treaty in this context. Gromyko, however, did raise this issue in Bonn on 23 November. Most Soviet spokesmen likely stayed away from this polemic as the treaty had yet to be ratified, it did not specifically include theater nuclear weapons, and any negative comments about SALT might be considered uncomplimentary to Brezhnev.

The fourth Soviet objection was that the American missiles endangered the policy of détente. Brezhnev warned in his East Berlin speech that "The realization of the NATO plans would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and to a great extent would poison the international atmosphere as a whole." He specifically warned Bonn that it could not expect to continue the advantages of détente and allow the United States to deploy new missiles on its soil.[22] The Soviet-East German communiqué at the end of Brezhnev's visit stated that "A new turn in the spiraling of the arms race would render a severe blow to détente and would enhance the risk of nuclear war."[23] This same theme was repeated by Kirilenko in Moscow, by B.N. Ponomarev in Rome, by Gromyko in Bonn, and by a lengthy editorial in *Pravda*.[24]

Closely related to the warning that the American LRTNFs threatened détente was the Soviet threat that these missiles posed a security threat to the countries in which they would be based. Brezhnev alluded to the fact that West Germany would be a prime target for Soviet counterforce weapons aimed at the American LRTNFs.[25] This warning was repeated in *Pravda* and *Krasnaya zvezda*.[26]

To complement the threat of striking at nuclear weapons in Western Europe, the Soviets offered reassurances that they would never use nuclear weapons against other nations that did not station nuclear weapons on their soil and did not sanction the deployment of nuclear arms in other countries. This pledge was apparently an appeal to Norway and Denmark, which do not permit nuclear weapons on their soil, to vote against the LRTNF question and an appeal to Belgium and the Netherlands to follow the example of their Nordic allies. This may have also been an attempt to undermine the policy of the Schmidt government, as it had said that it would not accept American LRTNFs if other NATO countries did not.[27]

An attempt to inflame West European and Russian public opinion was made by Lt. Gen. Nikolai Chervov of the Soviet General Staff, whose commentary on Soviet television was widely circulated abroad by the Novosti press agency. He claimed that the Americans planned to put neutron bombs on their new missiles. He further asserted that the missiles would have MIRVs. American spokesmen responded that the warheads for the new LRTNFs were designed for enhanced blast and reduced radiation, the opposite effects of the neutron bomb. They further stressed that the *Pershing II* would have a single warhead, although they left open the option of MIRVs for the GLCMs after expiration of the protocol to the SALT II Treaty.[28]

The above has been a brief review of Soviet statements to explain to the domestic Soviet public and to the West European and American audience why Moscow so vigorously opposed American LRTNFs. Some of the arguments probably reflect accurately some deeply felt views on Soviet security interests, while some seemed aimed at inflaming public opinion. The next section of this paper will briefly recount the Soviet diplomatic offensive against NATO.

Soviet Diplomatic Offensive Against NATO. Besides its efforts to undermine Western support for the

American medium-range missiles, the Kremlin was determined to do what it could through diplomatic channels to prevent NATO's approval of them on 12 December 1979. The Soviet "carrot" was the offer to begin immediately arms control negotiations on theater nuclear weapons and to expedite talks on conventional arms reductions. The Soviet "stick" was the threat that the Soviets would further build up their own theater nuclear forces to counteract the American missiles.

If Moscow meant seriously to negotiate on theater nuclear weapons, it confused the West with conflicting signals. Soviet spokesmen said at times that they would not negotiate if NATO voted in December for the deployment of the American missiles. At other times, the Soviets said that they would not negotiate if NATO approved *and* deployed the missiles—a difference of 4 years from 1979 to 1983.

Brezhnev said in his East Berlin speech that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce its number of "medium-range nuclear means" (*sredstvo*) deployed in western U.S.S.R., "but, of course, only in the event that there is no additional deployment of medium-range means in Western Europe."[29] The General Secretary was very vague in his use of the term *sredstvo,* which literally means "medium things." Was he offering to negotiate on the SS-20s, or only on the aged SS-4s and SS-5s? His mention of western U.S.S.R. suggests that it was the older missiles he meant to trade away, as the SS-20s have an extended range and can be stationed beyond the Urals. Brezhnev also suggested that the negotiations had to take place before 1983, not necessarily before December 1979.

Another question raised by Brezhnev's remarks was whether he meant that the negotiations should be within the SALT process or separately in a multinational arms control forum that would include the West Europeans. Craig Whitney of *The New York Times* reported from Moscow that the Kremlin was prepared to negotiate with Schmidt if Carter "fails to be a partner in détente," and that the Kremlin wanted to talk directly with the West Europeans if the U.S. Government delayed or killed the SALT II Treaty.[30] Henry Brandon of the *Washington Star* reported that he had been told in Moscow that the Soviets would seek arms control negotiations with the West Europeans separately from the Americans if the U.S. Senate rejected the SALT II Treaty and thereby destroyed the whole SALT process.[31]

A front page editorial in *Pravda* on 24 October elaborated on Brezhnev's offer to negotiate arms control for Europe. "We are prepared to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons in the western regions of our country if no more of these weapons are deployed in Western Europe," it declared. It further stated that the negotiations would be within the context of SALT III with the United States.[32] This editorial was a literal interpretation of Brezhnev's speech. The same line was repeated by Vadimir Alexeyev of Novosti in a letter to the *Washington Star* on 31 October.[33]

The Soviet position, however, hardened on 6 November when *Pravda* printed a call for immediate negotiations by Brezhnev. Referring to the possible positive outcome of such talks, he said, "There will be greater chances for such results if no decisions are made regarding the production and deployment in Western Europe of the above-mentioned weapons [American LRTNFs] before the outcome of these negotiations. On the contrary, these chances will be broken if these decisions are adopted in NATO."[34] For the first time, the Kremlin had strongly suggested that the negotiations had to begin before 12 December, a highly unlikely condition to be fulfilled in such short time.

The exact Sovier position was ambiguous and contradictory. In mid-November Zagladin was quoted by the East German newspaper *Die Wahrheit* as saying that Moscow wanted to negotiate on LRTNFs even if NATO did approve rhe new missiles in December, although such a decision would greatly complicate the talks.[35] Gromyko, however, gave a different impression at a press conference in Bonn on 23 November. According to his translator, the Foreign Minister said thar if NATO decided for LRTNFs then "rhere can be no negotiations." The official Soviet transcript, however, read differently: "If it [NATO] should come to such a decision, if our proposals for immediate negotiations should be rejected, *the basis for negotiations would be destroyed.* It would not exist. When we say we must begin negotiations immediately, we meant it must begin without a decision having been made on production and stationing...."[36]

The Soviets further confused the West in the communiqué of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers on 6 December: "The acceptance of a proposal on the production and deployment of new types of American-made missiles in Western Europe and the realization of this proposal would destroy the basis for negotiations."[37] This pronouncement sounded as though the Soviets were holding out their offer to negotiate to 1983.

The Soviet outhurst of condemnation after NATO's approval of the American missiles was predictable. What was surprising was Moscow's flat rejection of NATO's counterproposal to discuss theater nuclear arms control. The *TASS* report from Brussels said that the NATO decision would "destroy the very foundation for further talks" and that what NATO had proposed were "talks that are conceived on an absolutely different basis from the one proposed by the USSR."[38] Losev used even stronger words; he stated that the NATO decision had "killed the basis for talks on medium-range weapons."[39] Zagladin, however, sounded more moderate. He said that negotiations were still possible if rhe West did not deploy the LRTNFs and did not try ro "negotiate from strengrh" (which rhe Soviets interpret as an imposed *diktat*).[40] Nonetheless, on 3 January 1980, just days after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan had begun, Moscow sent a sharply worded reply to NATO's offer to negotiate that asserted that the decision of 12 December had "destroyed the basis for negotiations."[41]

Finally, the Soviets persistrently said that they would respond to any American LRTNFs in Europe by increasing their own arsenal of such weapons. Brezhnev mentioned this in his East Berlin speech and ir was repeated frequently by Ustinov, Ponomarev, and Gen. V.F. Tolubko, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as several other authorities.[42]

Soviet spokesmen said relatively little abour the NATO decision during the first few months of 1980, except to cite it in passing as one indicaror that the West had abandoned the policy of détente and that Carter was threatening a return to the cold war. The political consultative committee of the Warsaw Pact issued a statement on 15 May 1980 that echoed what Moscow had been preaching for months: negotiations on LRTNFs were still possible if NATO revoked its decision, or agreed to suspend the implementation of the decision pending the outcome of negotiations.[43]

Moscow renewed its propaganda offensive against the new American LRTNFs in July with proposals that some Westerners interpreted as a softening of the Soviet position. Following his visit to Moscow, Chancellor Schmidt announced that the Soviets would not insist that NATO had

to reverse its December decision before negotiations began, but the talks must include all American "forward based systems." Furthermore, Moscow would not insist that the SALT II Treaty had to be ratified by the United States before talks commenced, but it would have to go into official operation before accords could be concluded on arms control in Europe.[44]

In mid-August Brezhnev sent a letter to Carter and other Western leaders denouncing American reluctance to begin LRTNF negotiations. A month later, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie announced that the United States and the Soviet Union would begin such talks in October in Geneva. The first round quickly led nowhere with sharp disagreement over what weapon systems should be included in negoriations.[45]

In short, it is difficult to see exactly what Moscow was trying to accomplish by its confusing offers to negotiate. It offered litrle incentive to NATO to talk before deciding to deploy American missiles. Indeed, the Soviet offers looked to some Westerners as nothing more than maneuvers to prevent or delay as long as possible the introduction of American missiles, at no cost to Moscow. Perhaps the Soviets never meant their proposals seriously, using them only as propaganda. Or perhaps the Kremlin did want to negotiate, but it was terribly awkward in presenting its intentions to tbe West. Maybe the Soviets saw ambiguity as flexibility to handle future problems as they occurred. Or maybe the contradictions of Soviet spokesmen reflect internal disagreements in the Kremlin over how and when to deal with tbe West. It is too early now to know for sure.

Possible Motivations for Soviet Protests. The principal motivation for the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign against NATO was most likely the obvious one: to preempt by nonviolent means a weapon system designed to hit, from relatively short range, targets in the Socialist Motherland. The Soviets are extremely unhappy about a new nuclear threat to its cities and military forces on top of existing American strategic and tactical nuclear forces, British and French deterrents, and Chinese nuclear forces in the East. The Soviets probably saw two means of confronting the challenge of the American LRTNFs: a diplomatic offensive to srart arms control negotiations in order to delay or even prevent the NATO commitment to deploy LRTNFs and a propaganda campaign aimed at Western public opinion much the same as the Soviet campaign against the neutron homb in 1977-78. Both Washington and Bonn were acutely sensitive to the Soviet attempt to disrupt their plans for American medium-range missiles. Carter therefore dismissed Brezhnev's speech of 6 October as worth little: "What he's offering, in effect, is to continue their [Soviet] own rate of modernization as it has been, provided we don't modernize at all.... I think it's an effort designated to disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves."[46]

Besides the fact that the American missiles could hit targets in the Soviet Union, the Soviets may have feared them because they would he stationed in West Germany. The original NATO plan was to place all 108 *Pershing IIs* and 96 of 464 GLCMs in West Germany.[47] The Soviets have a historic paranoia about the Germans and they have vigorously opposed West German "re-armament," especially the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Chancellor Schmidt, however, tried to defuse the anti-German aspect of the LRTNF controversy by insisting that the Americans have total control of these missiles (no "two-key" system of weapon sharing) and thar the missiles had to be stationed in some country in

addition to West Germany. This is perhaps why the Soviets tried so hard to get Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy to back off from endorsing the American LRTNFs. Schmidt also demanded that the West pursue arms control talks with the Soviets, but while the American missiles were being readied, not before.[48]

A second reason for the Soviet offensive was a fear of an LRTNF arms race in the 1980s. The cost of the SS-20s and *Backfire* bombers must have been great, and the Soviets no doubt dreaded seeing their defensive investment eroded by American medium-range missiles. By the mid-1980s, the Soviets will have to accept parity (as defined by NATO) of LRTNFs or build up its own medium-range systems at great expense. The economics of defense is of very great concern to the Kremlin. The Soviets experienced their slowest industrial growth in 1979 since 1950. Even though they have significantly outspent the United States in defense during the 1970s, the Soviet resources for security are hardly unlimited. They reduced declared military spending in the 1980 budget. The Soviets will be hard pressed to spend large amounts on an LRTNF arms race and modernize further their strategic forces as well as address very serious industrial and agricultural problems.[49]

A third reason was to raise once again Moscow's anxiety about American forward-based systems (FBS). The Soviets have made the argument since 1969 that strategic weapons are those that can hit targets in the U.S.S.R. regardless of where they originate. They wanted to include American FBS in SALT I, but the Americans ardently refused to consider their tactical nuclear carriers under any strategic nuclear launcher ceilings. The Nixon-Brezhnev agreement of 20 May 1971 excluded the FBS issue from SALT I. This may have been a significant and politically difficult concession for Brezhnev to have made. The Soviets raised the matter again early in SALT II. The rather high ceilings of the Vladivostok Accords of 1974 were probably in part a compensation by the Americans to the Soviets for not including FBS in SALT II. Here again, Brezhnev may have made an unpopular concession with his own camp. In 1979, the Soviets in their campaign against the American middle-range missiles put the West on notice that the FBS would have to be addressed squarely in SALT III or any other nuclear arms control forum.[50]

The principal Soviet motivation for opposing LRTNFs in NATO as attributed by some Westerners was to weaken NATO militarily and politically. It is unlikely that this was Moscow's principal objective; after all, the Soviets had a legitimate security concern about the American missiles. Yet, whatever damage could be done to NATO preparedness and unity would have also been of considerable security value to the Kremlin. The Carter administration made a major issue of NATO unity during the LRTNF controversy, and thereby risked losing face if the decision of 12 December had come out differently.

The NATO decision must have been a serious disappointment for Moscow, although the result was not a total victory for Washington. That Italy stood firmly for the new missiles and offered to station them on its soil, with virtually no effective opposition from the Italian Communist Party, was surely a blow to Moscow. That Belgium and the Netherlands requested more time to make up their minds and that Norway and Denmark were unenthusiastic about the decision must have been of some satisfaction to the Soviets. On the other hand, that Schmidt overwhelmed the left wing of his own Social Democratic Party and emerged from the dispute even stronger than before had to have been a major reversal for Moscow. All in all, the effect of the

Soviet propaganda campaign was to strengthen the cohesion of NATO (for a while) rather than weaken it.[51]

Finally, there may have been some domestic Soviet political reasons behind the substance and procedures of the diplomatic offensive against NATO. Why did Brezhnev wait as late as 6 October to make his offer to negotiate on LRTNFs? He could have made his offer at Vienna in June, or even earlier. Kevin Klose reported from Moscow that there may have been opposition in the Kremlin to Brezhnev's initiative.[52] It seems most unlikely that there would have been outspoken opposition to the General Secretary, but there may have been those leaders who felt that Brezhnev was pursuing détente too hard, too long. For certain, Brezhnev put his personal reputation on the line during the LRTNF controversy, just as he had with the SALT II Treaty, and the result must have been an embarrassment for him. The NATO decision along with other Soviet frustrations in 1979, may have done much to weaken the policy of détente in the Kremlin. The Soviets have said that the NATO decision was one of several reasons why they sent troops into Afghanistan in late December.[53]

Conclusions. The Soviets were deeply concerned about the prospects of NATO approving the deployment of American LRTNFs at its ministerial meeting of 12 December 1979. Brezhnev himself took a leading role in the Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive against the West, and four other members of the Politburo made public comments on the matter. The Soviet statements reviewed in this paper reflect a persistent and well directed propaganda campaign aimed at both the Soviet audience and Western public opinion. Yet the word "propaganda" should not necessarily mean that the Soviets were lying or misrepresenting their beliefs. The language and concepts of Soviet public pronouncements can offer accurate insights into Soviet perceptions of its security interests, of the role of nuclear weapons in world politics, and of the European theater balance in respect to the worldwide balance.

The controversy over the proposed American LRTNFs was a major confrontation between the U.S.S.R. and the North Atlantic alliance. Because NATO did approve the deployment of the American missiles beginning in 1983, Washington viewed the decision as a major diplomatic victory. Whether or not Moscow viewed the incident as a major defeat, the result was a potentially damaging blow to the Western policy of détente with the Communist bloc begun by Willy Brandt in 1969. The question remaining is whether the decision for American LRTNFs will lessen the chance of nuclear war in the long run. The Western view was that the LRTNFs would further Western deterrence of Soviet provocations against Europe by raising the potential risk and cost to the Soviets. They also viewed the new missiles as a further bond linking the United States to the security of Europe rather than further "decoupling" European and American weapon systems and defense interests. Finally, the Western leaders believed that

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NATO force modernization would improve the odds of meaningful arms control negotiations, inasmuch as the new missiles would offer incentives to the Soviets to reach equitable accords. This paper has shown that Soviet perceptions of the LRTNFs are radically different from those of the West. It remains to be seen whether the Western leaders were accurate in their assessments. The critical period is 1980 to 1983, from the time of the commitment to American LRTNFs to earliest deployment.

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NATO has begun this decade with little change in the force postures and strategic concepts that it developed in its early years, three decades ago. World conditions, however, have not remained static. Political, military, economic conditions—all present broadened demands; all demand recognition. This paper offers some thoughts and suggestions.

STRENGTHENING THE NATO ALLIANCE: TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR THE 1980s

by

Jed Snyder

Introduction. For more than three decades, the NATO Alliance has successfully "kept the peace" in Western Europe, with the United States acting as senior partner among 15 nations united in their concern for Western security and their opposition to Soviet expansion and adventurism. These two parallel concerns had been sufficient to insure a reasonable amount of cohesion among the Allies on questions of strategy. With the dissolution of SEATO and CENTO—the need for a unified policy on questions of Western security became of even greater importance; the need for maintaining a collective deterrent posture in opposition to the considerable sttength of the Warsaw Pact *should* ptovide the West with sufficient incenrive for rational and united policies.

The Alliance is entering the 1980s with relatively the same force postures and strategic concepts with which it was formed 30 years ago. Considering the dramatic change in the military and political picture of the world, that is a disturbing and grossly inadequate calculus with which to approach a decade that may represent a watershed period for the West.

Strategie Realities and Conventional Assumptions. The strategic assumptions under which the Alliance has been operating are no longer correct and in fact have not been correct fot some time. The nuclear superiotity of the United States has disappeared. Even the architect of much détente policy, Henry Kissinger, admits that we have been "depleting capital" for some time now, and that cuttent strategic concepts will be "inadequate for the 1980s."[1]

Because the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture and strategy depended largely on the overwhelming strategic nuclear superiotity of the United States, it was only a matter of time before that credibility began to erode and with it a

significant measure of Western strength in meeting the Soviet challenge. Unfortunately, that grace period was shorter than we had planned for. Despite early indications of this erosion, the West did nothing to address increasing vulnerabilities. In addition, the U.S. lead in military technology was sufficient solace for many U.S. defense policymakers; we could always depend on the "state of the art" advantage to carry us through a difficult period.

Strategic Doctrine and European Security: Historieal Development. U.S. nuclear doctrine during the Eisenhower administration emphasized massive nuclear response to Soviet attack (either conventional or nuclear) against the United States or against Europe. This policy continued even after clear indications of a Soviet capability to attack the United States.[2] The doctrine of "massive retaliation" was reflected in NATO nuclear strategy in MC 14/2, adopted by the NATO Ministers in the 1950s. This document codified NATO's policy of early nuclear response to major Soviet aggression. The European powers were pleased with what they considered to be a U.S. guarantee to defend Europe with the U.S. central systems. It was evident early, however, that the linkage of U.S. strategic weapons to European defense was not necessarily axiomatic. The U.S. nuclear umbrella was, nevertheless, sufficient comfort to Europe during a period of overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority.

The inauguration of John Kennedy introduced a policy of flexible response with two components: (1) increased reliance on conventional forces in Europe and (2) formulation of a nuclear doctrine that provided targeting options short of massive strikes. It was an attempt to shift from the "all or none" principle. Although this flexible response strategy was first articulated in 1961, NATO did not formally recognize it until 1967 (and only *after* France left the integrated military structure), when approval was granted for the adoption of MC 14/3.

The need for flexibility in strategic policy was a theme that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara continually emphasized in the mid-1960s as he began to retreat from his support for Assured Destruction. As part of his campaign to introduce a range of response options into NATO planning, McNamara continued to press the Europeans to increase their conventional force contributions to NATO. Talk of "decoupling" had begun; the Europeans suspected a decrease in U.S. political resolve to link the defense of Europe with continental nuclear forces.

The desire for flexible options was tied to a higher goal—that of raising the nuclear threshold in Europe. This spurred a debate over whether or not conventional "denial" capabilities, (i.e., significantly raising the level of conventional forces) would weaken or strengthen deterrence.

In an attempt further to refine U.S. nuclear strategy, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird presented the doctrine of Strategic Sufficiency to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) during the first Nixon administration. Laird's successor, James Schlesinger, developed this doctrine further, announcing a policy of flexible response in 1974. He emphasized the necessity of insuring that nuclear conflict remain at a low level should deterrence fail. It should be noted that Schlesinger felt such a policy change did not require a restructuring of U.S. forces.[3] Flexible response was of particular interest and some concern to the NATO Allies, as it emphasized the use of limited nuclear options for Western Europe. Again, European cries of "decoupling" were heard.

The announcement in August 1980 of Presidential Directive 59[4] was the culmination of a move away from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD)

toward flexible response. PD 59 is essentially an exrension of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242 that outlined Secretary Schlesinger's flexible targeting doctrine. The formal announcement of this policy was made by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in an address at the U.S. Naval War College on 20 August 1980. Secretary Brown anticipated European concern as a result of this announcement and assured the NATO Allies that PD 59 would "improve the contribution of our strategic nuclear forces to deterrence across the full spectrum of threats . . . ."[5]

The Shrinking Nuclear Umbrella. As U.S.-NATO nuclear targeting doctrine has evolved, the United States has continued to assure its European NATO Allies of the commitment of strategic forces to European defense, while the relative balance of strategic forces between the United States and the Soviet Union had changed. During the 1950s and early 1960s, the United States enjoyed a very large margin of strategic superiority over the Soviet Union. Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the Soviets initiated a large strategic building program. As Albert Wohlstetter has shown, we significantly underestimated the rate at which the Soviet Union was adding to its strategic forces.[6] At the same time the Soviet Union was increasing its strategic capabilities, U.S. strategic spending was decreasing.

The history of the Soviet strategic building program has been exhaustively chronicled by others and need not be repeated here. Several recent developments, however, should be mentioned:

1. The deployment of the Soviet SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 continues at a rate of about 125 new launchers per year.[7]

2. Soviet ICBM accuracies continue to improve significantly. Reports of the 1977-78 tests of the SS-18 and SS-19 suggest that the "B Team" estimates of 1976 concerning future Soviet ICBM accuracies approaching 0.1 n.m., were accurate.[8]

3. The Soviet SSBN force continues its modernization program. The DELTA III class missiles have an extended range that allows targeting of virtually all of the Continental United States from patrols in the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk.[9]

4. The Soviets are developing a fifth generation of ICBMs. There have been reports of testing of a mobile system capable of carrying 10 reentry vehicles with a CEP of less than 0.14 n.m.[10]

As U.S.-NATO strategy evolved, little attention was paid to the shifting strategic balance. Policy was made in a vacuum; difficult spending decisions were deferred to a time when it was hoped that the political climate in Europe and in the United States would be more sympathetic to significant increases in Alliance defense spending. Although U.S. policy planners made the connection between the growth in Soviet strategic programs and U.S. security, they discounted the effect of strategic asymmetries and European security. Europeans saw a reduction in the effectiveness of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" simply from a comparative capability assessment. The United States interpreted this only as "political nervousness," to be listened to politely, but essentially ignored.

Now the West can no longer depend on the preponderance of American strategic nuclear power to guarantee the sanctity and security of Western Europe. As a result, threats of escalation become less credible; "tripwire" doctrines seem unrealistic. This fundamental change in the strategic situation has caused the NATO Allies to question seriously both the utility of the Alliance itself as well as their individual contributions to it. We are beginning to hear some of the same arguments advanced by Charles de Gaulle when he withdrew France from NATO's

integrated military command structure in 1966.

The answer to this remarkable and parallel set of events—a steep increase in Soviet military power and a steady decline in U.S. strategic programs—has been to emphasize arms control. The Carter administration chose to meet the Soviet challenge with offers of strategic, theater and conventional arms conrrol, while continuing to insist that we could afford to give up a small measure of our capability if the result was an equal concession by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not (and never did) share the U.S. feeling that arms control was in the interest of both parties. Clearly it felt rhat U.S. arms control was in its interest so long as it was a U.S. unilateral effort. It was willing to allow us to control ourselves, as the SALT process has shown. Soviet reductions are permitted only when they do not interfere with Soviet strategic programs.

Just as the Soviet Union has not shared the U.S. interest in mutual arms control, neither has it shared the fundamental assumptions attending the development of "flexible response."[11] A concrete example of this was the Soviet criticism of the Schlesinger doctrine, announced in 1974.[12]

A Paradox of Strategy. It has become evident during the last decade that serious divergencies exist between the United States and its European Allies on matters of NATO strategy. As noted earlier, the U.S. theater and strategic nuclear advantage has allowed the Alliance to get by on the cheap, while wielding a deterrent that was, for a time, credible. Enormous increases in Soviet nuclear force expenditures as well as a very impressive R&D program have, however, erased that superiority and with it much of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee to commit strategic forces to the defense of Western Europe.

The Europeans have become politically paralyzed by their fear that a reduced American commitment will focus the destruction on Europe, leaving the homelands of the two superpowers untouched. That fear is increased by the insistence of U.S. policymakers (and negotiators) on emphasizing to the Europeans the distinction between "strategic" and "theater" forces. This U.S. approach to NATO defense is seen as politically erroneous and insensitive, failing to recognize European concerns that dominate the thinking there. The Europeans (in particular, the Germans) have always stated that theater nuclear forces represent only one rung in the escalation ladder with direct connecrions to higher levels of escalation—to central strategic forces, specifically. The coupling of theater to strategic systems has always been a major theme in the European articulation of NATO strategy.

The U.S. attitude, however, is quite different in this regard. Official "U.S. Doctrine" does not consider escalation from one rung to another to be automatic. The United States has consistently favored "graduated deterrence" interrupted by "firebreaks" with deterrence at every level.

Interestingly, Soviet doctrine very closely parallels European thinking. The Soviets, like the Europeans, see the European theater as a strategic area inasmuch as NATO theater nuclear forces could be launched against Soviet territory from European soil. This capability will, of course, be significantly increased if the NATO decision of 12 December 1979, to deploy *Pershing* II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), is implemented. Conversely, the Europeans would consider Soviet "theater" weapons such as the SS-20 to be strategic inasmuch as European territory would be directly threatened.

Another element of this paradox lies in conventional forces. It is quite possible that while European Allies plead

for a greater U.S. conventional force commitment to Europe, the gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO forces might actually be temporarily desirable. This asymmetry (so the argument goes) might insure the commitment of U.S. strategic forces, reducing European fears of "decoupling." If the very large conventional force asymmetries in Europe were maintained the United States would find it politically very difficult to dilute its nuclear commitment.

Recognizing Political Constraints. There is a history of U.S. efforts to deal with difficult political questions by suggesting technical quick fixes. An example is the whole question of theater nuclear forces (TNF).

There has always been an ambivalence in Europe toward TNF. On the one hand, their very presence implies (to the Europeans) a blurring of the connection between the defense of Europe and the commitment of U.S. strategic systems. On the other hand, TNF tended to shift the focus away from improving the conventional force asymmetry in Europe. In addition, the United States and NATO have never developed adequate employment strategies for these forces. Part of the rationale for TNF is the control of nuclear conflict below the strategic level. But as Uwe Nerlich has written, NATO has never had a posture for controlled escalation.[13]

Theater nuclear forces (and particularly long-range systems) could bolster NATO's deterrent posture. As Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown postulated both a "selective use option" and a "general nuclear response option" for LRTNF.[14] The United States must be willing to approach employment decisions from a perspective that takes account of European political concerns. Such consideration was absent during the debate and decision to deploy 464 GLCM and 108 *Pershing* II launchers in Europe. The December 1979 decision by the NATO Ministers, if implemented, will provide long-range targeting of the Soviet Union from Western Europe. The mechanics of such a capability (political and otherwise) have not yet been seriously discussed. This is in part because of the feeling by some that these systems will never actually be deployed, owing to the state of European domestic politics. The United States should realize that any TNF modernization decision will be held hostage to the degree of stability of governing coalitions in Europe.

In addition to these domestic concerns, the very wording of the NATO decision causes some concern. The modernization decision was tied to future arms control initiatives. The Communique states that "limitations on U.S. and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach."[15] Unfortunately, the Soviet counterpart theater system—the SS-20—has already been deployed in large numbers. We would be asking the Soviers to limit a MIRVed system, representing the most threarening theater weapon in the Soviet inventory.

A recent example of the lack of appreciation for the political context of nuclear weapons employment was the neutron bomb episode. The United States took the position of withholding endorsement of the enhanced radiation (ER) warhead until the European Allies had announced their support. After the announcement, the United States withdrew consideration of its deployment, seriously undermining West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's position.

SALT II. The SALT II agreement has confirmed some of Europe's worst fears about the political and military liability of the United States. Although some Europeans can point with some relief to the fact that NATO's forward-

based-systems (FBS) are not restricted by SALT, neither is the SS-20 which, as previously noted, in its MIRVed configuration represents a serious challenge to NATO's forward defense.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that the Soviet Union has deployed 160 SS-20s in Europe.[16] In addition, there are reports of an increase in the SS-20s MIRVed capability from three to four warheads.[17]

The so-called grey area systems (of which the SS-20 is just one example) cause the Europeans a great deal of concern, particularly as we discuss limiting only NATO grey area systems.

Claims by some SALT proponents that Western Europe's leaders will be devastrated if the U.S. Senate does not vote to rarify the SALT II Treaty, do not hold up under a close analysis of the immediate effects of the Treaty on European security. Generally, SALT limits the flexibility of the United States in strategic planning, directly affecting NATO's deterrent posture and increasing the potential for "self-deterrence"[18]

A major cause for concern in Europe is the very restrictive SALT II limitation on cruise missiles in the Protocol accompanying the SALT II Treaty (which expires at the end of 1981). Unmanned, highly accurate aerodynamic vehicles could provide the Alliance with a relatively inexpensive, yet highly effective, penetration capability. Although nonnuclear cruise missiles present one option, nuclear roles for these weapons systems might be even more attractive. Cruise missiles are more easily dispersed than aircraft and their prelaunch survivability is higher. They are also less expensive than aircraft and would free the Quick Reaction Aircraft (QRA) for conventional missions. The optimal decision would be to deploy both nuclear and nonnuclear cruise missiles to Europe.

It should be remembered that SALT I did not limit cruise missiles. This was convenient for the Soviet Union who had already deployed them while the U.S. cruise missile was still in the development stage. As a result, there was no real interest on either side in limiting their numbers. At Vladivostok, agreement was reached on limiting *all launchers* of air launch missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers. Following its usual practice of capitalizing on U.S.-proposed, ambiguous, treaty language, the Soviets interpreted this restriction in the widest possible manner to include air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM). This limitation was carried through to the SALT II Protocol where, in addition, no new cruise missiles of any type with ranges greater than 600 kilometers may be deployed before 1982. This is particularly troublesome to some who view cruise missiles as an effective way of overwhelming Soviet air defenses. Cruise missiles would also be most effective on NATO's flanks, where sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) could play a major role in protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC), insuring uninterrupted transit of the Mediterranean and the Turkish Strait, for example.

Although Europeans are probably technically capable of developing cruise missiles on their own, such a divergence from the SALT theology could increase the possibility of decoupling the U.S. strategic forces from European defense. In addition, if the SALT process continues, the Soviets will most definitely attempt to extend the protocol (which limits cruise missile deployment) indefinitely.

Finally, cruise missiles represent a new technology and the Soviets have always attempted to stall the development of such technologies, reducing the state of the art advantage of the West. Allowing the Soviets to quash this advantage gives the Europeans cause for concern.

Conventional Defense: The Need for Uneonventional Wisdom. With

the shrinking of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, conventional force capability becomes even more critical during the period of reassessment by the Alliance. Very early in the life of the Alliance, the decision was made not to match the Warsaw Pact in conventional strength in Europe, either in manpower or armaments. An effective conventional defense would require many more divisions than are now deployed in Europe, requiring considerable increases in Alliance defense budgets beyond what the Alliance now considers "politically acceptable." "Tripwire" strategies served as a convenient excuse to reduce expenditures on convenrional forces.

Changes in conventional strength have two effects on the deterrent calculus: (1) shifts from the perceived change in the political-military situation, and (2) movement along a "curve of deterrence." This curve begins from a point where conventional forces are weak but deterrence is considered to be high (because of the expected "tripwire" nuclear response) to a point of stalemate where conventional forces approach an actual fighting capability (what some have referred to as "the nuclear pause") to the third point where a perceived conventional defense is achieved and deterrence is high. The shift in this curve is directly dependent on the perception of the degree of U.S. commitment at any one time. In the past the Allies have been led to believe that as they increased their conventional force contribution, the United States would unilaterally withdraw, even as Soviet conventional defense increased. This has had obvious detrimental effects on deterrence.

NATO's forces are now so thinly deployed along the central front that a sustained defense in depth is not possible. Insufficient deployment of forces (in this case) is more because of reliance on outmoded doctrines that still govern NATO force sizing decisions, than because of scarce resources. The larger problem on the central front is the critical logistics deficit. There would be a great resupply problem in any central front conflict. Although greater prepositioning (POMCUS) of stocks and equipment as well as enhanced airlift and sealift could significantly improve the situation, there must be a greater European commitment generally. U.S. reinforcement to Europe will be effective only if supplemented by similar levels of effort by the Europeans.

The creation of a large operational reserve is of critical importance. Only two of NATO's eight corps have significant reserve forces available.[19] These reserves must be mobile to allow rapid movement ro the crisis area, which *may not* be in central Europe where NATO has always focused its crisis planning (much to the detriment of the Northern and Southern Flanks).

NATO's conventional force problems do not stem entirely from resource constraints. Doctrine has not yet caught up with rapidly evolving technologies of precision that would allow more discriminating responses to aggression. The area of Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) has been looked at only in a superficial manner. NATO's much heralded Long Term Defense Program (LTDP), for example, does not include specific measures to exploit such technologies. PGMs show some of the same attributes of cruise missiles—they are highly accurate and precisely controlled. In addition, PGMs may well represent an attractive substitute for certain battlefield nuclear weapons, thus raising the nuclear threshold. This would also address European (especially West German) concerns to reduce the collateral damage effects of weapons systems generally. Although PGMs are not inexpensive, they will be cost effective if correctly employed.

The Soviets enjoy an advantage in virtually every component of conventional strength in Europe, including tactical aircraft, medium-range bombers

and surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. These asymmetries seemed to have been ignored in the much publicized Presidential Review Memorandum 10, which took a very optimistic view of NATO's conventional capabilities.[20] It also confirmed some of the worst fears of West Germany; that U.S. doctrine concedes the loss of a substantial amount of territory early in any conflict.

In addition to reviewing conventional force posture, NATO will have to reassess its conventional doctrine. Combat outside of Europe will affect Alliance strategy. The Yom Kippur War, for example, has led NATO to reexamine components of its conventional doctrine in light of the performance there of weapons systems in close combat situations.[21]

Finally, Soviet planning and doctrine does not make the clear distinction between nuclear and conventional combat that the United States and NATO have relied on. Soviet forces in Europe train in both nuclear and conventional (as well as chemical) environments and, in fact, Soviet military planners recognize the requirement for strong conventional forces to complement a nuclear operation in seizing territory quickly.[22]

Defense Spending. Official U.S. estimates until 1975 suggested that Soviet outlays for defense equalled 6 to 8 percent of GNP. Revised estimates indicate that a more accurate figure would be 11 to 13 percent of GNP. And, in fact, it may approach 20 percent during the late 1980s.

The size of the Soviet effort (in terms of U.S. dollars required to equal it in the United States) is roughly 40 percent greater than the current U.S. defense program.[23] Soviet defense expenditures (in rubles) show an annual growth rate of from 4 to 5 percent for at least the past decade.[24] During this period, the Soviets have spent $100 million more on defense than had the United States. More specifically (and more importantly), the Soviet investment in military R&D was $40 billion more than that of the United States.[25] In the area of weapons R&D, the Soviets are spending three times what the United Srates is and two times as much as the whole of NATO.[26] Annual spending for strategic forces is 250 percent greater than the U.S. effort. To appreciate the payoff of such expenditures, this Soviet investment financed four new generations of ICBMs, several new theater ballistic systems, a new manned strategic bomber, and enormous increases in conventional force levels. These funds would have been sufficient to provide the United States with virtually every major weapons program proposed during the lasr decade, including an entire force of B1 bombers, the full Trident submarine program, a modernized U.S. Navy and substantial improvements in NATO's conventional armaments.

It is important to note that one argument advanced by proponents of SALT is that it will result in reduced strategic spending. In fact, Soviet spending levels have increased exponentially during the SALT era. William T. Lee has recently estimated that Soviet defense outlays have nearly tripled since 1968 when serious discussion on SALT I began.[27]

The most rapid growth in Soviet military spending occurred during two 4-year periods—1959-1963 and 1966-1970, increasing 75 percent in the first period and nearly doubling in the latter period.[28]

By comparison, the U.S. defense budget has shown a decrease in real military expenditures. In FY 1964, for example, defense outlays were 8.29 percent of GNP, in FY 1981 they may be less than 5.3 percent.[29] Although the 1964 figure reflects our Vietnam commitment, it is still clear that real growth in the Soviet defense

budget was met by a decreased commitment in the United States.

Frequently, opponents of increased defense spending have argued that its burden on the national economy is intolerable. In fact, during the post-Vietnam period, despite the increased level of international crises, the "burden" of U.S. defense expenditures on the U.S. economy has not grown, but lessened. In addition, U.S. defense procurements have dropped from a high of $44 billion in 1968 to a low of $17 billion (in constant dollars) in 1975.[30]

As a result of a prolonged period of neglect, U.S. force levels across the board have declined substantially—military personnel strength, for example, has declined by more than half a million, directly effecting our ability to reinforce our conventional strength in Europe.

Alliance spending shows a similar picture. Total NATO defense expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) have fallen from 5.2 percent in 1974 to 4.3 percent in 1979.[31]

Despite the agreement by the NATO Ministers at the May 1978 summit to increase defense spending by 3 percent in real terms, it is doubtful that any of the major allies met this very modest goal in 1980. An increase of 3 percent in real terms would not even arrest the decline in Alliance capabilities. Increases of from 10 to 20 percent ($15-30 billion) would be required to reverse the deterioration in U.S. capabilities alone.

Energy Security. Events of the last several years have highlighted, dramatically, the extent of Alliance dependence on petroleum from the Persian Gulf. This is troubling for at least two reasons; (1) the Gulf area is a turbulent zone whose internal political trends have defied prediction and which, in some cases, continue to seem insoluble, and (2) this turbulence directly effects the security of oil supply from that region.

The dependency of the Alliance on oil to fuel its industrial economies has roughly doubled from 1960 to 1976.[32] As Table 1 shows, the dependency of NATO as a whole on *Persian Gulf* oil has increased significantly since the embargo of 1973-1974. This table lists separately both the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The data are shown graphically on Figures 1 and 2. Distinguishing between these two cartels is important as OPEC includes several major oil producers (Nigeria, Venezuela and Indonesia) not included in OAPEC membership.

A close evaluation of oil production and consumption figures reveals several interesting facts:

1. West Germany is the only major ally who has reduced the amount of OPEC and OAPEC oil as a percentage of its total imports. In addition, the reduction has been dramatic—from 75 percent to 55 percent in 6 years.

2. Despite the North Sea oil discovery, Great Britain has increased the percentage of OAPEC oil that it imports.

3. The Alliance as a whole has increased the percentage of Arab imports while reducing the percentage of imported non-Arab crude since the 1973 embargo. There is some evidence suggesting that this may be because of the decrease in Iranian and Venezuelan production, and a great increase in Saudi Arabian production.[33]

In the case of West Germany, it appears that an increase in the amount of U.K. oil imported (from the North Sea) is a significant factor. In 1976 West Germany imported 14,000 barrels of U.K. oil per day, while in 1980 it will buy at least 300,000 barrels per day. In addition, West Germany has decreased its dependency on Saudi oil significantly. It has greatly reduced its imports of Libyan and Kuwaiti crude.[34]

TABLE 1—CRUDE OIL IMPORTS OF SELECTED NATO COUNTRIES
(In Thousands of Barrels Per Day)

	Total Imports	From OPEC**	From OAPEC*	OAPEC % of Total Imports	OPEC % of Total Imports
United States					
Sep. 1973*	3471	2367	1066	31	68
1977	8815	5644	3175	48	85
1978	8356	5184	2957	47	81
1979	6478	5084	3046	47	78
West Germany					
Sep. 1973	2297	2182	1718	75	95
1977	1951	1743	1234	63	89
1978	1913	1615	1050	55	84
1979	2147	1733	1183	55	81
France					
Sep. 1973	2784	2555	2003	72	92
1977	2350	2158	1765	75	92
1978	2302	2091	1685	73	91
1979	2520	2271	1920	76	90
Great Britain					
Sep. 1973	1917	1754	1135	59	91
1977	1405	1134	800	57	81
1978	1318	1054	774	59	80
1979	1158	821	736	64	71
Canada					
Sep. 1973	940	896	210	22	95
1977	675	575	184	27	85
1978	621	485	164	26	78
1979	686	555	290	42	81
Italy					
Sep. 1973	2514	2273	1966	78	90
1977	2122	1768	1454	69	83
1978	2212	1839	1506	68	83
1979	2242	1908	1774	79	85
Totals					
Sep. 1973	13,903	12,027	8098	56	89
1977	15,118	13,022	8612	57	86
1978	14,722	12,268	8136	55	83
1979	15,231	12,372	8949	61	81

*OAPEC Membership: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lybia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates

**OPEC Membership (Excluding OAPEC Members): Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, Venazuela

Source: International Energy Statistical Review, National Foreign Assessment Canter, Central Intelligence Agency, -ER IESR 80012, 26 August 1980.

A similar table covering data until 1978 appears in Amos Jordan, "Energy and The Future of NATO," in Kenneth Myers, ed. *NATO: The Next 30 Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).



Fig. 1—OAPEC Dependence of Selected NATO Countries.



Fig. 2—Japanese Dependance on OAPEC.

TABLE 2—CRUDE OIL IMPORTS OF JAPAN
(In Thousands of Barrels Per Day)

	Total Imports	From OPEC	From OAPEC	OAPEC % of Total Imports	OPEC % of Total Imports
Sep. 1973	4878	4481	2181	48	92
1977	4791	4241	2775	58	89
1978	4662	4088	2676	57	88
1979	4846	4222	3047	63	87

Source: International Energy Statistical Review. National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, -ER IESR 60012, 26 August 1980.

A similar table covering data until 1978 appears in Amos Jordan, "Energy and The Future of NATO," in Kenneth Myers, ed., *NATO: The Next 30 Years* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

Looking to Japan, Iranian oil seems to be the significant factor in its increasing the percentage of imported OAPEC oil. Iran, a non-Arab OPEC nation, was Japan's largest supplier of crude in 1973, providing Japan with 33 percent of its oil. In 1979 it was delivering less than 10 percent of Japan's imported oil.[35] The effect of the Iranian revolution on Iranian exports is clearly seen by comparing production figures for 1978 and 1980. In 1978, Iran was producing 5,240,000 barrels of oil per day. In May 1980, it was producing only 1,700,000 barrels per day—a 68 percent reduction.

The production level of Saudi Arabia may be the single most significant determining factor in the changing percentage of OAPEC dependency of the Alliance as a whole. In 1973 Saudi Arabia was producing 7,335,000 barrels per day. In 1979 it produced 9,250,000 barrels per day—a 26 percent increase. The size of this increase could, by itself, explain the increasing percentage of OAPEC imports to certain Alliance members.

The NATO Alliance is not only vulnerable to embargoes by producing countries, as was the case of 1973-74; the revolution in Iran was a clear example of how internal political and religious conflict can greatly affect powers outside the region. As the West was becoming more vulnerable to interruptions in oil supply, it was also becoming less capable (in a political-military sense) to affect events in the region.[36] Also, at the same time, the Soviet Union has greatly increased its capability to project power into the region at a rapid pace and with considerable force.[37]

Shifting the Focus. Up until recently (and continuing in some quarters) our concern (particularly in Europe) for the security of the Persian Gulf area has been directly tied to our perceptions of the state of the "Palestinian problem." Western Europe has spoken with some consistency on this issue, refusing to tackle seriously the question of Persian Gulf security until the Palestinian problem was resolved.

The European preoccupation with the Palestinian issue and Europe's fear of Arab economic power were both illustrated during the Venice summit meeting of the European Economic Community (EEC) in June 1980. During this conference the EEC members called for the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in any future Middle East negotiations.[38] The endorsement of a role for the PLO rather than one for the Palestinian people is an unmistakable signal of Europe's fear of the "Arab oil weapon." The result of that policy is the endorsement of a terrorist organization, with obviously disturbing implications.

One hopes that the Iran-Iraq conflict will shift the focus away from the Palestinian issue toward the more important security questions. There have been, however, no indications to date of a change in European attitudes.

The myopic focus on the Palestinian issue was a convenient way of deferring Alliance discussion on the Soviet threat to this region. Clearly resolution of the Palestinian issue will not reduce Soviet incentives for adventurism in the area. A firm and unified Alliance position—on protecting vital sea lines (along which pass 60 percent of the world's oil), for example—will.

Arab OPEC members can make very effective use of their "oil weapon" to mold policies of European governments regarding certain issues in the Middle East. Witness, for example, the EEC statement on the PLO. Although perhaps only implicit, threats of reduced oil exports if the EEC did not toe the line were assumed. This can only serve to blur the focus of the Alliance on the real issues of global concern. With the Iran-Iraq war and the recognition of serious interstate disputes in the area, the Palestinian problem should pale in comparison to it and the Soviet threat.

The U.S. inability to develop a sound and comprehensive energy policy despite President Carter's declaration that we faced "the moral equivalent of war," caused great concern among our allies, reducing the chances that individual Alliance members would begin to consider the problem seriously.

The remarkable parallel development referred to earlier—the great increase in Soviet power projection capabilities and the great reduction of Western military power in the region—has also caused some concern among friendly and Western-aligned states in the area. Saudi Arabia is one example. The decision to establish an AWACS orbit and additional ground radars there[39] is certainly a positive step, but it is also only a first step. Providing the Saudis with a long-range radar capability does signify the U.S. commitment to the security of the country and the stability of its monarchy.

Soviet Energy Futures. There has been much speculation of late on the future of Soviet energy requirements. Debate has focused on the 1977 CIA estimate that the Soviet Union will become a net oil importer during the next decade. Whether or not this will be the case, there are alternatives open to the Soviets that are not available to the Alliance. Natural gas represents a very attractive alternative to oil for the Soviet Union. Development of the northern fields in Western Siberia will (Soviet leaders hope) produce gas at a rate faster than the declining rate of crude oil production.[40] Indeed, if the Soviets are able to tap vast natural gas fields within their own borders, their much heralded energy crisis may be postponed. In addition to implications for the Soviet economy, natural gas production there has already attracted the interest of Western Europe. Large contracts are now being negotiated between the Soviet Union and Western European countries for the export of this fuel in return for the raw materials required for its exploration and transportation. For example, Soviet exports of natural gas to France have increased from 2.5 billion c.m./year in 1976 to 4 billion c.m./year in March 1980.[41] West German natural gas imports from the Soviet Union were expected to reach 10 billion c.m./year in 1980. For the purpose of comparison, it is possible that the Soviet Union's natural gas flow will equal that of the United States by late 1984.[42]

Should this trend continue, the potential pressure that the Soviet Union could exert on Western Europe would be enormous. If the Western European economies become dependent on the Soviet Union for fuel, the debate will focus on the relative dangers of Soviet natural gas dependence vs. Persian Gulf oil dependence.

Flank Security. The generally shared assumption that an isolated Soviet attack on either of the flanks would be irrational and contrary to Soviet goals is, I think, specious. If the Soviet Union (as I believe) is interested primarily in the political dissolutions of the Alliance as opposed to a protracted central front military confrontation, then a lightning strike to seize territory on the flanks would be an attractive and relatively low-risk operation. Current NATO plans do not call for substantial reinforcement for either the Northern or Southern Flanks, inasmuch as such forces would come from the Central Region, weakening that theater. Again, this is more a function of poor planning and politically outmoded doctrine than scarce resources.

In addition, to divorce the defense of the center from that of the flanks is illogical. A Soviet hold on either of the flanks would seriously undermine NATO's position in the center, particularly if both flanks were seized simultaneously. Also, secure flanks would cause the Soviets pause in any attempt

to attack the center, as NATO would then be able to conduct flanking attacks of its own. As Admiral Sir Peter Hill Norton, former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, has written, "there is a clear lack of a coherent NATO policy which relates the problems of the Central Region to the quite different ones of the Northern and Southern Regions . . . . "[43]

The Northern Flank. Soviet expansion is dramatically illustrated on the Northern Flank, where the Soviet Northern Fleet has dispersed from its home base at Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula to the Barents and Norwegian Seas. It is now in position to establish a strong and threatening presence in most of the North Atlantic, north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The Northern Fleet is structured to emphasize airborne antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, strategic strike and long-range aerial reconaissance.[44] Increased Northern Fleet deployments could seriously impede Allied convoy operations during any conflict on the Northern Flank.[45]

Rapid reinforcement and supply have always been the central defense problems in the north. NATO could deal with this problem as long as it retained control of the string of islands and seas west of the eastern borders of NATO's northern nations. The Soviet naval expansion has, however, threatened this control; NATO's defensive positions in Norway are now *behind* Soviet maritime forces.[46]

Soviet exercises have shown the ability to coordinate units from the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and engage in combined operations of ground, sea and air forces. By extending its network of bases in the north, the Soviets could realize control over the Barents, Norwegian and North Seas. Short supply and communications lines would ease the logistics burden of such an operation. The many Soviet strategic airfields (from which *Backfires* could be launched) in the Kola Peninsula would allow increased power projection, in addition to rapid reinforcement of its forces on the Northern Flank.

The NATO base structure in the north is thin; the security of the flank depends on the continued use of NATO bases in Iceland and Greenland. These bases provide peacetime support for ASW monitoring, intelligence and surveillance.

A situation peculiar to the Northern Flank complicates the deterrent equation in the area—the sensitivity of Denmark and Norway to the stationing of Allied troops and nuclear weapons on their territories. This attitude is so strongly held and respected by NATO that in the event of conflict, reinforcements could not be brought in without an explicit request from these two governments. As a result, reinforcements might not arrive in a timely manner. In addition, most of the forces earmarked for the Northern Flank would come from the United States, not from units already in place in Europe. The only forces in Europe theoretically capable of rapid flank reinforcement are components of the Ace Mobile Force (AMF), which is roughly evenly divided in responsibility between the Southern and Northern Flanks. This "deterrent" force, however, would not arrive early enough as any operation of that kind would not be mounted until after conflict erupts, erasing the deterrent effect of a mobile force.

The Southern Flank. NATO's Southern Region is by far the largest area in Allied Command Europe (ACE) covering almost half a million square miles, including the strategically vital eastern and central Mediterranean, as well as the three peninsular nations of Greece, Turkey and Italy.

The strategic importance of the Southern Flank extends beyond its

perimeters, being linked in geopolitical ways to the Middle East. The economic, political and military potential of the Mediterranean is certainly not lost on the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the vast increases in Soviet naval activity. In 1963, for example, there were virtually no Soviet naval vessels in the area. Today there are more than 25 surface combatants permanently deployed. This affects the ability of the U.S. 6th Fleet to support Greek and Turkish land forces. In addition, the strength of the 6th Fleet has been cut by one-half with the deployment of one of its two carrier task groups to the Arabian Sea, which may be a permanent deployment.

The Soviets have shown an impressive capability to reinforce their Mediterranean naval squadron in time of war, as illustrated during the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict when the number of Soviet naval vessels there reached nearly 100.[47]

Complementing the Soviet naval buildup is land-based tactical airpower, as well as the *Backfire* bomber; both factors would seriously threaten the survival of the 6th Fleet.

Turkey is of central importance to the defense of the Southern Region; it is one of two NATO members to share a land border with the Soviet Union. Turkey controls transit through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles—one of several important constraints on Soviet naval power—and also has potential control of the vital airspace in the region. However, Turkey's importance extends beyond the flank to the Persian Gulf where its position assumes strategic importance for the defense of the vital Gulf area. Turkey's current economic and political situation is disturbing but clearly not irreversible, given continued Alliance recognition of her problems and an increased commitment to strengthen Turkey. The economic and political crisis there increases Turkey's vulnerability to pressure from the Soviet Union, which has been increased by the collapse of the CENTO Alliance.

The 12 September coup in Turkey highlights the extent of domestic upheaval there. For some time the Turkish military leaders had warned the political leadership of the possibility of a military coup if the domestic situation did not improve. A parliamentary maneuver by the opposition Republican People's Party (RPP) to oust the Foreign Minister, Hayrettin Erkmen, succeeded.[48] In addition, the Turkish Parliament had been unable to agree on a successor to President Fahri Koruturk, whose term had expired in April. Although the ouster of Erkmen clearly precipitated the military takeover, the economic situation and the increasing political terrorism would probably have been sufficient provocation for a coup in the near future.

The leader of the six-man military junta (referred to formally as the National Security Council), Gen. Kenan Evren, has pledged to return Turkey to stability and to democratic rule. He has also affirmed his support for Turkey's very important role in the NATO Alliance.[49] The appointment of Turgut Ozal as one of two Deputy Prime Ministers, is seen as a positive sign. Ozal was the architect of economic reforms under the deposed government of Suleyman Demirel (leader of the Justice Party). He will continue to serve as Turkey's chief negotiator with foreign financial institutions, trying to attract loans and grants from such sources as the International Monetary Fund and the EEC. He has already succeeded in acquiring $6 billion in Western loans. In addition, the Turkish inflation rate has been reduced by 30 percent since his economic austerity program was introduced.

Greece is also of great importance to the security interests of the Alliance (in addition to its political importance). There are several major airbases in Greece where U.S. tactical aircraft com-

mitted to NATO have been based. In addition, the Port of Piraeus has served as a home port for some units of the U.S. 6th Fleet. Greek installations provide a major link in NATO's air defense network and communications systems.[50] Her ports have sheltered not only her own naval vessels, but those of her NATO partners. NATO military operations in support of the Greek Army would be essential in stopping a southward Warsaw Pact thrust into Thrace.

The return of Greece to the NATO integrated military command structure closes a large gap on NATO's Southeastern Flank. Its withdrawal in 1974 over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus accompanied a promise not to return until all Turkish troops were removed from the island. Turkish troops are still stationed on Cyprus, occupying 40 percent of the island.

The major Greek demand is a return to the "*status quo ante* 1974," meaning total Greek control of the Aegean Sea and the vital airspace there. Turkey has repeatedly vetoed the Greek reentry primarily because of this demand and it should be noted that this issue has not yet been resolved. Greece has simply agreed to return and negotiate later. Reportedly, the previous Aegean command boundaries have been eliminated[51] at the suggestion of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), Gen. Bernard Rogers, who took the lead in bringing Greece back into the fold. Rogers' predecessor, Gen. Alexander Haig, had begun discussions on this issue. Other disputes, including a resolution of the continental shelf issue (and the Cyprus dispute) will have to be settled.

The external threat to the Southern Flank is clear and takes several forms:

1. *The Black Sea Exits.* Control of the Black Sea exits would allow the Soviets to reinforce their Mediterranean squadron with sufficient strength to challenge the U.S. 6th Fleet. In event of imminent threat of war on the Southern Flank, the Turkish Strait would become one of several obvious Soviet objectives.

2. *Control of Oil.* The possibility for Soviet control or denial of Persian Gulf oil to the NATO Alliance would be catastrophic. Denial of these resources or control of both the quantity and price could collapse the economies of Western Europe and Japan who depend on the Gulf for 57.5 percent and 72 percent of their total petroleum consumption, respectively.

3. *Interdiction of the Lines of Communications.* NATO's naval lines of communications are critically important because, in time of war, the majority of war materiel to the peninsular nations of Italy, Greece and Turkey would come by sea.

4. *Fracturing the Alliance.* Any Soviet initiative in the Southern Flank may encourage the permanent withdrawal of Turkey and Greece from the Alliance. As Pierre Hassner has noted, these countries are already in a state of "semi-withdrawal."[52]

5. *Presenting the Alliance with a "fait accompli."* The Thrace-Strait area constitutes one of the few regions in NATO where the Soviet Union might execute a lightning strike, seizing a large amount of territory before NATO is able to respond effectively. Presumably, the Soviets would face principally Greek and Turkish national forces in such a conflict, as it is questionable whether NATO could lift many reinforcements into the area on a timely basis. The assumption that an attack on the flank would come *only* as the result of an all-out attack on Europe generally must be examined. Considering the peculiar vulnerabilities of the Southern Flank, that assumption is highly questionable.

Policy Planning for the 1980s: Conclusions. Several steps should be taken to both modernize NATO doctrine and apply it to the broadened

demands that surely will surface in the 1980s.

1. *Retire the "Assured Destruction" Scenario.* The U.S. emphasis on this doctrine only serves to increase European tendencies to maximize deterrence (as they perceive it) while neglecting actual combat capabilities. The result was, however, to decrease the credibility of the deterrent. The strategy of "flexible response," though actually inflexible, served the Alliance adequately during a period when the only perceived threat to NATO was in the Central Region.

2. *Threat Perception.* Recent Soviet incursions into Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa signal much different types of threats to the Alliance in the coming decade. NATO must broaden its perception of threat to include areas that are outside the formal treaty zone, but of critical value to the Alliance, i.e., the Persian Gulf. The Alliance must also increase the range of contingencies for which it will have to generate Alliance support. There are some fairly tangible incentives for such support, specifically, the very great reliance of NATO on Persian Gulf oil and dependency on the African Continent for strategic minerals.

3. NATO must begin to develop new responses rather than focusing solely on the time-honored Fulda Gap views. These new options should include *credible* responses where NATO is weakest, not just where it is strongest.

4. The principle of unanimity, while politically preferable, should not be the absolute rule of procedure. Individual Alliance members most directly affected by a particular contingency should develop options in concert with each other. Although this strategy may initially create fissures in the Alliance, long-term security will be the result. In the long term, deterrence will be better served as the Soviet Union will not be able to play one member against another. The more absolute unanimity is stressed, the more likely the success of Soviet attempts to split the Alliance along lines of economic divergencies, for example. It should be remembered that the success of collective security depends in part on how effectively the concerns of the individual members are addressed. The 1966 French withdrawal from the NATO military structure is a case in point.

5. *Coupling and Uncoupling.* As already mentioned, the advent of strategic "parity" and mutual second-strike capability has reduced the value (to the Europeans) of coupling theater systems to the central systems. Flexible *strategic* response, however, would strengthen this relationship. Technology will allow selected employment options on the strategic level, while adhering to the collateral damage criteria established by the Alliance. Threats of escalation are credible only if there is a continuity of detailed options along the spectrum of responses.

6. *TNF Modernization.* While the 12 December 1979 TNF decision is a welcome event, several important issues peculiar to these systems were ignored because of either political or budgetary considerations.

NATO must be able to mobilize TNF during a crisis. Because some of these

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systems may be used early in any conflict, rapid release time is essential if these weapons are to be used to any effect. In particular, a more sensible mechanism for political consultation is of paramount importance. Even with a streamlined military release procedure, the final authorization will come from political authority. This is in contrast to Warsaw Pact procedures where such consultation is not required. As a result, the Soviets might exploit this to advance their own forces and, perhaps, preempt Alliance action. Improved Alliance measures in this area would not be provocative (as some have claimed) but, in fact, would remove a very significant element of "self deterrence."

For the above reasons, survivability of TNF becomes essential. Survivable forces would frustrate Soviet attempts to destroy these systems while the release-request sequence is in operation.

7. *Nonnuclear Weapons Technology.* As discussed earlier, increased R&D in the area of precision nonnuclear munitions would go far to bolster forward defense. Some (clearly not all) targets previously classified as nuclear may be serviced with precise high explosive nonnuclear munitions.

In sum, NATO must begin to reduce the gap between announced policy and actual capability. We have allowed that gap to widen, even as Soviet capabilities were dramatically increasing.

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Although it is not yet possible to define how the Soviets intend to use their new High Seas Fleet, Western naval planners must reexamine their understanding of the Soviet Navy—its goals, its missions, and its strategy. Earlier notions based on an earlier navy may no longer be pertinent. Fresh speculation is in order. This paper is such a speculation and finds that a swing role would be a realistic compromise between the Soviet desire for a blue-water navy on the one hand and the imperatives of their geographical position on the other.

THE SOVIET HIGH SEAS FLEET OF THE 1990s: DESIGN FOR A "SWING STRATEGY"?

by

J.S. Breemer

Introduction. As the Soviet Navy continues its transition from a coastal defense force to an offensive "blue-water" fleet, it is timely to contemplate how Soviet naval strategy might reflect the new range of capabilities that is now on the horizon. Two fundamental changes in Soviet fleet characteristics in particular warrant attention. The first is the trend toward much larger major surface combatants: frigates, destroyers, and cruisers.[1] The second is the rumored construction of a large-deck "conventional" aircraft carrier.[2] Having identified these two particular areas of change is not meant to imply the absence of other worrisome developments. The high-speed, deep-diving *Alfa*-class submarine, the *Trident*-size *Typhoon*-class SSBN, and the continuing modernization of the Soviet Naval Aviation's *Badger* force with the supersonic *Backfire* bomber are three other prominent instances of a progressively more potent naval opponent. The difference between those capabilities and the two areas of Soviet naval growth that are at the center of this essay is not one of different destructive potentials, but rather one of evolutionary versus revolutionary change. The *Backfire,* the *Alpha,* and the *Typhoon* embody, strictly speaking, qualitative improvements in the "traditional" elements in the Soviet Navy force structure. None are a radical departure from the kinds of Soviet naval forces that Western Fleets have encountered for two decades. Certainly, they will pose new and difficult problems some of which, such as the *Alpha's* speed capability, may elude a

satisfactory counter with existing anti-submarine warfare (ASW) technology. However, the fact, for example, that Soviet antiship missiles are getting faster and will be launched at greater srandoff ranges, or that Soviet submarines may exceed their Western counterparts in depth-keeping are not anomalies within the prevailing Western perception of Soviet naval strategy. The building of a "real" aircraft carrier and the across-the-board construction of larger surface warships are.

Put simply, the Soviets are now acquiring the tools to give effect to Admiral Gorshkov's order to the fleet in 1963 "to go to sea." Despite severe logistical shortcomings, a low operational tempo, and ships that were barely suited for long-distance deployments, the Soviets' *operational* gamble of "forward deployment" has paid off. It has bought them now the time and the practical experience to design a fleet with the capability to expand the meaning of "forward deployment" from its largely political-symbolic content to one with operational significance.

As the Soviet Union's peacetime hluewater navy evolves into a wartime bluewater fleet, naval planners must reassess some of the key concepts that have been at the foundarion of Western understanding of Soviet naval goals and missions. Notions that are brought into question include: the Soviet Fleet's "sea denial" role; its "single-salvo" capability, and its "zone defense" posture.[3] Instead, the possible strategic options, goals and missions of the Soviet Fleet in the 1990s ought probably to be contemplated in terms of the more traditional goal of a great naval power: maritime supremacy.

While it is certainly too early to attempt to define how the Soviet Union might use its "big navy" a decade hence, it is useful to begin to speculate on plausible alternative uses. The particular thesis that is advanced in this essay explores how a Soviet big navy could be employed to practice a "swing strategy" between the Soviet Union's main Pacific and Atlantic fleet areas. As a corollary, this essay suggests how such a fleet could help overcome the Soviet Navy's historical disadvantage in geography. Finally, it is speculated that the possession of a high seas fleet will give new impetus to the Soviet Navy's search for secure forward bases.

Soviet Surface Warship Construction Programs. According to Western news reports, four different "cruiser-size" ships are presently in different stages of construction in Soviet yards. The first unit of the 27,000-30,000-ton *Kirov*-class nuclear-powered "battle cruiser" has been undergoing sea trials in the Baltic Sea.[4] A second unit is under construction. Two other cruiser classes, one displacing about 7,000 tons and fitted with antiship missiles, and one of approximately 8,000 tons and equipped for ASW, are also being built in Baltic yards. In the Black Sea in the meantime a fourth, *Kara*-size unit, i.e., about 10,000 tons, is on the ways.

Evidence of the construction of a "conventional" aircraft carrier at the Severodvinsk yard remains sketchy. Increasingly, however, U.S. Navy spokesmen are stating their conviction that the Soviet Fleet will have at least one large-deck carrier with conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft by the end of the decade.

One Western expert on Soviet naval affairs, Michael MccGwire, has related the large sizes of the various ships under construction to the Soviet Union's redesignation of some of its surface combatants 3 years ago. MccGwire has speculated "four main sizes of ships": a battle cruiser size, a cruiser size of about 12,000 tons, a destroyer size of 8,000 tons, and an ocean escort or frigate size of about 4,000 tons.[5] If correct this would mean, for example, that the *Kara* and *Kresta I/II* classes, now the largest modern nonaviation ships in the Soviet

Fleet, would be treated as "destroyers." Granted that there exists no universal type classification scheme among the world's navies, there is a certain irony in the fact that while the U.S. Navy continues to "upgrade" its ships (e.g., from DDG-47 to CC-47), the Soviet Fleet might effectively go through a reverse process.

There has been a great deal of speculation on the meaning of the new Soviet shipbuilding programs. While the end goal may not be clear, there is a consensus that, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Brown, "the Soviets are interested in more than the defense of their periphery, ..."[6] The following pages speculate on a possible strategic design to match the Soviet Union's new range of naval capabilities. The basic thrust of this design would be to overcome what has traditionally been the key obstacle to the development of Russia/Soviet Union as a first-rate naval power: the country's adverse geographic position.

Geographic Adversity. Naval experts in both the West and in the Soviet Union agree that geographic circumstances continue to impose a most important constraint on the effective use of Soviet seapower. The lack of direct access to the open oceans, the huge distances that separate the country's main coastal areas, harsh climatological conditions, and the opponents' historical advantage in overseas bases, are a constant theme in Admiral Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State*. As far as Gorshkov is concerned, czarist failure to take these factors into account in doctrine, force planning and warship construction bore fruit dramatically in the disaster at Tsushima Strait in 1905.[7] While acknowledging that subsequently "influential Russians began to get a better understanding of the significance of the Navy in modern warfare," Gorshkov stresses the continued indifference of the "Czarist rulers" to *Russia's* naval needs. His complaints focus in particular on the priority of "national prestige" rather than "naval power," and the "servile imitating" of foreign ship designs rather than the building of ships tailored to Russia's geographic needs. Warships appropriate to Russia's geographic circumstances, according to Gorshkov, would have been designed to meet the requirements of "inter-theater maneuver of naval forces," and the "timely concentration of forces in the required theater." The possession of overseas bases and "suitably equipped sea routes" would have eased the design problem. Unfortunately, the admiral continues, the czars had been indifferent "to laying claim to the many islands and overseas territories which had been discovered by the Russians," a result, in turn, of the failure properly to understand naval power. The lack of bases being a *fait accompli*, Gorshkov says, the alternative would have been to build ships with a "long-range navigation capability." This, too, was not done with the result that Russia was left with several isolated fleets, each of which was usually weaker than that of the opponent that could concentrate his forces.[8]

Escape from geographic impediments has been a longstanding Soviet foreign policy objective. In World War II Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov explained to his Norwegian counterpart, Trygve Lie:

> . . . The Dardanelles . . . here we are locked . . . Oresund . . . here we are locked in. Only in the North is there an opening, but this war has shown that the supply line to Northern Russia can be cut or interfered with. This shall not be repeated in the future.[9]

Attempts by the Soviet Union to overcome the geographic fragmentation of its fleet and to secure open and safe access to the high seas have taken different forms. Technology, international law, the threat of military force, and political maneuvering have all been employed at various times and at different

places. On the technological front, three schemes have been pursued. The first one has been the construction of an extensive network of internal canals that link some of the principal rivers to the Black, Baltic and White Seas. Depth constraints permit the interfleet transfer of small vessels only, however. The evolution of Soviet Naval Aviation as a long-range bomber force has been a second application of technology to overcome fleet fragmentation. Aircraft can be redeployed rapidly among staging areas as the situation requires. The submarine, particularly if nuclear-powered, has been the third answer. Submarines stand a much better chance than surface ships to leave port undetected and reach the open sea where they may join up with units from other fleet areas.

On the legal front, the Soviets have made persistent efforts to interpret the international law of the sea in light of their goal of secure access to and free use of the seas, while limiting the access of foreign navies to Soviet regional seas. In the case of the Baltic Sea, for example, the principle of *mare clausum* has been invoked to exclude the navies of the noncontiguous nations. Similar claims have been made with regard to the Black Sea and the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan.[10] At the same time, the Soviets have sought strenuously to defuse territorial claims on narrow passages and straits through which their ships have to pass to the open seas.[11]

The threat of military force and political cajoling, alternating with offers of economic aid, has been used in a carrot and stick approach in the Soviet effort to detach Turkey from the Western alliance with the ultimate objective of political, if not outright physical, control over the Turkish Strait.

The need to concentrate forces runs like a continuing threat through Soviet military writings, whether at the operational-tactical or on the strategic level. The requirement for concentration of force is also a well-established principle of naval strategy. Naval strategists, at least since Mahan, have held that a large fleet that cannot be concentrated in time to do battle is intrinsically weak. The prerequisites for concentration include a favorable geographic position in relation to the theater of action, and high endurance. If the home country itself is located adversely, then forward bases must be secured.

At the present the Soviet Union lacks both. Major fleet components are separated by lines of communications thousands of nautical miles long that pass through or skirt the waters controlled by opponents and potential opponents. Access to the open oceans is via relatively narrow passages that are subject to constant surveillance and interdiction. In many respects then the Soviet Fleet, despite its impressive numbers, suffers from serious operational limitations. The fact that Soviet naval doctrine and exercises have emphasized operations in the contiguous sea may have been not so much a matter of choice, as one of necessity.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Fleet's first "global" exercises, *OKEANs* 70 and 75, took place at about the time that decisions on the procurement of battle cruiser and larger ships in general would have been made. While the Western press has focused on the command and control, and apparent mission-orientation of the two maneuvers, it is possible that the critical "lessons," as far as Gorshkov and his colleagues were concerned, were of a much more mundane character. Equipment deficiencies after a long voyage to the exercise areas, logistical difficulties, and crew weariness as the result of habitability standards not meant for long overseas deployments may have been the real "evidence" that Gorshkov and his colleagues looked for to justify "Phase IV" in the Soviet postwar naval building program.[12]

The Soviet naval leadership may well have resolved that the only way to

surmount the physical isolation of its two main fleet areas, i.e., the Northern and Pacific Fleets, is to shift shipbuilding priorities to endurance, survivability and defensive capabilities: in other words, to build a fleet that, even in time of protracted hostilities, is capable of a swing strategy between the main Atlantic and Pacific theaters.

Soviet Naval Force Design for a Swing Strategy. Under most foreseeable circumstances only two of the four Soviet main fleet areas can expect to have ready access to the open ocean in wartime: the Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula, and the Pacific Fleet headquartered on Vladivostok and the Kamchatka peninsula. Western military planners believe (as do presumably the Soviets) that the exits from the Baltic and Black Seas can be closed with relative ease.

Combined, the Northern and Pacific Fleets account for about 70 percent of the Soviet Navy's general-purpose submarine forces (including virtually all of the nuclear units), all but 6 percent of the SSB/SSBN force, and about 55 percent of the major surface combatants.[13] Moreover, major surface combatants assigned to the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets tend to be dominated by older units (i.e., over 25 years) and smaller displacement ships (e.g., the *Krivak*-class FFG). Finally, almost 70 percent of the Soviet Navy's large displacement service force is also associated with the Northern and Pacific Fleets.[14] In sum, it is reasonable to suppose that units caught or deliberately held back in the Baltic and Black Seas on D-day will remain there to provide local, nearshore defense. Any operations against mainstay Western forces on the open seas would primarily be the responsibility of the Soviet "Atlantic" and "Pacific" Fleets.

To date, Western observers have rated Soviet surface capabilities as the least worrisome of the Soviet naval triad of air, subsurface, and surface forces. Outside the range of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) strike bombers the Soviet surface navy as presently structured would probably be a marginal opponent. This means that it may effectively have to stand by helplessly until Western forces have approached to within the 1,500 to 2,000 nautical miles SNA combat radius. Even then the coordination between air and surface units at a distance of, say, 1,500 nautical miles would require that the latrer leave their ports several days ahead of the air units. While in transit the surface fleet would be under the constant threat of surprise attack by Western forces, including land-based aircraft. If it arrived safely in the intended encounter area, the margin for error in effecting the *rendezvous* with the SNA bombers would be extremely small. Errors in timing, navigation, faulty intelligence on the movement of Western forces, or a sudden deterioration in weather conditions could all contribute to failure, if not disaster. As a final note, Western naval campaign plans are unlikely to be scheduled to accommodate the availability of SNA bombers. Namely, it can reasonably be imagined that, just as Long Range Aviation (LRA) bombers might be called on to reinforce an SNA mission, similarly SNA bombers may be committed to higher priority land strikes.[15] In other words, the necessary SNA bombers may not always be there.

Admiral Gorshkov has argued strongly the importance of combining the operations of submarines and surface ships. Certainly, the Soviet submarine fleet on a unit-for-unit basis offers a very formidable capability. Again, however, there are likely to be severe problems in maximizing the coordinated effect of multiple surface and subsurface units. Not in the least, for example, is the difficulty of prompt, reliable, and secure communications among submarines and between the submarines and a surface strike force.

The Soviet problem of how to concentrate forces in a timely manner and in sufficient strength to stand up against Western, primarily U.S. Navy aircraft carrier groups, is not only an intertheater but also an intratheater problem. On the intratheater level the Soviet solution can be twofold: first, upgrade and "up-size" those surface combatants that would be at the heart of a surface battle group, and second, acquire seagoing tactical airpower, i.e., aircraft carriers. The first part of the solution would be aimed at improving fleet staying power and air defense capabilities. The second part would seek an escape from the fleet's dependence on land-based airpower.

The construction and operation of large warships and aircraft carriers plus the various supporting assets calls for a huge investment. Probably it would be neither affordable nor, for that matter, necessary for the Soviets to commit themselves to such an enterprise on the basis that the Northern and Pacific Fleets would have roughly equal priorities. Instead, a practical compromise is to build forces that could be "swung" between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters as the military situation dictates. In other words, one high seas fleet built around aircraft carriers, battle cruisers, and large cruisers and destroyers would be used either to augment surface forces within theater, to concentrate naval strength out-of-thearer, or to redeploy forces between rheaters.

In his book, Admiral Gorshkov devotes considerable attention to the "Problems of Balancing Navies." He stresses the dynamic nature of the balancing process, pointing out that force levels and force composition must be responsive to changes in "historical conditions."[16] There can be little doubt that the Soviet naval leadership has perceived both an absolute and relarive decline in Western, including U.S., naval strength. It would not have taken a content analysis of congressional testimony by U.S. Navy officials for the Soviets to conclude that the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct an intensive two-ocean war has become marginal. The debate within the U.S. Navy over the possible need to redeploy Pacific Third Fleet elements, primarily aircraft carriers, to support a NATO Atlantic campaign, may have helped convince the Soviets that the creation of a high seas swing force is both a practical and a low-risk strategy.[17]

A carrier-centered battle fleet used in a swing role would be a realistic compromise between Soviet desire for a long-range oceangoing navy on the one hand, and the imperatives of its unique geographical situation on rhe other. It would blend the global mission orientation of today's U.S. Navy with the hitherto regional mission primacy of the Soviet Fleet. A Soviet naval swing straregy would not denude the regional fleet areas in either the Pacific or the Atlantic from their potent naval defenses. Both the Northern and Pacific Fleets would retain "fleets in being" of more or less the same size and characteristics as exist today. It must be remembered that although Gorshkov himself may be convinced that the likelihood of major Western naval campaigns against both areas simultaneously is low, his counterparts on land may not. In order to secure their support for his high seas navy, Gorshkov may well have had to assure the generals that adequate regional naval strength would always be available to support the land forces.

The details of the debate within the Soviet military hierarchy that must have preceded the decision to build a big navy will not readily become known in the West. The products of this resolution are becoming visible, however: nuclear propulsion, large displacement hulls, sea-based aviation, and long-range afloat support. How these elements would mesh in a Soviet swing strategy is discussed next, as is the prospect for a

more determined Soviet forward basing strategy.

Elements of a Soviet Navy "Swing Strategy." Soviet naval writings are replete with references to the advantages of nuclear propulsion. The capabilities of the U.S. Navy's all-nuclear surface task groups, for example, have been described with grudging respect.

The installation of nuclear propulsion plants on the Soviet Navy's larger ships such as "battle cruisers" and CTOL aircraft carriers is not only sensible from an efficiency point of view, but also makes it easier to provide adequate logistical support to the smaller oil-fired warships. Nuclear propulsion of capital ships would help ease the problem that the Soviets have apparently encountered in scheduling frequent at-sea fuel replenishments. Today, for example, it is still common to see Soviet warships at anchor for days while awaiting the arrival of tankers. While the resultant degradation in readiness may be acceptable in peacetime, it is not in time of war.[18]

Nuclear propulsion for the larger combatants would reduce the Soviet Navy's fleetwide requirements for underway support, although already in this area the Soviet Navy has made very significant strides. Until recently, its underway tankers were of modest size compared with U.S. Navy oilers. The appearance in 1978 of the lead unit in a series of at least four *Berezina*-class ships has changed this trend. The ship is comparable in most respects with the U.S. Navy's largest replenishment ship, the *Wichita* class. The authoritative 1980/81 edition of *Combat Fleets of the World* summed up its description of the *Berezina* as marking "the maturation of Soviet naval logistics at sea."[19]

The building of four *Berezina*-class units underscores the report by *Jane's Fighting Ships* that Soviet large-deck carrier plans include possibly four units.[20] The possible composition of a Soviet carrier battle group might therefore be as follows:

- one 75,000-ton nuclear carrier
- one 27,000-32,000-ton nuclear battle cruiser
- two 12,500-ton *Kara* follow-on strike warfare/surface warfare cuisers
- two 7,800-ton multipurpose cruiser/destroyers
- one *Berezina*-class fleet replenishment ship.

A potent sea-based aviation component would be essential to the feasibility of a Soviet naval swing strategy. Long-range antiship missiles present a formidable threat to the U.S. carrier navy; however, given a state of war, carrier aviation has a distinct advantage in terms of striking radius, reattack capability, and weapon delivery accuracy at long ranges. If the whereabouts of a Soviet missile-only strike force is known, Western carriers could simply stay out of range while their aircraft go about attacking the force.

The Soviet carrier building program will create the means for a Soviet swing force to bring along its own long-range air defense umbrella—a need long recognized by Gorshkov as is clear from his criticism of the lack of "balance" in the Soviet Union's pre-World War II naval building program. He says:

> The program for building a large ocean-going Navy, adopted in 1938, called for the building of major gunnery ships capable of engaging in single combat with a strong enemy on the high seas. The questions of balancing the naval forces as applied to the new condirions were nor properly resolved either in theory or in naval construction practice . . . the high combat capabilities of aircraft as attack factors in naval warfare were not given sufficient considerations. At the same time, Soviet military theory, being oriented toward surface ships, was unable to

justify the need to have in its ocean-going naval inventory aircraft carriers capable of providing cover for ships beyond the range of the shore-based fighter aircraft. As a result, one could not count on success in ship operations in the relatively distant areas of the sea, much less in zones controlled by enemy aircraft . . . . Thus, the ocean-going Navy that was being built actually could operate only in its own coastal areas . . . . [21]

Implications For Soviet Naval Forward Basing. A Soviet swing strategy would levy a heavy requirement for logistical support. The longer the voyage, which in the case of a transfer between the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean via the Cape of Good Hope would involve about 17,000 nautical miles, the greater the need for fuel, ammunition, spares, and repair assets. There are two alternatives: forward bases or afloat support. Thus far the Soviet Navy has relied primarily on the latter while taking advantage of the country's large merchant marine tanker fleet. As mentioned, important improvements in Soviet afloat support are presently underway.

The reason that the Soviet Navy has not availed itself of overseas bases may have to do less with Gorshkov's claim that "The USSR, in conducting a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy, does not aspire to any such acquisition," than with lack of opportunity.[22] Reportedly Admiral Sergeyev, the Chief of Naval Staff, told a Western naval attache in 1973 that his greatest problem as a result of the move to forward deployment was the lack of bases.[23]

What have been termed Soviet naval "bases" in the Western press have actually been ports of privileged access. Generally, facilities and services available to Soviet warships have been limited to fuel, water, minor repairs, and "rest and recreation" for crews. According to President Sadat, even at the time of large-scale Soviet involvement in his country, Soviet port privileges at Alexandria and Mersa Matruh were never extended to permanent shore installations. Instead, the Soviets were allowed to maintain depots for reserve stocks, storage, and spare parts.[24] By no stretch of the imagination can Soviet naval facilities in such ports as Aden in South Yemen, Latakia in Syria, or formerly Berbera in Somalia be compared with the huge U.S. Navy operating bases in Subic Bay or Yokosuka.

One can fairly guess at the reasons why the Soviet Navy has thus far apparently been satisfied with its frequently quite tenuous and temporary arrangements for fleet support on foreign shores. The stigma of "imperialism" that is associated with "foreign bases" is probably one reason. Not only the Soviet Union itself carefully attempts to avoid this label, but the potential grantors of base rights, too, i.e., mostly the developing nations, strive assiduously not to become known as "imperialist pawns" before the rest of the nonaligned world. There are also military reasons. A forward naval base has little value if the user-fleet cannot protect it and its lines of communications back to the home country. Because the ultimate reason for a forward base is to strengthen a navy's ability to concentrate forces in a critical area in a timely manner, access to and from the base must be secure during hostilities. To date, the Soviet Navy has not possessed the wherewithal to gain and maintain sea control over wide expanses of the world's oceans. What forward bases it might have acquired would have been isolated as soon as hostilities started. In the event, the fate of such bases and of the Soviet warships that might be there at the time would probably resemble that of the German colonial ports at the outbreak of World War I. Most

important, until the Soviet Union can convince a host country that it is capable of defending the base and the host country, the latter is not likely to accede to the Soviet request and thereby risk its own security in the event of war.

The Soviet high seas fleet of the 1990s will probably have an important influence on future Soviet forward basing strategy. Even though the Soviet Navy's long-range support afloat capabilities are growing commensurately with the expansion of its war potential, there will be an acute need for a secure overseas basing network. In particular, there is likely to be a strategic demand for at least one operating base to serve as a hinge for operations between the Cape of Good Hope and the Malacca Strait. If the Soviets anticipate the Indian Ocean to be a potential theater of hostilities, a long-term deployment and logistical support of a high seas fleet based on Far Eastern or North Atlantic ports would be very difficult to sustain. Wear and tear on people and machinery alone would reduce combat effectiveness in important ways.

It remains to be seen whether the Soviet Navy's use of the former U.S. base at Cam Ranh Bay will be the rudiment of its first legitimate forward operating base. From a geostrategic perspective, other desirable locations are the islands in the Seychelles and Mauritius.

Bases do not translate into more ships; however, fleets and forward bases are mutually reinforcing elements in the seapower equation. The Soviet high seas fleet of the 1990s will give the Soviet Union the material means (and motivation) to secure an overseas network of bases. The possession of those bases will enhance, in turn, the flexibility and effective strength of the fleet.

Conclusion. As stated earlier, the existence of a Soviet strategic design to use a high seas fleet in a swing role is speculative. It is a "model" that seems to match the kinds of ships that the Soviet Navy is acquiring today and that moreover suggests a practical solution to the Soviet Union's longstanding geographic problem. In conclusion, the following excerpt from Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State* is appropriate to recall:

> Establishing the conditions for gaining sea control has always required lengthy periods of time and the execution of a series of measures while still at peace.[25]

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. At least four different classes of cruisers are under construction, a 27,000-30,000-ron nuclear-powered "battle cruiser" and three other classes displacing about 7,600 to 12,000 rons. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Prinr. Off., 29 January 1980), p. 103.

2. Reportedly displacing between 50,000 and 75,000 tons and nuclear-powered, at least one unit is supposedly under construction at the Severodvinsk yard on the Whire Sea. See, for example, *The Washington Post*, 14 August 1980, p. A34.

3. A critique of rhose concepts is contained in my essay "Rethinking the Soviet Navy" in *Naval War College Review*, January-February 1981, pp. 4-12.

4. L. Edgar Prina, "Defense Spending Increase Includes Big Shipbuilding Hike," *Sea Power*, July 1980, p. 39.

5. Michael A. McGwire, "A New Trend in Soviet Naval Development," *Naval War College Review*, July-August 1980, pp. 3-12.

6. *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981*, p. 38.

7. S.G. Gorshkov, *Sea Power of the State* (Morskaya Moshch' Gosudarstva) (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1976), pp. 109-115.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 115-116.

9. Quoted in Trygve Lie, *Hjemover* (Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1958). Cited in Phillip A. Karber and Jon L. Lellenberg, "The State and Future of U.S. Naval Forces in the North Atlantic," Christopher Bertram and Johan Jorgen Holst, eds., *New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic* (Oslo: Universitets Forlaget, 1977), pp. 37-38.

10. William E. Butler, *The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 116-133.

11. Robert L. Friedheim and Mary E. Jehn, "The Soviet Position at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference," in Michael McGwire, et al., eds., *Soviet Naval Policy Objectives and Constraints* (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 341-362.

12. The term "Phase IV" is used in a report by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to denote the introduction of new platforms and weapons such as the *Backfire, Kiev*, a possible CTOL carrier, and the nuclear-powered "battle cruiser." The CBO report characterizes Soviet "Phase IV" naval missions as "SSBN Protection, Small War, and Naval Presence Missions," *Shaping the General Purpose Navy of the Eighties: Issues for Fiscal Years 1981-1985* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., January 1980), pp. 27-32.

13. John Moore, *Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80* (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1979), p. 500.

14. *Ibid.*

15. That the Soviets are at least contemplating using SNA *Backfires* in land strike missions is suggested by a series of photographs in the 14 July 1980 issue of *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, pp. 18-19. The pictures show the *Backfire B* in SNA colors carrying a single AS-4 missile. According to the caption, the dielectric plate on the nose of the AS-4 is a sign that the missile is not equipped with a homing type of guidance for antiship missions but has an inertial system intended for strikes against shore installations.

16. Gorshkov, p. 324.

17. A discussion of this option is contained in the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas, *Securing the Seas—The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 210-211.

18. One author hypothesized that fuel conservation and reduced wear and tear of propulsion plants are probably the reason for the low tempo of Soviet warship deployments. He notes that in 1975, for example, Soviet combatants in the Mediterranean Sea spent 80 percent of their deployment time in port or at anchor. Also when underway, transit times rarely exceed 12 knots whereas those for U.S. Navy ships are usually over 15 knots. Charles C. Petersen, "Trends in Soviet Naval Operations," in Bradfore Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 47.

19. Jean Labayle Couhat, ed., *Combat Fleets of the World 1980/81: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980), p. 598.

20. Cited in *The Washington Star*, 14 August 1980, p. A7.

21. Gorshkov, p. 348.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 226.

23. Cited in Michael McGwire, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," Congressional Research Service, *Soviet Oceans Development* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), p. 146.

24. *The New York Times*, 22 April 1974, p. 7.

25. Gorshkov, p. 297.

In military history, land conflicts progressed to use of the sea and then of the air as requisite technology became available. We are now at another frontier for the application of military power—space. But as the authors here point out, space is a place, not a mission. They call for an American space policy that requires new vision, an appropriate organizational structure, and adequate program funding. Alternative approaches are recognized and discussed and positive recommendations are made.

2001: A U.S. SPACE FORCE

by

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Introduction. By the year 2001, space activity for both peaceful and military purposes will increase significantly, with signal importance for continued international stability. As U.S. and Soviet activities in space continue to increase, the possibility for competition and conflict will almost certainly arise. Although we would prefer to shape the world into a place of mutual cooperation and good will, the present international environment continues to be dominated by superpower rivalry and suspicion; "détente" has been expunged from the lexicon of official policymakers on both sides. Competition is an inevitable outgrowth of the incompatible political, moral and economic values espoused by the United States and the Soviet Union. The scope and intensity of this antagonistic rivalry has ebbed and flowed for more than three decades, but it would appear that for the foreseeable future the prospects for alleviating the competitiveness of the relationship are not particularly optimistic. This competition is likely to intensify in many areas and to be extended into new areas, with direct and serious military and political consequences.

Nowhere are the prospects for conflict so intrinsically dangerous to future global security than in Soviet initiatives in space. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Robert J. Hermann recently remarked that, "the 1980s are surely going to be characterized by continued intense competition and confrontation between ourselves and the Soviet Union. That competition and confrontation is likely to be more open, more visible and potentially more reckless."[1] This competition has already begun in space, and the United States must decide now what its space policy will be in face of a clear and present danger. Because the Soviets have assuredly decided to compete in a determined way, we

cannot afford the consequences of muddling through in a struggle that could spell disaster.

As a result of the prospects for continued competition between the superpowers, particularly in the military sphere, the United States must decide what should be its military role in space. This article examines this issue from the following perspectives: What policy options are open to the United States? What factors should be addressed in considering these options? And finally, what course of action will best serve the long-range security interests of the United States?

Relevant Factors. U.S. National Objectives. The security and well-being of the United States in the next century will depend increasingly on the uninhibited use of space for the collection of environmental data, communications relay, weather monitoring, safe navigation and transportation, and the efficient use of resources and energy. In addition, the surveillance, detection, and warning of impending attacks on our homeland require the use of space-based systems. According to former Secretary of the Air Force, Hans M. Mark, "There is no question whatsoever in my mind that space operations will take on an ever-increasing importance in maintaining our national security. Communications, surveillance, indications and warning and weather observations will depend more on space operations than they do now."[2] The denial of our ability to operate freely in space could threaten our continued growth and advancement, and indeed, our very survival as a nation.

In addressing this critical national issue, *Air Force Military Space Doctrine* (AFM 1-6) states: "As national use of space increases, protection of our resources will become more important. This growing importance of space operations introduces the possibility of space-to-space and space-to-earth warfare."[3] An interpretation of this reference to "space-to-space and space-to-earth warfare" is not provided, nor is there any indication of how it might be conducted. Instead, the *Space Doctrine Manual* goes on to say that "the United States intends *to deter the introduction* of offensive military capabilities into space by whatever means are appropriate. *To hedge* against failure, it is in our national interests to develop the means to conclude any military conflict in or from space on favorable terms." This statement leaves considerable room for interpretation, ranging from negotiated international agreements to the pursuit of U.S. military superiority in space.

The Soviet Challenge. For the past 20 years the Soviet Union has pursued an unrelenting effort to surpass the United States in every area of military capability. The Soviets have outproduced the United States in land and air forces. They now have 173 active army divisions to our 16; they have over 50,000 tanks to our 10,900; they have some 5,000 Air Force tactical aircraft to our 3,700.[4] While increasing the numerical gap, the Soviet Union has also significantly improved the quality of its weapons to the point that "they are a bit behind us in some areas, but are moving fast in every area."[5]

The Soviets have 289 major combat surface ships to our 173.[6] They have moved from a coastal defense force in 1960 to a blue-water navy having global strike capabilities in 1980. Only in the key category of aircraft carriers does the United States remain superior. In Theater Nuclear Forces, the Soviets have a 3.1 to 1 overall advantage in arriving warheads if *Poseidon* warheads are not included on the U.S. side.[7]

In Strategic Nuclear Forces the Soviets now have 1,398 ICBMs, 1,003 SLBMs and 156 long-range bombers to the United States' 1,054 ICBMs, 656 SLBMs and 338 bombers.[8] Whether the

Soviet Union now has or will soon achieve nuclear superiority over the United States is the subject of current debate, but the trend is patently clear—the Soviets have continued to increase both the quantity and quality of their weapons after the United States remained relatively constant.

In space systems, although less noticed and discussed, the Soviets have also pursued an aggressive development effort. Last year alone they launched ten times more payloads into orbit than did the United States. Many of these were military satellites, including a number of manned flights. Although the United States has had some spectacular successes with unmanned planetary probes, including the recent *Voyager* flyby of Saturn, no American has flown in space since 1975.[9] Clearly, the Soviets are not ignoring this new arena for military competition.

There are at least two reasons to believe that the Soviet space programs have direct military application. The first, and certainly the most important reason, is that the Soviet policymakers have no other option in pursuing a space program. There is only one agency within the Soviet Union that has the requisite human and organizational structure to exploit the space medium—the Strategic Rocket Force. It has a monopoly on all the human and technical resources required to support Soviet activities in space.

This situation is the result of at least two decades of Politburo policies to make available to the Soviet Armed Forces the men, material and money needed to build a military power that could favorably compete with the United States. Therefore, it is Defense Minister Ustinov and Marshal Ogarkov who are primarily responsible for Soviet space efforts. The Politburo has neither the flexibility nor the desire to change this fact of Soviet bureaucratic life. It follows that the Soviet Military Establishment can hardly be expected to undertake major Soviet space initiatives of a wholly scientific nature out of a spirit of altruism. To believe that the Soviet General Staff would not seek to maximize military applications of space technology is dangerously naive. They will do so as a matter of policy; indeed, it is an inherent result of their organizational process and single-minded focus on a superior military capability. This fact cannot be overstated; it is a critical factor for American policymakers to consider whenever they review Soviet space initiatives.

The second reason the Soviet activities in space should be a cause for grave military concern is the scope and intensity of Soviet research and development; operational testing; and the deployment of space support, defense and force enhancement systems. The character of these Soviet initiatives presents a major challenge to U.S. leadership in space. In fact, unless the U.S. military space program is substantially energized it is likely that the dynamics of ongoing Soviet investment will consign the United States to a position of second place that will be difficult to reverse.

No one in the West knows for certain just how much the Soviet Union is willing to spend for space exploration. If defense spending trends for the last decade are extended for space, Soviet spending will be significantly greater than U.S. investment. Current Soviet defense spending exceeds that of the United States by more than 50 percent and is growing by 3 percent each year.[10] In the field of high-energy lasers, the Soviets outspend the United States by three to five times.[11]

The Soviet Union relies heavily on space systems for many of the same purposes that the United States does. They have weather, navigation, communications, early warning and reconnaissance satellites in both near earth and geosynchronous orbit. These systems play important reconnaissance roles and greatly assist Soviet military

commanders for near real-time surveillance as well as for providing over-the-horizon targeting data.

The Soviets also have experimented with offensive strategic systems in space.[12] One such example was their experiment with fractional orbital bombardment systems that was terminated after ratification of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. However, the Soviets have actively pursued other space programs that could promote a strategic advantage. They have an operational antisatellite program (ASAT) that threatens U.S. satellites upon which we depend for surveillance and attack warning.[13] Although the Soviet ASATs are presently restricted to near earth orbit capabilities, our own ASAT system is still on the drawing board and even under the most optimistic circumstances will not be operational before 1985.[14] It is expected that the Soviet ASAT system will have appreciably matured by that time.

Although it is extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions based on rudimentary evidence of their space development activities, such an assessment is indeed necessary if we are to avoid a technological surprise. By the time Soviet intentions become convincingly obvious to U.S. observers, it will be too late to recover strategic parity. The Soviet Union is likely to exploit the situation to achieve long-sought political and military advantages over the United States. In assessing military intentions, *Air Force Magazine* suggests that "The Soviet Union, unencumbered by moralistic views about the peaceful and humanitarian character of the cosmos, treats space as a predominantly military high ground that needs to be seized and exploited by its armed forces."[15]

One possible high payoff area for the Soviets to pursue is the development of a large space-based laser system that could destroy ballistic missiles and strategic bombers on their way toward enemy targets. Such a system, if operationally deployed, could dramatically upset the delicate strategic balance of offensive nuclear weapons that has characterized the U.S.-Soviet military relationship for the past two decades. According to Senator Malcolm Wallop, the placement of a single high-energy laser in space would permit the Soviet Union to disable U.S. space satellites without warning. With only four laser battle stations in space, the Soviets could "shoot down our entire fleet of high altitude bombers—B-52s, FB-111s and most KC-135 tankers."[16] Senator Wallop suggests that Russian space-based lasers could prevent U.S. flight tests of any missile, or the placing of U.S. payloads in orbit.[17] Thus, the Soviets could permanently freeze the United States out of space and prevent us from reestablishing the strategic nuclear balance.

Evidence of Soviet intentions to exploit operationally the strategic advantage of space-based weapons is contained in several seemingly unrelated Soviet developmental activities. These activities include Soviet experimentation with directed energy weapons, their extensive manned space station activities, their development of large space boosters and reusable orbiting vehicle, and their concentration on improving space power generation capabilities.

Soviet experimentation with directed energy weapons, both high-energy lasers and charged particle beams, has been suspected for some time. According to retired Maj. Gen. George J. Keegan, former head of U.S. Air Force intelligence activities, the Soviet Union has conducted intensive and costly research for at least 10 years to develop an operational charged particle beam capable of destroying enemy missile warheads and orbiting satellites.[18] In July 1980 *Aviation Week* reported, "From a variety of sources the U.S. has discovered a massive Soviet effort to

develop and deploy directed-energy weapons—both high-energy lasers and charged particle beams. There is evidence the Soviets already may have issued orders to design bureaus to begin prototyping the electron-beam device at Saryshagan."[19] In addition, "U.S. intelligence estimates have concluded that the U.S.S.R. is moving at a pace that could permit it to place high-energy lasers in space between 1984 and 1986."[20] The United States is more than 10 years away from having a similar capability if current development schedules and funding levels are adhered to.[21]

Another area of active Soviet military space activity is the development of manned space platforms. In 1971 the Soviets launched an experimental manned space station called *Salyut-1*, 3 years prior to the first U.S. experimental *Skylab* spacecraft.[22] Since that time, they have had over 25 manned orbital missions, one of which set a new 185-day endurance record. This is contrasted with the U.S. endurance record of 84 days set in 1974.[23] Thus, the Soviets continue to make steady progress toward establishing a permanently manned space station in orbit.

According to *Aviation Week* there is srrong evidence to suggest that the "Soviet Union is developing a 220,000-lb. military/scientific space station to be manned permanently in earth orbit by about 12 cosmonauts." "Military objectives are expected to dominate the multidisciplinary station and could include . . . the first large-scale development of space-based, directed-energy weapons."[24]

In order to launch their large space platforms into orbit, the Soviets have been working on a 10-14 million lb. thrust booster.[25] This huge spacecraft booster can be compared with the 7.5 million lb. lift-off thrust of the U.S. *Saturn 5* vehicle that propelled U.S. astronauts to the moon. Current work on the giant new Soviet booster could result in a launch attempt as early as 1983. A space station launch could occur in 1985 if all goes well for the Russians. Although the U.S. Space Shuttle will provide easier and less expensive access to space, nothing approaching the scale of Soviet space activity is planned for the United States. The large booster developments will permit the Russians to maintain their important lead in long duration manned space flight.[26]

At the same time that Soviet booster development is dramatically improving, so is Soviet space electrical power generation capabilities primarily as a result of continued nuclear reactor progress. "Loss of the Cosmos 954 reactor-powered spacecraft over Canada . . . has not slowed the Soviet reactor program."[27] Soviet nuclear reactor developments in space could have important consequences for the advancement of spaceborne high-energy laser devices that employ nuclear power sources.

The implementation of large booster payloads, leading to manned space stations with large intrinsic electrical power capabilities, leads us full circle to the laser battle station concept alluded to earlier. While we cannot be certain of Soviet intentions, and one might be guilty of ascribing to them goals that are not in their farsighted policies, Soviet developments, capabilities and centrally directed programs suggest that to ignore these possibilities would abrogate our responsibility to insure adequately the security of the United States and our allies.

Technology. An awareness of intensified Soviet efforts to develop and deploy a directed-energy weapon in space that could alter the strategic nuclear equation has not been lost on U.S. policymakers. Despite the controversy surrounding the development of directed-energy weapons, Department of Defense and Congressional officials have stated that high-energy

laser weapons will become a reality. Current debate centers around how soon such a system could be placed in space and at what cost.[28]

There is some sentiment suggesting that the Defense Department is studying the concept to death and that a firm commitment should be made to accelerate the U.S. effort to head off the possibility of a Soviet surprise. In addition to the immense political implications the Soviet announcement of an operational space-based laser platform would have, proliferation of the system could force the United States into making unfavorable military concessions.

Because of the greatly increased size and complexity of today's strategic systems, moving a new concept from the laboratory to the field takes increasingly more time and effort. Given the experience, the momentum, the technical work force, and the military production capability of the Soviet space effort, it will be extremely difficult for the United States to match the Soviet accomplishment even if a "crash effort" program is begun now.

A typical U.S. weapon system development program, such as the MX missile, B-1 bomber, or *Trident* submarine, takes about 15 years from concept formulation to production. Little is known about how much the time could be reduced if a crash effort is initiated that reduces red tape, provides unlimited funds and proceeds concurrently with all segments. The atomic bomb's Manhattan Project and the *Polaris* ballistic missile submarine, which were both considerably simpler systems than a space-based laser system, took approximately 4 years to develop. The United States has not succeeded in matching those schedules for a major weapon system for the last 20 years. Thus, the size, cost, complexity, and technological difficulties militate against a sudden reversal of the development trends that have already been set in the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Agreements. America's military activities in space are partially circumscribed by a myriad of international agreements and treaties. The three that have the most immediate influence on military space programs are the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. Several other international conventions impinge on space activities, but are very specific or highly technical in nature and do not inhibit the military role of space to the same degree as the three major treaties cited.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty does not appear to influence the military space initiatives of the two superpowers to any great degree. Its major provision enjoined the signatories from carrying out nuclear weapons test explosions, or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, under water or in outer space.[29] The phrase "any other nuclear explosion" includes explosions for peaceful purposes.[30] The provisions of this program would foreclose, however, an antisatellite system that used nuclear explosions. It would also foreclose an exoatmospheric or atmospheric ballistic missile defense system that used a nuclear explosion as a kill device. This injunction might pose a restriction on superpower space plans; however, these plans are more restricted by the provisions of the ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty permits both the United States and the U.S.S.R. to have one limited ABM System to prorect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. There are precise limits imposed on the number of interceptors and launchers that may be deployed, and the characteristics of radars permitted. In addition, to avert the strategic consequence of a technological breakthrough, the ABM treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of ABM systems or components that are sea-

based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.[31] The majot intent of the ABM Treaty was to promote strategic stability by making both superpowers inherently vulnerable to a ballistic missile attack by each other.

At the time of its signing there were few who saw the likelihood of effective national ballistic missile defense. However, there is growing evidence that this one time certainty is becoming increasingly suspect.[32] In fact, Soviet and U.S. ABM research and development funding has continued to grow, with Soviet initiatives exceeding those of the United States. Presently the U.S. Army has the responsibility for the ballistic missile defense efforts for America. The Army is working on both a low-altitude system that could use a nuclear warhead detonation as the kill mechanism as well as an exoatmospheric system still in the concept definition stage.[33]

General Keegan and others point to Soviet initiatives in particle beam research and lasers to suggest that our primary adversary is considering using the exoatmosphere for ballistic missile defense.[34] The deployment of any ABM system with national defense capabilities would be in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, there is a strong likelihood that the most efficient environment to use these types of systems might be in space. Indeed, this is a major reason to suggest that this will eventually take place.

The Outer Space Treaty, signed by mote than 100 nations, contains two provisions that significantly restrict military activities in space. First, it enjoins the contracting parties from placing in orbit around the earth, or installing on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing in outer space *nuclear* or any other *weapons of mass destruction.* Second, it limits the use of the moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and forbids the establishment of military bases, installations, fortifications, and weapons testing on celestial bodies.[35] It makes no provision for verification, and any party to the treaty may withdraw 1 year after giving written notification.

The implication of these Outer Space Treaty provisions for the possible enlargement of either U.S. or Soviet military space activities is obvious if the terms of this agreement are to be complied with. The interpretation of exactly what constitutes a *weapon of mass destruction* will certainly come to dominate the future military space debate. High-energy lasers or other directed-energy weapons could be construed as such systems. However, the potential for selective and controlled use of high-energy laser weapons suggests that they cannot be easily included in any definition of indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological. In his analysis of the coercive capabilities of high-energy lasers, Beane observes that "It is a clean, discriminating weapon, not one of mass destruction. . . . Because the laser is unique, it can be used in unique ways."[36] In his comprehensive look at the legal implications of directed-energy weapons, Fessler says, "There is little consensus in either academic or political circles as to precisely what is meant in the use of the language *any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.*"[37]

The suggestion that international space treaties can serve as an effective impediment to the introduction of strategic defensive weapons in space is contradicted by the following arguments. First, included within each of the three major treaties that most directly affect military applications in space are articles for either amendment or termination. Article IV of the Limited Test Ban Treaty permits any of the signatories to withdraw after 3 months' advance notice.[38] The ABM Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union provides for amendments and allows each party to withdraw after 6 months' advance notice if it decides its

supreme interests are jeopardized.[39] Article XVI of the Outer Space Treaty provides for unilateral withdrawal from its provisions 1 year after notification of intent.[40] Thus, space treaty provisions give the United States no more than 1 year to recover from the announcement of Soviet intentions to deploy military systems in space that fall outside the confines of international agreements.

Second, as evidenced by recent Soviet actions, they may choose to violate the provisions of the space treaties without notification or explanation. Clarence Robinson points out the following Soviet record: (1) The Soviets have tested an air defense system in an antiballistic missile mode that is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty; (2) During recent war games, the Soviets exercised a 2-5 day reload procedure for the SS-18 heavy ICBM in violation of the SALT accord; (3) Tests of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile used encrypted telemetry that is also a violation of SALT provisions; (4) A new Soviet air-launched cruise missile was tested from the *Backfire* bomber with a missile range greater than 600 km, the maximum distance permitted by the unratified SALT 2 agreement; (5) the SS-18 is clearly designed to carry 12-14 reentry vehicles, not the 10 limited by SALT 2.[41] One arms control expert concluded, "With the deployment of the flat twin movable ABM radar system, the new missiles tested against RVs (reentry vehicles) and the battle management radar around Moscow, the Soviets are building toward a capability to break out of the ABM agreement with a clear-cut capability and leave the U.S. behind."[42] There appears to be little doubt that the Russians do not feel obliged or constrained by the provisions of military arms agreements when they can see distinct advantages accruing from their violation or abrogation.

Space Policy Alternatives. There are at least four major space policy alternatives that the United States could pursue in meeting the Soviet challenge. First, we could choose to ignore Soviet space activities and conserve defense resources for other priorities. Second, we could seek to dampen the pace of Soviet military developments in space through treaties. Third, we could focus our efforts on research and development programs as a hedge against a Soviet technological surprise. Finally, we could choose to exploit the medium of space to our own advantage, thus seizing the high ground before the Soviets do. The following discussion examines the implications of these space policy alternatives for U.S. security interests.

Option 1: Do Nothing. The option to do nothing in space does not have strong or broadly based support in the United States. However, there is a vocal minority that advocates the reduction or elimination of our military activites in space. This opposition is a byproduct of the political activism of a host of single issue pressure groups whose programs cut across environmental, arms control and minority rights issues. Those who argue for no U.S. involvement in space are concerned primarily about the possible fouling of another environmental medium, or that the space resource investments could be better spent on earth, ministering to societal ills. Counterarguments based on the needs of national security fail to impress these "true believers" because of the zealousness of their convictions and disbelief of a Soviet threat. Although sincere in their beliefs, antispace lobbies often display an unfortunate naiveté about the factual aspects of space exploration, the false simplicity of transferring funds from the space program to cures for societal ills, and the nature of Communist purpose.

Fortunately, there are very few who argue for absolutely no U.S. activities in space. However, whenever military space applications are considered, this

small coterie of negativists are often joined by peace groups and arms control spokesmen who insist that the United States must demonstrate unilateral restraint.[43] Many liberal political leaders suggest that if the United States would only demonstrate unilateral military restraint, then surely our major adversary will see the wisdom in that policy and follow suit. Unfortunately, the Soviet record does not support this view.[44] The evidence is diametrically opposed and the dangers of following such a program would constitute an abrogation of our obligation to provide for the common defense.

The general strategy of the "do nothing" school of thought is one of delaying, stretching out, continually questioning and carping, in order to stall critical programs. *Air Force Magazine* referred to the advocates of this policy as "fuzzy thinkers."[45] While this criticism of their intellectual capability appears harsh, it certainly could be ascribed to their policy recommendations.

Option 2: Negotiate. For the two decades that the United States has been actively involved in the space age, administrations have attempted to define U.S. military space objectives and to develop strategies to attain them. Unfortunately, the clarity of our stated policies and the emphasis placed on reaching our objectives have ebbed and flowed with successive administrations. Some have tackled the issue with vision and ambition, witness the *Apollo* program; others have tended to founder in indecision, witness the *Dyna Soar,* MOL and Space Shuttle programs. A common thread throughout the two decades, however, has been the determination to resolve diplomatically, through international conventions and agreements, the problems associated with extending military conflict into space. In fact, there are at least seven major multilateral treaties and numerous U.N. documents that govern everything from the exploration of celestial bodies to the rescue of astronauts in distress.[46]

The Carter administration was deeply committed to a continuation of these efforts. The desire to negotiate agreements on the peaceful use of space was the linchpin of the Carter space policy.[47] The risks and costs of this approach in terms of Soviet advances and lagging U.S. efforts are profoundly disadvantageous to American security. Examples of this approach include the Moon Treaty, a relatively innocuous document governing the exploration of outer space, but one that could have adverse implications for American access to the resources of space.[48]

While pursuing this diplomatic approach to defense, the last administration favored an agreement to preclude antisatellite and other offensive military weapons in space. This initiative continues the mind set of being permanently on the defensive. Endemic to our conventional and strategic nuclear policy, this defensive approach also underlies our space programs. It is still too early to determine which direction the Reagan administration will take as far as negotiating a solution to space defense is concerned.

The New York Times has characterized our current space program as being dominated by the single goal of developing the Space Shuttle.[49] Even that goal appears to be hampered now by "NASA's putative nonchalance about schedules and operational aspects, (which) threatens to turn this program into a management nightmare."[50] Another expression of this malaise was expressed in a 1978 policy statement that spoke of space as a place to work, and of a space program that should be modest and balanced. According to the White House, "It is neither feasible nor necessary at this time to commit the United States to a high challenge space engineering initiative comparable to Apollo."[51]

An even clearer appreciation of the Carter policy can be gained from former Secretary Brown's Annual Report for FY 81. Our security interest in space is covered by the single statement: "More generally, our economic well-being and security depend on expanding world trade, freedom of the arteries of commerce at sea and in the air, and increasingly on the peaceful and unhindered uses of space."[52] As far as directed energy technology (lasers and particle beams) is concerned, our stated policy is "to concentrate our efforts on identifying the scientific and engineering uncertainties associated with this technology, determining means for their resolution, and determining the feasiblity and utility of directed energy weapons."[53] This can hardly be interpreted as a policy for achieving a U.S. technological lead in this potentially revolutionary scientific area. At best, it is a risky, moderate hedge against a Soviet technological surprise.

Present national space policy is governed by the National Aeronaurics and Space Act of 1958. This act established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as the responsible agency to direct aeronautics and space research and development. The act also designated the Department of Defense as responsible for "those activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provisions for the defense of the United States)."[54]

There is a growing concern that this dual responsibility has become detrimental to the national security interests of the Unired States. This is because of NASA's lead on the Space Shuttle program which has primarily military payloads, and the diverging civilian-military influence on setting space goals in general. A sobering analysis of just how deeply divided the separate communities within our space program have become was offered by *Air Force Magazine*. It indicated that the division is both one of a bureaucratic nature, which is probably resolvable, and also one of seeking different goals, which might continue to fester.[55] In fact, senior editor Ulsamer suggests that, "Two decades into the Space Age, in the absence of a clear national space program, the Air Force and NASA have yet to sort out precisely how the national defense possibilities in space should be managed."[56] Some officials contend that because the national security mission of the shuttle is its reason for being, the Pentagon ought to be in charge of the program.[57]

Revised responsibilities and goals for space are not entirely a NASA responsibility, given both Congressional and Administration guidance. Dr. Mark stated "that the objective of rhe firsr decade of American activities in space was to establish the *U.S. leadership* in space activities by placing men on the moon and returning them safely to earth" [emphasis added].[58] He suggested that in the 1970s we concentrate on developing a space transportation system that would preserve and enhance that leadership. In light of numerous manned and unmanned Soviet space missions, many responsible commentarors are not nearly so satisfied that this conclusion is warranted.

Option 3: Prepare. The third U.S. space policy option argues for an increased military role in space, but solely to deny the Soviets any strategic advantage. This position is probably most compatible with thinking within the Air Force. It requires an aggressive research and development program to promote defensive space-based systems, with the Air Force taking the lead and managing its own destiny, but consrrained by past treaties and future conventions.

It is neither possible nor desirable to identify an Air Force space policy different from that of an incumbent administration, because of the primacy of civilian control that is rightly the cornerstone of our political-military relationship. However, this does not mean that a Service cannot advocate a greater role for a particular weapon system or even for a greater use of a particular medium. For more than two decades the U.S. Air Force has been a leading advocate of a significantly increased military use of space. It presently has a separate Space Division, Space Defense Operarions Center and is creating a Consolidated Space Operations Center to be operational in the near future.[59] "In Planning long-term exploitation of space for national security purposes, the Air Force System Command's Space Division at Los Angeles, California, is coming up with blueprints for a comprehensive space strategy and even an orbital force structure," according to a recent *Air Force Magazine* report.[60]

The Air Force position was clearly articulated by recently retired Maj. Gen. William Yost whose last assignment as the Director of Space Systems ar Headquarters Air Force offered an excellent vantage point. He said, "Space systems are crucial to the expansion of our territorial force capabilities. It provides that force multiplier effort which is so critical in a period of limited resource and diverse national priorities for those resources."[61] General Yost's conclusion about the military role and use of space is much more far reaching than that of the Carter administration, but it also suggests that space must compete for its share of limited defense resources. In this competition it runs into a stiff battle because it is still viewed by many as somewhat esoteric, having little to do with operations, maintenance and force readiness.

There are Air Force advocates for a greater military role in space, but their opinions are organizationally fragmented without a definitive sponsor at the Air Staff level. An Air Force staff officer charged with long-range planning acknowledged that space was important, but it had to be balanced with other competing requirements.[62] Certainly the Air Force is interested in the greater military application of space, but it is bound both by Administration and Congressional interest and by its own bureaucratic/organizational makeup. This condition will prevail as long as the Air Force manages the space functions.

The U.S. Air Force is charged with the mission of organizing, training, equipping and sustaining forces for conducting space operations for (1) space support, (2) force enhancement and (3) space defense.[63] Each of these missions entails a series of tasks that could be very far reaching and have the growth potential for a much wider application. As currently proposed the missions are all passive. This probably results from the requirement to be supportive of past policies, such as the several treaties, conventions and arms negotiations in which the United States has participated. Certainly this is understandable; however, the stakes are getting higher and reactive shifts in national policies waste valuable time and resources.

In a recent speech General Yost commented "that perhaps the most exciting and promising view of the future is given by the idea of *total battlefield management* made possible by space assets" (emphasis added).[64] Certainly this is a likely phenomenon in the year 2001; however, it does not go far enough. It reveals the continued view that the most likely scenario for future conflict is of a terrestrial nature. After all, that is where the overwhelming bulk of the present balancing of requirements is taking place. However, what is just as probable is that *space itself will be the battlefield of the future!*

The authors see this likelihood, for good or ill, as being the more credible. Defensively oriented, organizationally fragmented, and internally "balanced" programs may leave us singularly unprepared to control our destiny against a Soviet supremacy in space, unless we act dramatically to change our present course.

The problem of bureaucratic infighting and extended political debate was foreseen by Gen. Thomas D. White more than 20 years ago.

> Once we attain the space capability, a lack of centralized authority would certainly hamper our peaceful use of space and could be disastrous in time of war. Failure to properly coordinate peaceful space activities under common direction could cause confusion. . . . In war, when time is of the essence and quick reaction so necessary, centralized military authority will surely be mandatory.[65]

Certainly the Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) was a victim of this confusion seen by General White. The MOL cancellation along with the retarded entry into directed-energy weapon projects can be laid at the doorstep of bureaucratic failings.

> The question can again be asked, What appears to be a logical future program? The answer is not easy. It is very difficult to make a firm prognosis on military need during a twenty-year period for something as new and revolutionary as ballistic missiles, with satellites, and space vehicles. We are somewhat in the same position today as were military planners at the close of the First World War when they were trying to anticipate the employment of aircraft in future wars.[66]

This eloquent view was expressed by Gen. Bernard Schreiver in 1959 and the question is just as germane now as then. However, the answer was also partially provided in the same year by General White,

> Airmen throughout the world have learned that the capability to control the air above the earth's surface permits freedom of movement on the land and seas beneath. As we progress into space, I feel sure that our capability to *control space* [emphasis added] will assure freedom of movement on the surface of the earth and through the earth's atmosphere.[67]

The three space policy options just discussed fall far short of the goal suggested by General White. Therefore, a fourth oprion aimed at providing the United States an unmistakable military advantage, is suggested as both reasonable and attainable by the year 2001.

Option 4: Compete. Beyond the prospect of trying to stay even with the Soviets and hedging against a technological surprise in space, another policy option is to pursue an aggressive space program aimed at achieving U.S. space superiority. Although contrary to current policy preferences, space superiority is eventually certain to follow such well-articulated U.S. military doctrines as air superiority, naval superiority and technological superiority. However, this change in thinking is not apt to occur until after the first military confrontation in space has taken place. Because of the strategic consequences of spaceborne combat to our national survival, the apparent concentration of Soviet resources in this area, and the technological leadtime required to deploy an offensive space capability, waiting until the first shots are fired may prove to be too late. As stated by Air Marshall Giulio Douhet many years ago, "Victory smiles on those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur."[68]

Whereas critics of this policy of seeking space superiority might suggest that it would engender an arms race, we are persuaded that we might otherwise have the making of a Soviet unilateral arms race. General Graham confirmed this opinion when he said, "In my view, there is an arms race going on, and the Soviets are running almost as hard as they can. So the idea that they would suddenly take off if we did something about the balance is really not in the cards."[69]

From the lessons of history it might be well to note that while arms races might have been a contributing cause of an armed conflict, the importance of a real or perceived power imbalance between rival powers has been of paramount importance as a cause of war. In fact, it was just such an imbalance that Thucydides posited in his *History of the Peloponnesian War* as the reason for the strife that destroyed the Greek city states civilization.[70] The great paradox for today's world is the juxtaposition of the Athenian's (United States) becoming the descendant power, whereas Sparta (U.S.S.R.) is the ascendant power.

In 1974 Secretary of Defense Schlesinger pointed out that essential equivalence did not require that opposing forces be absolutely equal or a mirror image, but he did suggest that neither side could have all the force posture advantages.[71] Because of the tremendous costs associated with the maintenance of large standing conventional forces and its requisite manpower intensiveness, it is unreasonable to believe that the United States can reverse the present conventional or general-purpose force imbalance. This is especially difficult not only because of Soviet production quantities, but also because of Soviet technological advances that have eroded the West's once huge advantage in this area.

The momentum of Soviet strategic initiatives also has allowed them to surpass the United States in almost all of the static, and most of the dynamic indicators of strategic capabilities.[72] The "window of vulnerability" of U.S. land-based ICBMs will extend at least into the late 1980s. Unless Soviet efforts are constrained appreciably, the "window" will open even wider.[73] Many national security analysts have suggested that the United States can never expect to regain strategic superiority because of the cost of such an effort, ongoing Soviet programs, and the ephemeral nature of the concept itself.[74]

If we are to gain any military leverage over the Soviet Union and the traditional avenues of gaining military power are foreclosed, are we to throw up our hands and accept "essential inequivalence"? The authors contend that the United States does not have to be frozen into inequality. We should restore the initiative to the Department of Defense to exploit space for both *active defense of the United States* and for *strategic offensive missions* using manned space platforms and directed energy weapons as necessary. The primary candidate for such a program would be a space-based laser system that is entirely within our capability. According to General Graham, "the curious thing is that we could get a space-borne defense quicker than we can deploy the 200 MX missiles in the way the Carter administration wants. As a matter of fact, getting a space-borne defense deployed would carry less technological risk than our decision years ago to deploy the Polaris submarine."[75] Although this appears to be a highly optimistic assessment, it is indicative of what might be done if we act decisively now. If essential equivalence is to be restored to the power equation, then it is time for the United States to seize the high ground of space and to exploit its military potential.

The basic motivation for pursuing this policy of aggressive competition can be summarized by the startlingly clairvoyant premonition of James H.

Doolittle when he said in *1959*, "We, the United States of America, can be *first* [emphasis added]. If we do not expend the thought, the effort, and the money required, then another and more progressive nation will. It will dominate space, and it will dominate the world."[76] In 1974, Gen. Jacob E. Smart gave us the same message with these words, "Today and henceforth the United States must be prepared to defend itself against aggression *in* space and *from* space. We cannot surrender the 'high ground' without contest. We must be in space to acquire knowledge of what others are doing there and to prepare to counter that which threatens us."[77] We are concerned that we have foresworn the progressive nature that Generals Doolittle and Smart presaged, and we now find ourselves in the position posed by Paul Fitzgerald of NASA, "We can't sit here on earth when we can go to the moon and the planets with all our instruments and our people, anymore than our forefathers could sit on Plymouth Rock with the whole continent before them. *There is just too much to learn to be complacent.*"[78] This call to action is even more urgent with respect to our complacency in preserving and promoting the security of our nation.

What Should Be Done? The authors recommend that the U.S. strategy in space should be closely aligned with Option 4 for many of the reasons already mentioned. First, it is in our national interest to preserve and defend the uninhibited access to space for our growth and survival. Second, the Soviets have set forth the challenge; their activities in space and their programs under development reveal their intentions and capability to exploit the regions of space for their own strategic military advantage. Only a credible counter-challenge by the United States can temper Soviet plans. Third, the size, complexity and cost of future military space systems rule against a successful U.S. crash effort to overcome the crippling effect of a Soviet technological surprise. Finally, negotiated treaties and agreements may lure us into a false sense of complacency allowing the Soviets to advance unnoticed their long-range plan for global dominance.

In order to set a new course for American space policy, three actions must be taken. These actions involve setting a new vision for the future, creating a suitable organizational structure, and providing adequate funding. In our democratic society, organizational interests and bureaucratic politics have a way of impeding our progress toward countering what now appears to be a clear and present danger. If these immediate barriers are to be overcome, then a concerted effort by the Congress and the new Administration is required.

A New Vision: During the course of the recent national elections there was an underlying current of thought that suggested America's concern with military superiority was at best a reactionary policy that could lead to superpower confrontation. Indeed it was viewed by many defense pundits as an attempt to recreate the halcyon days of U.S. nuclear superiority of the 1950s. While this view was treated as a retreat to the past, it actually deserves to be cloaked in the mantle of a new vision for America. Exploitation of space is attainable, but only if we have a vision and the leadership willing to undertake the task.

The decade of the 1980s could be analogous to the 1960s, when America had the vision of President John F. Kennedy leading us into a New Frontier, including the advancement of American initiatives in space. It is scarcely believable that President Kennedy's prophecy that we would put an American on the moon within the decade would come to fruition in the summer of 1969.[79] We are on the precipice of a revolutionary capability in

terms of the military role in space for the decade of the 1980s. If we are to reach that goal, it will require all of the elements that underwrote the Man on the Moon program of the 1960s. The risk this time, however, is greater because of the dynamics associated with the ongoing Soviet programs. The question, "Can it be done?" while germane, should be better phrased "Can we afford not to undertake it?"

It can be done, because it is in the area of highly complex space technology that we still have the clear advantage. The comments of Lt. Gen. Richard C. Henry are particularly pertinent. From his vantage point as the Commander of the Air Force Space Division he stated, "I will argue that our largest technological advantage lies in the sophisticated machinery that we put into space. If we can but properly exploit that advantage, we may compensate in military efficiency for what we lack in men and material."[80] He goes on to suggest what may be a reality by the year 2001. "By taking advantage of space, the expression Iron Curtain and all that it implies, can disappear from our vocabulary."[81]

Organizational Structure. To bring the new vision set for America to fruition, we need to create an organizational structure with the direction, leadership and funding to see it through. First and foremost is to separate the military activities in space from the civilian uses. There is a real, overriding and critical requirement to create a separate and distinct military organization to focus our efforts and to make operational the military applications of space. This organization would have to be assimilated from the presently diverse interservice and civilian agencies that are presently involved in space.

By 2001 the eventual goal of our proposal is the creation of the U.S. Space Force, independent of the other military services. The rationale developed for the U.S. Air Force as a separate entity from the Army can now be applied to space. In a remarkably prescient work Brig. Gen. Perry Smith captured the very heart of this argument in his assessment of the Army Air Corps leadership from 1943-1945. As he states, "The argument put forward in the plans, in the press, and before Congress was that autonomy was necessary since the air was a separate environment from the land or the sea, and that . . . equality with the Army and the Navy was thus . . . necessary."[82]

Space is a place; it is not a mission. It is an environment as distinct from air, as air was from land or sea. Interestingly, however, the Air Force argument for autonomy in 1945 did not simply stop at this point. Air Force leaders argued that the strategic importance of technological improvements in aeronautics strongly suggested that airpower would have the paramount role in providing for national defense.[83] While there is still a requirement for the three traditional military forces for the foreseeable future, there is also the stark realization that in the not too distant future, space will be the dominant medium for the maintenance of national security.

A particularly salient issue discussed by General Smith as a reason for a separate autonomous Air Force and one that is also true for the suggested Space Force, is that it would be a major claimant in the budgetary process. Whereas the Air Force planners openly asserted a desire for an equal share of the national defense budget, they inwardly felt that an even larger share was attainable because of their predominant mission. They were proven to be right, much to the chagrin of their sister services.[84] A separate U.S. Space Force would be in a much better position to increase and certainly to consolidate the military space budget.

Besides consolidating and increasing the space budget, a separate space force

should also provide the much needed organizational cohesiveness that is now lacking in the military space program. This cohesiveness would promote an element of reinforcement and consistency in the space initiatives to be undertaken in the next two decades. These psychological concerns are essential for providing the motivation required to promote activities that will often be of necessity on the forefront of technology. In fact, it is entirely likely that there will be a significant number of failures or near misses, and without pioneers continuously reinforcing one another, the process could not be sustained. If these events occurred in an organization that had pressing terrestrial concerns, one could easily see where the lack of reinforcement, indeed even ridicule, could doom the program.

The last major benefit that better organizational cohesiveness would have is the establishment of a well thought out doctrine for both the employment of and need for space systems. Often doctrine has been an afterthought or the stepchild of military forces. The primary function of a separate space force would be to equate space doctrine with the requisite space force structure. In fact, the doctrine should be addressed as a matter of principle long before space weapons systems are operationally fielded. A separate organization unfettered by diverse bureaucratic balancing acts would be better able to promote this critical function than several space divisions, branches and agencies each trying to justify its separate existence within one of the three major services or within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The experience of a separate U.S. Air Force has demonstrably proven many of the points made in support of the organizational model suggested.

As an example of how a separate organizational structure can be effectively used to fulfill a new military vision, we can take a page from the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. The idea of the "Revolution in military affairs" dominated the lexicon of Soviet military doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s. The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces were made the preeminent and elite arm of the Soviet Armed Forces.[85] They have fostered that role ever since their creation, with the result that in two decades they surpassed the United States in nuclear delivery potential as well as carved out a major role in the space program of the Soviet Union.[86] The decision to make a fifth service in the Soviet Union was strongly resisted, but Khrushchev and Malinovsksy persevered and the results have borne out their desire.

Funding: Our commitment to a new vision of expanding our role in space must also be matched with a commitment of adequate and sustained funding. The space budget in the present Five-Year Defense Program is deemed totally inadequate to support the space program on which we should be embarked.[87] A separate space organization with only a space mission to concern itself with would almost certainly be able to increase the funds necessary to pursue its diverse tasks. As a minimum it would consolidate the budgetary process and reduce organizational duplication.

Given a sagging economy, and orher social and defense spending priorities, allocating funds for a massive new space effort will be a difficult proposition at best. It becomes a matter of priorities. The choice is easy if the immediacy of the Soviet challenge is perceived and the threat to our freedom and national survival is evident. It may be necessary to abandon our conservative approach of trying to match the Russians tank for tank and missile for missile, and take the high risk/high payoff approach of achieving space superiority to negate the military and political potency of Soviet conventional and strategic

nuclear forces. With the likely prospect of deploying the major elements of a spaceborne laser antiballistic missile defense system within the same time as the deployment of the planned MX system, it may be prudent to forego the latter, thus releasing substantial funds for a military space system.

What is sought here is not a sideline event that could be achieved without a national commitment, sacrifice, and sense of purpose. It goes to the very heart of what we stand for as a nation and the hostile forces that are present in the world today. We can decide to act now while there is still time to recover, or we can wait until we are confronted with another *Sputnik*-like event that will shake us out of our lethargy.

Conclusion. In tracing our interests in space and the Soviet challenge confronting us today, we have suggested that the United States is presently delinquent in fulfilling its obligation under the Constitution of "providing for the common defense." The technological feasibility of placing in space a directed-energy weapon, such as a high-energy laser with the potential to destroy a long-range bomber or a ballistic missile in flight, is currently available for either the United States or the Soviet Union to exploit. To stand by and allow the Russians to freeze us into strategic nuclear impotence is tantamount to national suicide. To be lulled into complacency by the lure of negotiating against the military use of space is unforgivably naive for a great superpower. To strive for "essential equivalence" in space by attempting to match Soviet initiatives is to allow them the edge in all areas—general purpose, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear, and space—and the political leverage that accompanies that perception of military power. Our only acceptable recourse is to recognize the inevitable danger now, and to engage the Soviets aggressively in a race for the high ground of space in order to secure for ourselves a position of space superiority that can provide the bedrock for our future security doctrine.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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How to stretch a finite and limited Royal Navy to cover two- (or three-) ocean commitments was a problem Great Britain faced in the 1930s. Japan had announced her intention to achieve parity and no accommodation seemed possible; a major shipbuilding program might trigger a competition with Germany similar to that that had contributed to the seeming inexorability of World War I; a naval arms limitation treaty with Germany appeared to be an attractive and achievable option. The 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement resulted. It was no solution.

THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT OF 1935: AN ASPECT OF APPEASEMENT

by

Richard A. Best, Jr.

Policy Considerations. The Agreement between Germany and Great Britain signed on 18 June 1935 limiting the size of the German Navy to 35 percent of that of the British Commonwealth[1] has been often criticized for the damage it did to the efforts of Britain, France and Italy to form a common front against Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the Versailles settlement. It led also to the embittering of relations between Britain and France at a time when Anglo-French unity *vis-à-vis* Germany was essential. Nonetheless, the Agreement had a broader significance: it was part of the extensive but ultimately futile effort in naval arms control in the interwar years and at the same time an important first step in Britain's policy towards Nazi Germany that came to be known as Appeasement.

It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 in the context of British policy regarding naval limitations on one hand and a resurgent Germany on the other. The negotiating tactics of von Ribbentrop are worth attention as they so effectively accomplished the Führer's goals, but the documentary record should not obscure the larger issues that led to the eager acceptance of Hitler's offer and to the approach of war.

Throughout the interwar years, serious attention was given to efforts to limit the dangers of war resulting from an unrestrained arms race and particularly from naval competition. The movement to limit naval arms was launched by the United States in 1921 and, by 1935, had resulted in a series of agreements, principally the Five Power Treaty of 1922 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930. These pacts resulted in,

inter alia, parity in major surface ships between the world's two greatest maritime powers, the United States and Great Britain, and in smaller fleets for Japan, France and Italy. Germany, for her part, had been severely restricted to essentially coastal forces by the Treaty of Versailles. By the mid-1930s, however, this situation was under great strains, largely from pressures by the Japanese to achieve parity with the United States and Britain and to build a navy consistent with her imperial ambitions in East Asia. There were, in addition, strong differences between the British and Americans regarding questions of qualitative limitations—the Americans preferring heavier cruisers with larger guns, the British needing larger numbers of less powerful ships to protect imperial lines of communication. The British particularly sought to limit qualitative innovations, i.e., new ships outclassing all those currently in existence, that could render her heavy investment in the Royal Navy largely obsolete.

Differences in naval policy were certain to cause diplomaric difficulties inasmuch as the 1922 Treaty was due to expire in 1936 and the Japanese were determined to attain parity. After extensive negotiations with both British and American officials, the Japanese finally announced on 29 December 1934 the termination of their adherence to the Five Power Treaty. This action increased the urgency of maintaining some kind of naval limitations system. The British not only favored limitations on principle, but undoubtedly considered that an agreement would preclude other nations' efforts to outbuild the world's largest navy.

Although the British were concerned about the growrh of the Japanese Navy and Tokyo's aggressive policies in Manchuria and northern China, there was little fear of threats to Hong Kong, Singapore or the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand. Accordingly, there was a potential for reaching an accommodation with Tokyo, recalling the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, and a number of important officials favored efforts in this direction.

Such a course of action was, however, doomed from the start. The Japanese did not prove willing to be accommodaring to British interests[2] and, much more importantly, an effort to reach a rapprochement with Tokyo would have exposed London to fierce opposition from Washington. Traditional American concern about Japanese expansion and a perceived threat to American interests in Hawaii, the Philippines and various Pacific possessions worked to insure that the Roosevelt administration would insist upon joint U.S.-British opposition to Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland and to the growth of the Japanese Navy as the *conditio sine qua non* for cooperation with Britain across the board. As President Roosevelt wrote ro his negotiator on naval armaments, Norman Davis:

> Simon and a few other Tories [*sic:* John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, was a National Liberal] must be constantly impressed with the simple fact that if Great Britain is even suspected of preferring to play with Japan to playing with us, I shall be compelled, in the interest of American security to approach public sentiment in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa in a definite effort to make these Dominions understand clearly that their future security is linked with us in the United States.[3]

Although it is not often explicitly articulated in Brirish documents, there is little doubt that good relations between Britain and the United States were fundamental to British policy. Thus opposition by Washington to any British accommodation of Japanese desires regarding naval parity meant that the naval treaty would have to be completely renegotiated in the mid-

thirties and, secondly, that British defense planning had to continue to take the Japanese Navy into consideration. The need to maintain a naval capability in the Far East had major implications not just for the Admiralty but also for the Foreign Office as well.

The needs of the Pacific meant a reduction in the number of ships that would be available in European waters—principally the Mediterranean, which was part of the sea route to India and potentially vulnerable to interdiction by the Italian Navy. Until the advent of Nazi government in Germany in 1933, there had been no need to concentrate forces in the North Sea. France was presumed to be friendly and the small German Navy could present no challenge beyond coastal waters. However, if German rearmament, already underway by 1935 in air and ground forces, were extended into the maritime sphere, then a much graver threat would exist requiring additional naval forces to be maintained in northern waters.

Admiralty and Foreign Office officials alike had reason to recall the contributory effects of the naval competition before World War I to the permanent estrangement of Britain and Germany. There was a determination to avoid a repetition of another naval race if at all possible. There was at the same time an acute perception that the Royal Navy's capabilities were dangerously limited even if a rebuilding campaign were launched. The likely outcome of a war in the Far East against Japan and in Europe against Italy and Germany was grave, especially as there was little expectation of support from the United States beyond a benign neutrality. Such spreading of forces would be strategically dangerous and could lead to global defeat.

There were a number of possible ways to approach these problems. The option of reaching an accommodation with Japan that would remove the need to maintain major forces in the Far East was, as noted above, precluded by U.S. opposition (even benign American neutrality being too valuable to sacrifice under any conceivable condition). Another theoretical option was to build up the Royal Navy to an extent that would allow a two-ocean war. There was, indeed, after the Nazi takeover in 1933, a realization that there would have to be greater defense expenditures, but there were limits to which an already overburdened Treasury could be expected to finance a vastly larger Navy. The National Governments of the thirties were also laboring under orthodox economic policies that argued against deficit spending on one hand and higher taxation on the other. The political costs would also have been high.[4]

If it was impossible to come to terms with Japan or to build a much larger navy, the Admiralty focused on another possibility—negotiating a ceiling on the expected growth of the German Navy. If some naval rearmament was inevitable, given the drift of Hitler's policies, it would at least take some time before the German Navy would pose a significant threat to Britain. There was a hope to bring Germany into the international system of naval arms limitations that the British aimed to reconstruct despite Japanese recalcitrance. The Germans, it was considered, might accept some openly negotiated force levels once freed from the constraints of the dictated peace. If German naval rearmament could in fact be constrained by agreement, then it might be just possible that Britain would have adequate forces to preserve the naval balance of power both in European and Pacific waters. There can be little doubt that some limitation on Germany's Navy was seen by senior Admiralty officials as well as by some in the Treasury and the Foreign Office as the one possibility that could provide hope for imperial security in the years ahead.

Thus by late 1934 some form of a naval agreement with Germany appeared to be an attractive option. It was hoped by the British that an agreement would be part of a worldwide treaty that even Japan would eventually join and that an international system for regulating naval forces could be reestablished. Thus when the Germans began hinting that their goal was only to build up to a third of the size of the British Navy, they found receptive listeners. The British began work for the next London conference and their tasks included consultations with the Germans regarding their plans.

Lack of British Policy. Turning aside for the moment from considerations of naval policy, it is important to recall the difficulties faced by the makers of British foreign policy in the first years of the Nazi regime in Germany. The British did not, as is sometimes imagined, fail to perceive the brutal nature of the Third Reich. The atrocities, which were perpetrated by the German Government and acquiesced in by the German people, were well known to British officials and public alike. Nor was there any simplistic conviction that Nazi foreign policy would be a positive contribution to the comity of Europe. There was instead a realization that Britain was faced by a challenge of the first magnitude and that a real possibility exisred that the carnage that had stopped in November 1918 might be renewed. Because of the deeply felt losses of the Firsr World War, the British were determined to avoid any further conflict. The desire for peace permeated British society and Cabinet members bent their minds towards maintaining it. They were, however, under no illusions about the difficulties under which they would be working.

At the same time, there had been a widespread discrediring of the Versailles settlement. The attacks of John Maynard Keynes in his *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*[3] were followed by over a decade of revisionist historiography. It was widely believed rhat there were genuine German grievances with Versailles and that these grievances had contribured to the Nazi triumph. In addition, the wartime alliance with France had passed into years of peacetime acrimony. The French were often viewed as overly antagonistic to Germany, hostile to British efforts at reconciliation and unwilling to develop new policies to suit changed circumstances. Anglo-French relations were vexed and troubled during rhe interwar years by constant suspicion and an inability ro work together for mutual interests.

By 1935 British diplomacy was faced with the necessity of dealing with a resurgent Germany determined to free herself from the restrictions of Versailles while France was internally divided but nonetheless adamantly opposed to any changes in the 1919 settlement. The British considered that there was nothing that could be done that would actually prevent some German rearmament and that the French refusal to come to terms with this reality was futile.

British policymakers, although aware of the need to improve Britain's defense position and to deal in some way with German rearmament, had not by 1935 developed a consistent strategy. There were those—particularly Sir Roberr Vansittart, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Ralph Wigram, head of the Central Department in the Foreign Office that handled German matters—who favored a policy of firm resistance to any German moves towards unilateral revision of Versailles. On the other hand, the officials most directly concerned with military questions, such as Sir Roberr Craigie of the Foreign Office's American Department (which dealt with questions of naval disarmament) and some outside the Foreign

Office such as Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence and to the Cabinet, Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, and Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, considered that financial exigencies required some way of coming to some kind of terms with the Germans.

It cannot be said, however, that any resolution of these differences had been made by early 1935. Different approaches—particularly regarding the most appropriate way to deal with Italy—were still being weighed. The Prime Minister, J. Ramsay MacDonald, was failing and had not been providing strong leadership in foreign affairs. The Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, was not a commanding figure and had few deep insights into British policy alternatives. He too was ending his term at the Foreign Office; he would shortly be replaced by Samuel Hoare, then at the India Office. Hoare would recall later that when in June 1935 he arrived at the Foreign Office, "there appeared to be no generally accepted body of opinion on the main issues. Dramatically opposite views were pressed upon me . . . . "[6]

As a result of the absence of strong leadership and the imminence of Cabinet changes, British policy toward Germany by mid-1935 was in a state of flux. A British and French offer to Berlin of an air pact had not been accepted. The creation of the "Stresa Front" in mid-April 1935 in which Britain, France and Italy condemned Germany's reintroduction of general conscription had reflected the goals of Vansittart and Anthony Eden, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but it had not been built on settled principles accepted by the Cabinet and the higher levels of the bureaucracy. The doubts and uncertainties of Craigie, Hankey, Chamberlain and others had nor been resolved. Thus, an apparently attractive German proposal on naval limitations, which would incidentally and cavalierly override important provisions of the Versailles treaty, could not be carefully assessed in its relation to a settled British policy towards either Germany or Europe as a whole inasmuch as none existed.

German Poliey: British Acceptance. Germany's goals, unfortunately for Britain, had been more cogently established. The German Chancellor was himself aware of the undesirable results of the prewar Anglo-German naval rivalry and, as is well known, was from time to time seized with the idea of an Anglo-German alliance. He was, nonetheless, determined to improve the German Navy's capabilities along with the expansion of his Army and Air Force.[7] He authorized Adm. Erich Raeder, the Chief of the German Naval Command, to proceed with plans that would provide for naval superiority in the Baltic and cause grave anxiety to a France which had to divide its fleet between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.[8] Whether in the years 1933-1935 Hitler and the German Navy were actually planning an eventual war against Great Britain remains controversial;[9] Hitler was, however, no doubt planning on drastically altering the European balance of naval power in a way that would work to French and British disadvantage.

The German Navy had for years been involved in submarine construction abroad despite the prohibition in the Versailles Treaty on Germany possessing a submarine force. In April 1935 Hitler authorized the Navy to begin construction of twelve 250-ton submarines. This fact was eventually relayed to the British Government,[10] but despite the violation of the Versailles treaty, neither the British Ambassador in Berlin nor the Foreign Secretary lodged a formal protest; the latter contented himself, in a conversation with the German Ambassador, to note the "unpleasant surprise."[11] When Lt. Cdr.

Leopold Bürkner of the German Naval Command advised the British Naval Attaché in Berlin, Capt. G.C. Muirhead-Gould, of German plans for surface ship construction in April 1935, the German officer felt he could have provided "simultaneous information about submarine construction without arousing more unfavorable reactions; [Muirhead-Gould] is certainly thoroughly prepared to hear such news, and so, I suppose, is the Admiralty."[12]

Germany could, of course, have proceeded with her ship construction efforts without British approval; a preventive war in 1935 aimed at forcing compliance with Versailles was unthinkable. Yet firm British opposition would have caused Hitler major diplomatic difficulties and might have endangered the Führer's larger goals. That general political aims and not merely naval planning motivated Hitler at this point is indicated in Raeder's comments when the decision was reached to try to arrive at a naval agreement with Britain; the effort, he affirmed, was "based on considerations of European politics."[13]

The willingness to accept a navy approximately one-third the size of Britain's had been conceived by Hitler before he became Chancellor. It was apparently an arbitrary figure; there is no evidence that exhaustive studies were conducted to reach this percentage.[14] It was, however, roughly consistent with German ship construction capabilities and Raeder made no effort to dissuade his leader.

Hitler first mentioned the 35 percent figure to Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps in a conversation in November 1934.[15] Phipps had complained about German rearmament and Hitler was indicating the "limited" character of his plans. In a subsequent visit to Berlin by Lord Lothian, the Secretary to the Rhodes Trust and a keen student of foreign affairs, the Chancellor indicated his desire to settle all outstanding issues between the two countries, "including the conclusion of a Naval agreement designed to recognize Britain's supremacy at sea."[16] Lothian proposed a visit by the British Foreign Secretary to Germany. The suggestion was taken up and a visit was subsequently arranged for March 1935.

Despite Hitler's announcement on 16 March 1935 of his intention to resume conscription and to enlarge the Army (both in violation of Versailles), the visit by Simon and his depury Anthony Eden was carried out. The British were desirous of finding some means to achieve a general disarmament arrangement that Germany would accept. During these talks, which were inconclusive, Hitler again broached his proposal for a naval arrangement. At that time Simon told Hitler that:

> a figure which he believed had been mentioned to the British Ambassador of 35 per cent of the British fleet would appear to the British Government—apart from any other question—to be so large as to make general agreement almost impossible. The result would therefore be, if that figure were insisted upon, to promote the unlimited armaments race which the Chancellor said the German Government wished to avoid.[17]

Hitler did not, however, give up on his proposal; in an address to the Reichstag on 21 May 1935 he would publicly mention it once again.[18] This official speech should have resolved any remaining doubt that Hitler was going to continue to push the 35 percent concept. British preparations for general naval disarmament talks went forward nonetheless, oblivious to the need to deal with Hitler's goals.

In preparing for summoning another naval conference in 1936, the British had discussed with the French, in the summer of 1934, the need to sound out the Germans regarding their plans.[19] The French had not objected and Simon had, in his March 1935 talks with Hitler,

suggested that detailed conversations between the two countries' naval staffs be conducted in London. It was hoped that such talks would lay the groundwork for bringing Germany into a worldwide treaty system. The offer was accepted by Hitler and, after some shuffling of schedules, it was arranged that a German delegation would arrive in London for talks in late May 1935.

Disregarding the likelihood of the Germans reiterating the 35 percent formula, the Admiralty pressed forward with its own ideas that were directed at general considerations of naval limitation and not specifically toward the emergence of a threat from the German Navy. As finally articulated, they included:

a. German support for a general international convention to deal with qualitative limitation and notification of the construction of new vessels;

b. Elimination in any future naval treaty of ratios of naval strength between the signatories;

c. Negotiation of an understanding regarding the form and substance of declarations to be issued by each Power indicating future construction programs; and

d. A provision in the new treaty recognizing the equality of national status of each signatory of the new treaty, regardless of the size of its navy.[20]

Perhaps somewhat exasperated, Simon on 25 May asked Craigie, "Do we *reject* 35 percent or accept it or sidetrack it? That is the main point for public and parliamentary purposes." The reply was,

> The answer is that we attempt to sidetrack it in favour of our own proposal for declarations of building programmes, which if adopted, would obviate the necessity of agreeing upon any particular ratio between the two fleets.[21]

It is noteworthy that Phipps, writing from Berlin, was much in favor of accepting the German proposal[22] and Muirhead-Gould in discussing the need for advance notification of German ship construction plan with the German Navy's liaison officer gratuitously used the 35 percent figure as an example.[23] The Cabinet Paper on the proposed agenda for the talks, dated 3 June 1935, reiterated British goals for the talks, but noted,

> Presumably Herr Hitler will insist on his 35 per cent . . . . It would be unwise to make a frontal attack on this declared objective and preferable to concentrate on persuading the Germans to moderate the rate at which they will seek to achieve this new objective.[24]

The German delegation that participated in the talks was headed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, not a professional diplomat but rather the head of the *Dienstelle Ribbentrop*, a Nazi agency created to collect and analyze foreign intelligence. The *Dienstelle* had been increasingly meddling with Foreign Office affairs and especially those regarding relations with Britain. For the naval talks Ribbentrop, who considered himself an expert on British affairs, was designated Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission much to the disgust of the traditional diplomats. Along with Ribbentrop came Adm. K.G. Schuster, of Raeder's staff, and various other naval and diplomatic officials.[25] The British delegation was headed by Simon and included Craigie, Vice Adm. C.J.C. Little, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Capt. V.H. Danckwerts of the Admiralty Plans Division as well as other officials. Significantly, however, no Foreign Office officials who dealt with European political questions were included.

The initial meeting, held on 4 June 1935, was opened by Simon who made a general welcoming speech. Ribbentrop, however, in his response made a categorical demand that the Führer's decision to establish a 35:100 ratio with the

British Navy be accepted as final and not subject to alteration or negotiation. Ribbentrop maintained that rhe "Germans had assumed the 35 percent ratio was an accepted decision and felt that adjustment could only proceed if this ratio was taken as a basis." Further, "no bargaining on this point could be accepted. In no case did Herr Hitler, after making a serious decision, change his mind one inch."[26] Simon was nonplussed at this first exposure to classic Nazi negotiating tactics but, having another meeting to attend, turned discussions over to Craigie who managed to calm Ribbentrop by indicating that only the Cabinet could make a decision on wherher to accept the German proposal.

Several further meetings ensued, but Ribbentrop was adamant that the ratio had to be accepted or rejected. On the next day, 5 June, Ribbentrop interrupted the British presentation to reiterate his point:

> Could the British Delegation tell the German Delegation, that day or the next day, their reply to the question he had put yesterday? Namely: could they give a clear and formal *recognition* of the *decision* taken by Herr Hitler in laying down a 35 to 100 ratio between the two countries?[27]

The British did not in fact take long to make up their minds. According to the biographers of the incoming Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin,

> The effective decision was taken on [5 June]. MacDonald gave luncheon to the British and German Delegations and, after the guests had left, he called together a small group of senior Ministers, explaining that Baldwin (to whom he had already given charge of the negotiations) wanted to have a word with them. The discussion was brief . . . the Admiralty and the Foreign Office were in favour of acceptance. Did anyone else object? All the senior Cabinet Ministers who were present appeared to favour the proposed agreement. Only Mr. Eden had reservations, namely the probable strain that it would place on our relations with France. . . .[28]

This interpretation is supported by the documents indicating that Craigie had gone to the Carlton Hotel on the afternoon of 5 June with a draft memorandum to show to Ribbentrop to ensure that the German position was correctly described. Craigie also indicated that he intended to submit his memorandum to the Cabinet "if possible on the evening of the same day."[29] It may be assumed that Craigie was tying up loose ends left over from the earlier informal Cabinet meeting.

The Cabinet changes that were occurring at this time—Baldwin becoming Prime Minister on 6 June, Hoare going to the Foreign Office, Simon becoming Home Secretary—did not cause any postponement of the negotiations with Ribbentrop. This is one of the more curious aspects of the negotiations. In the midst of a change in governments it seems unlikely that responsible ministers had time to study with care the crucial decisions that had to be made. Indeed, the documentary record suggests that attention to the Agreement was perfunctory and that almost total reliance was placed on Admiralty advice combined with Craigie's recommendations.

In accordance with the decision taken on 5 June, Simon informed Ribbentrop on the following morning that

> His Majesty's Government intended to recognise the Reich Chancellor's decision as the basis of future Naval discussions between the British and German Governments, and . . . agree to a permanent relationship between the two fleets in the proportion of 35 for the Germans and 100 for the British Fleet.

Ribbentrop was of course pleased with

the announcement but insisted that foreign governments being notified of the agreement be advised of a decision by the British Government and not given a chance to state objections. Simon calmly replied that "our language means that we had *decided*."[30] Thus did the German representative ensure that maximum consternation would be caused for the French.

The agreement stipulated that the 35 percent ratio would be taken on a category basis, i.e., Germany would build up to 35 percent of the tonnage of British battleships, cruisers, destroyers, etc. Transfers above the 35 percent limit in one category would have to be at the expense of decrements in another, but any proposal to do this would have to be on the basis of conversations between the two Governments "in the light of the Naval situation then existing." The Brirish considered that this language would preclude Germany from outbuilding the Royal Navy in any one class of ship.

The talks then broke for the Whitsuntide holiday and Ribbentrop and his party returned to Berlin. It was decided that another series of sessions would provide for the exchange of ship construction plans and the final signing of the Agreement. The British hoped to avoid a formal treaty as such an action would, in the circumspect words of Craigie, "make it more difficult to meet the argument that we were condoning or confirming Germany's breach of the Treaty of Versailles."[31]

In the second stage of negotiations beginning on 15 June 1935, the Germans made an additional demand that the 35 percent arrangement not include submarines in which category they intended to seek parity with the Royal Navy. The British had to accept this although a compromise was worked out whereby the German Navy could build up to 45 percent of the British submarine tonnage unless Germany felt it necessary to exceed this percentage in which case notice would be given and the matter "would be the subject of friendly discussion before the German Government exercise that right."[32] The desire for more than a 35 percent ratio in the case of submarines had been hinted at by Ribbentrop on 6 June.[33] A German Navy staff document prepared on 12 June 1935 provides background for this claim:

> When announcing our claim for parity of submarine tonnage in principle . . . , it seems best to limit ourselves to the near future (perhaps for the period of expansion) to a smaller tonnage, in order not to give the British unnecessary cause for suspicion, particularly since on personnel grounds we cannot go substantially beyond our present programme (35 per cent).[34]

From this assessment arose the 45 percent figure that apparently did not give the British cause for suspicion. As Professor Watt has written,

> The inclusion of the 100 per cent clause in the 1935 Agreement showed that the intention to build up to these limits was always present, and it was invoked as soon as necessary to make the continuing flow of submarine construction beyond the 45 per cent limit legitimate.[35]

The Agreement, in the desired form of an exchange of diplomatic notes, was signed on 18 June 1935 by Ribbentrop and Samuel Hoare, the new Foreign Secretary. There were several additional meetings of the technical staffs to exchange information about their respective naval construction programs.

When Ribbentrop returned to Berlin, Hitler received him warmly and claimed that because of the Agreement and good news from his doctor about a recent ailment, it was the happiest day of his life. It was undoubtedly not a sad day for Ribbentrop. There had been skepticism among the professional diplomats regarding the possibility of Britain's

acceptance of the arrangement and even a desire to see Ribbentrop sustain a major failure.[36] Nonetheless the former champagne salesman had triumphed and gained an increased measure of the Führer's favor.

There can be no doubt that the positions of the Admiralty and of Craigie, who usually reflected Admiralty influence, were decisive in the British acceptance of the German proposal. Admiralty support was publicly alluded to in press and Parliamentary announcements. Indeed Captain Danckwerts told the German Naval Attaché after Ribbentrop had returned to Berlin that,

> the Admiralty had in the strongest possible manner advocated the new course which had resulted in our 35 per cent "agreement," and had succeeded in this, despite the fact that British Government circles were by no means all convinced that a showdown by force with Germany was beyond the realm of possibility.[37]

A Naval Staff Memorandum circulated on 5 June 1935 bears out the conclusion of the Admiralty's support referred to in public:

> From the point of view of general limitation of naval armament it would be greatly to our advantage to recognise the decision of the German Government lest the demand be increased.[38]

There is an underlying assumption, evident throughout, that the Germans were only trying to redress grievances and lacked malign ambitions:

> It is quite apparent from the attitude of the German representatives that it is a question of *Gleichberechtigung* which is really exercising their minds, and not the desire to acquire a submarine fleet. In the present mood of Germany, it seems probable that the surest way to persuade them to be moderate in their actual performance is to grant them every consideration in theory.[39]

It might not have been expected that the Admiralty would have spent much time trying to fathom the nature of the Nazi psyche, but what of the Foreign Office officials who were charged with the conduct of British policy regarding Germany? Unfortunately, their role in the acceptance of the German proposal cannot be closely followed. Eden was, as noted above, concerned about the French reaction, but he did not press his concerns very hard and it was he who was later sent to explain the rationale behind the British decisions to both the French and the Italians. Vansittart says little about the Agreement in his memoirs[40] and there is little written by him on the Agreement in the published documents. Ribbentrop thought he was opposed to the pact, but Hoare said later that on this issue, "Vansittart strongly supported me."[41] It is quite possible that Vansittart was primarily concerned with restraining spending on the Navy to provide funds for the Army and Air Force to put Britain in a better position to challenge Germany. He may then have seen the Agreement as a way to limit naval expenditures, or at least undercut the demands for a larger navy. Wigram's situation is even more strange. Writing in 1963, Valentine Lawford, a retired British diplomat who worked for Wigram in the thirties, recalled Wigram as being highly exercised about the Agreement and particularly by the fact that it was handled by the Admiralty and Craigie of the American Department. When they delved into questions of tonnages, Wigram

> was far more exercised by the plain fact—at least it seems plain, even trite, today—that by actively conniving at this further breach of the limiting clauses of the Treaty of Versailles so soon after publicly condemning Hitler's unilateral repudiation of the military restrictions of the Treaty in the spring, Britain was not only encouraging

> German rearmament but gratuitously providing the German Government with just the kind of opportunity they so much relished to drive a wedge between her and her closest friends . . . his private comments on the whole interlude were scathing.[42]

Yet, curiously, Martin Gilbert's volume of the biography of Churchill that covers this period records a letter from Wigram to Churchill on 18 June 1935 in which the Foreign Office department head wrote in support of the Agreement:

> I think anything that will help to extricate us from the disarmament muddle is to be welcomed—and that in the end the French will not regret that we cut the Gordian Knot for them. And after all we are the people who bear the brunt on the sea.[43]

Wigram carried on an extensive correspondence with Churchill and it is doubtful that he was merely parroting the official line; it is possible that he initially went along with the Admiralty position until the French views became known and it was his later opinions that were recalled by Lawford.

Oddly, it is Simon who may have offered the most resistance. His initial rebuff to Hitler in March has been noted. Professor Norman Gibbs writes, based on extensive research in the Cabinet papers, that

> in this particular case Simon had clearly warned his colleagues, and more than once, against the 35 per cent provision and against concluding a separate arrangement with Germany outside a general treaty to supersede those of Washington and London.[44]

Simon says almost nothing about the Agreement in his memoirs while Hoare defends it extensively in his.[45] Simon may have been reluctant to lead the fight against the Admiralty, especially at the very end of his tenure at the Foreign Office.

It is probable that Treasury officials were quite pleased with the Agreement although there is no specific evidence of any direct Treasury involvement in the negotiations. However, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Neville Chamberlain, was a constant defender of the Agreement and considered it then and later a prime example of the possibilities of Anglo-German cooperation.

Thus the British accepted Hitler's offer of a naval arrangement. The Admiralty and Robert Craigie, head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, had undoubtedly the major influence on the decision. For one reason or another, the political experts responsible for Anglo-German relations supported the Admiralty or else made their objections quietly. It was a difficult time for the political leadership: the attention of all was focused on the change in governments and quite possibly the decision to approve the pact result in some measure from absence of mind.

Hostile reaction from abroad was nonetheless quick in coming as was criticism in Parliament. More significantly, however, the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 was the first stop on a 4-year excursion along a policy of appeasement that ended with Britain and Germany once again at war.

Reaction to the Agreement. The immediate reaction to the Agreement by the other naval powers was mixed. The Japanese were pleased, knowing that a larger German Navy would inevitably tie up British forces in Europe. Drawing diametrically opposite conclusions, Washington was also pleased inasmuch as Germany "is prepared to regard a ratio between the British and German fleets . . . as final, irrespective of future construction by third powers."[46] The State Department thought that the Agreement would in

fact enable the British to maintain strong forces in the Far East:

> Our first concern is with relations in the Pacific, where the navies of the United States, Great Britain and Japan are the controlling factors. The immediate influence of the naval armaments of the Continental states is confined to the Eastern Atlantic and to European waters in which our interest is relatively small.[47]

Accordingly, the State Department was careful to avoid commenting on any matter affecting European arrangements.

The Russians considered the agreement as a setback for Britain. According to William Bullitt, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union,

> The Russians point out that the construction of the new German fleet will make it necessary for England to retain the greater part of her naval forces in the North Sea, that she will have to diminish her forces in the Mediterranean and that it will be absolutely impossible for her to send a fleet to Singapore.[48]

The signing of the Agreement only a few weeks after Stresa convinced Mussolini of the undependability of British policy. Seeing the British accept the breaking of the Versailles Treaty led the Italian dictator to believe that he could pursue his aims in Abyssinia without undue concern. The subsequent strong British reaction may have been the major factor in his ultimate alliance with Germany.[49]

The French more than any other power had the most to lose from any breach in the Versailles settlement. That Britain would sign an agreement flagrantly in contradiction with Versailles and with previous agreements with Paris was a grave shock and the French protest was sent in strong terms.[50] It arrived, however, too late to be considered before the Agreement was officially signed on 18 June and, in any event, futilely as Ribbentrop had already ensured that the British decision was final. As Professor Watt has written,

> By the conclusion of the Agreement, which amounted in French eyes to sheer betrayal and certain ruin of French efforts to win naval independence from Great Britian throughout the 1922-34 period, the admiralty had fatally ruined all chances of friendly co-operation with the French navy. At one stroke all France's efforts were rendered useless.[51]

The effect of the Agreement was deep; the sense of British unwillingness to stand against Germany probably influenced France's willingness to stand by when Germany invaded the Rhineland only 9 months later. The British had not expected that the Agreement would be so ill-received in Paris. They were focusing almost single-mindedly on questions of international arms control and questions relating to the European balance of power were not given full weight. In addition, the British felt that French intransigence over the air clauses of Versailles may have already precluded an agreement with Berlin that would have limited the buildup of the German Air Force.[52]

A special problem was the naval situation in the Baltic. The Scandinavian countries had only recently supported the protests of Britain, France and Italy against German conscription. Now the British agreed to the creation of a German Navy that could easily control the Baltic (at least unless the Russians sought to provide a challenge). It is curious that the available British documents do not reflect concern with this aspect of the problem despite Britain's historic concern with the naval balance of power in both the Baltic and the adjoining North Sea.[53]

In the British Parliament the Agreement came under heavy criticism,

especially for the influence it was having on Anglo-French relations. Winston Churchill, who had long been out of favor among his fellow Conservatives, said in the House of Commons:

> I do not believe that this isolated action by Great Britain will be found to work for the cause of peace. The immediate reaction is that every day the German Fleet approaches a tonnage which gives it absolute command of the Baltic, and very soon one of the deterrents of a European war will gradually fade away. So far as the position in the Mediterranean is concerned, it seems to me that we are in for very great difficulties.
>
> The British Fleet, when this programme is completed, will be largely anchored to the North Sea. That means to say the whole position in the Far East has been very gravely altered, to the detriment of the United States and of Great Britain and to the detriment of China . . . . [54]

In response Hoare and Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, argued that Britian had to face the facts of German rearmament and endeavor to find a way to place limits on the expansion of the German Navy. They stated that an agreement Germany voluntarily entered into would be respected. When asked about the submarine provisions of the Agreement, Government speakers answered that Germany had agreed to abide by the provisions of Part IV of the 1930 London Treaty that prohibited what had been known as unrestricted submarine warfare.[55] This supposedly was a secure protection of British sealanes. Despite the criticism, the Government was supported in the House of Commons on 22 July 1935 by a vote of 247 to 44 (with Churchill voting in the majority).

It is interesting to note the reaction to the Agreement of the semiofficial *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution.* In May 1935 the *Journal* noted the German Government's announcement regarding the intended acquisition of submarines:

> In effect, therefore, it is the obvious intention of Germany to recover everything she lost in the War. In spite of her protestations of peace, it is plain that, unless the late allies are sufficiently well armed to make the risks too great, she will, sooner or later, fight for what she wants if she cannot obtain it by any other means.

However, in August of the same year, the tone was changed:

> . . . those who are not anxious to make political capital by distortion of facts cannot fail to appreciate that the British Government have seized an opportunity which it would have been unpardonable to have evaded or allowed to slip through procrastination.[56]

Results of the Naval Agreement. There are many ways to interpret the implications of the Agreement for subsequent Anglo-German relations. It is true that until Hitler denounced the Agreement on 28 April 1939 the Germans did substantially live up to it. It is equally valid to note that it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, for the Germans to have found the resources to have built more ships and submarines in the years 1935 to 1939 and that plans for further expansion were in any event proceeding. Professor Watt argues that, while a few orders were taken by German firms from foreign countries after 1935, this resulted from the German need for foreign exchange and "in fact the German naval construction programme suffered considerably during 1936-38 from the general strain of rearmament upon the German economy."[57] In 1938 Hitler did decide to build submarines up to 100 percent of the British tonnage

and it was these boats that came to pose the greatest threat to Britain in World War II.

There are a number of reasons why the Admiralty in 1935 was not sufficiently concerned about the potential submarine threat—overconfidence in sonar (then known as *asdic*), the prevailing belief in the effectiveness of surface ships in antisubmarine warfare, and an understandable inability to foresee that German submarines would eventually be operating out of French ports on the Atlantic.[58]

Admiral Chatfield, the First Sea Lord in 1935, continued to defend the Agreement after the end of World War II:

> It was a unique treaty, this voluntary acceptance of armed inferiority on the seas, advantageous on balance to this country and the Empire and from practical considerations equally so to France.[59]

The fundamental assumption of British naval planning had been that,

> if Britain's ratio with Japan were preserved, and if Germany accepted thirty-five percent of British strength "we can face hostilities against Germany in Europe, with France as our ally, and at the same time preserve a defensive position against Japan."[60]

In actual fact the Agreement did not prove to be advantageous; the growth of the German Navy meant that the British could not maintain a defensive position in the Far East and the French Navy was not in a position to cooperate. The arguments made by Hoare[61] that the Agreement effectively restrained the expansion of the German Navy have been dealt with by Professor Watt who notes that the Germans would have been unable in any event to exceed the limits they accepted in the Agreement; in fact, the British Admiralty did not even expect the Germans to be able to exceed the 35 percent limit. Watt argues that, compared to the Luftwaffe and the Army, the German Navy "was a luxury."[62]

It is also noteworthy that while the British focused on the Agreement's supposed beneficial effects on their naval balance with the Germans, the latter took a broader, more political outlook. An August 1935 German Naval Staff memorandum, after noting the implications of the Agreement for naval planning, claimed that,

> The success of the Agreement lies principally in the political sphere. In this respect its consequences should not be underrated. As a result of the Agreement the most powerful of our former enemies and of the signatories of the Versailles Treaty has formally invalidated an important part of this Treaty and formally recognized Germany's equality of rights. The danger of Germany's being isolated, which definitely threatened in March and April of this year, has been eliminated. A political understanding with Great Britain has been initiated by the naval settlement. The front recently formed against us by the Stresa Powers has been considerably weakened by the Agreement.[63]

Thus the evidence from the German side, available only after the war, gives a clear indication that the British were set up for the purpose of discrediting Versailles. The plans of the German Navy were not in fact constrained by the Agreement; when the submarine construction program began to reach the agreed-upon limits, the Germans demanded the 100 percent ratio and within a few months the entire Agreement was denounced. It can of course be argued that Hitler may have actually intended that the Agreement be the first stage in an evolving Anglo-German condominium, but this concept does no credit to those responsible for signing the Agreement as such an alliance could have been made only at the cost of all British interests as traditionally understood.[64]

It is extremely difficult to see in retrospect how the British could have solved the dilemmas of their naval policy in the thirties. To have reached an agreement with Japan, had one been possible, in order to concentrate on Europe would have alienated Washington and might have precluded the fruitful Anglo-American naval cooperation of 1940-1941. The failure to provide adequately for the defense of Singapore and the impetuous decision to send *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to the Far East in 1941 were reflections of the more serious problems that afflicted Britain's strategic planning. The acceptance of the 35 percent ratio was but another. Unfortuantely, it only made the difficulties worse.

Britain's unwillingness to coordinate defense and foreign policy with France in the interwar years is a constant and tragic theme that is clearly seen in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The fact that inadequate thought was given to either the political or naval implications for France reflects great discredit upon the British Governments of the day. While it might not have been possible to have prevented German naval rearmament, closer cooperation with the French could have strengthened the military and diplomatic positions of both countries. At the least a greater willingness to undertake naval cooperation with the French who faced a "two-ocean" threat could have been useful and not very costly.

That British diplomats and Cabinet members would so supinely yield to Ribbentrop's badgering was an unfortunate portent. It is occasionally necessary to make a diplomatic retreat, but a voluntary capitulation can only induce heavier pressure. The same tactics that carried the day for the Germans in June 1935 would be employed continually and usually with success by Hitler, reaching their culmination at Munich in September 1938.

Beyond the failure of British negotiating techniques, however, lies a larger failure to conceive a successful strategy for dealing with an aggressive Germany. As indicated earlier, British policy toward Germany was in flux at the time of the naval negotiations in 1935. It would continue to move in fits and starts for the next 2 years only to be solidified by Neville Chamberlain when he became Prime Minister in May 1937. Chamberlain unfortunately believed that the precedent established by the Agreement was a sure guide to future British policy. The importance placed by the Chamberlain government in the 1935 Agreement is reflected in a long message from Lord Halifax, Chamberlain's Foreign Secretary, to the British Ambassador in Berlin in August 1938 at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis:

> This is not to say that we have not every interest in avoiding a denunciation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1935, which would create a present state of uncertainty as to Germany's intentions and the ultimate threat of an attempt at parity with our navy which must be regarded as potentially dangerous . . . . Indeed, so important is the naval Agreement to His Majesty's Government that it is difficult to conceive that any general understanding between Great Britain and Germany . . . would any longer be possible were the German Government to denounce the Naval Agreement.[65]

Chamberlain's policy of appeasement implied Britain's willingness to accept the end of the Versailles system, to ratify the growth of German power in international agreements and to let ties with France go slack—all portended in the Naval Agreement of 1935. It is not without significance that Chamberlain and Hitler would refer to the Naval Agreement in the document that the British Prime Minister would so proudly wave on his return from Munich:

> We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as symbolic of the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one another again.[66]

The extent to which Chamberlain saw the Naval Agreement as a model for his larger policies had already been revealed to the House of Commons on 26 July 1938. When Hitler proposed the Naval Agreement, according to the Prime Minister, he

> made a notable gesture of a most practical kind in the direction of peace, the value of which it seems to me has not ever been fully appreciated as tending towards this general appeasement. There the treaty stands as a demonstration that it is possible for Germany and ourselves to agree upon matters which are vital to both of us.[67]

Such trust in the peaceful intentions of Adolf Hitler was to have its reward. All that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 had accomplished was, in Churchill's words, "to authorize Germany to build to her utmost capacity for five or six years to come."[68] All that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement accomplished was to ensure the outbreak of world war.

BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

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NOTES

1. Published as "Exchange of Notes Between the Government of the German Reich and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom Regarding the Limitation of Naval Armaments. London, June 18th, 1935," *League of Nations Treaty Series, 1935*, No. 3701. Also, *British Treaty Series (1935)*, No. 22.

2. Some knowledgeable historians argue that it was much more Japanese recalcitrance than American pressure that precluded an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement in the 1930s despite tentative feelers from London. See Norman Gibbs, "The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years: A Study in Anglo-American Relations," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1977, p. 61; and Ann Trotter, *Britain and East Asia 1933-1937* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 88-114.

3. Quoted in Meredith William Berg, "Admiral William H. Stanley and the Second London Naval Treaty, 1934-1936," *The Historian*, February 1971, p. 224.

4. There was another important aspect to this question. The Navy was not by itself in making claims to higher expenditures; the Army and the Air Force also needed improvement if some viable effort was to be made to keep up with a rearming Germany. The nature of the conflict for which planning should be undertaken was necessarily uncertain and controversial. Nonetheless, there was a determination to avoid the commitment of large ground forces to continental warfare in the light of the experience of World War I. Countering the new threat of aerial bombardment was, however, recognized to have a high priority and would require major investment. The Royal Navy, despite skillful infighting and the sympathy that was accorded to the "senior service," did not receive adequate funds to increase its capabilities against the threat in the Far East. Priorities were judged to be higher elsewhere. See G.C. Peden, *British Rearmament and the Treasury* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), p. 167. It is also noteworthy that not only public antipathy to higher defense expenditures but also opposition from the United States served to limit expanded ship construction; the Roosevelt administration wanted parity with the Royal Navy but did not want to have to embark on a major building campaign of its own.

It should not be overlooked in considering the background of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement that those officials most determined to counter the German challenge, particularly Sir Robert Vansittart and Warren Fisher at the Foreign Office and Treasury respectively, were arguing for increased Army and air defense funding. They, too, recoiled from the necessity of heavily increased naval expenditures as such might have detracted from higher priority efforts. There seems to be a good possibility that this factor may have inhibited Vansittart in particular from opposing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement to the extent

that otherwise would have been the case. See Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment* (London: Temple Smith, 1972), especially pp. 96-120 and Stephen E. Pelz, *Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), especially pp. 104-110.

5. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919).

6. Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), *Nine Troubled Years* (London: Collins, 1954), p. 137.

7. Articles 181 through 197 of the Treaty of Paris limited the German Navy to six battleships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats. Article 191 forbade the construction or acquisition of submarines.

8. Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars: Vol. II, The Period of Reluctant Rearmament, 1930-1939* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1976), p. 302.

9. Raeder wrote in his memoirs that, "Not until Hitler's conference of 22 August 1938 had the Navy ever had any real concern over having to meet England as a definite opponent." See his *My Life* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1960), p. 279. Some recent research, however, indicates that "as early as 1934 . . . Britain was once again seen as the future enemy" and Raeder was in fact planning at the time for a Navy 50 percent as large as Britain's. Fritz Fischer, "Recent Works on German Naval Policy," *European Studies Review*, October 1975, p. 459. Fischer was commenting on Jost Dülffer, *Hitler und die Marine, Reichspolitik und Flottenbau 1920-1939* (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1973).

10. *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 129. (Hereafter cited as *DBFP*.)

11. *Ibid.*, No. 157, No. 165 and *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 66. (Hereafter cited as *DGFP*.)

12. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 25.

13. International Military Tribunal, *The Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremburg, Germany: International Military Tribunal, 1948), v. XIV, pp. 24-25.

14. D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgment," *Journal of Modern History*, June 1956, p. 174.

15. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XII, No. 230; *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. III, No. 358.

16. D.C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London: Longmans, Green, 1965), p. 127.

17. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XII, No. 651.

18. Norman H. Baynes, ed., *The Speeches of Adolf Hitler April 1922-August 1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 1242-1243.

19. N.H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy: Vol. I, Rearmament Policy* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976), pp. 156-157.

20. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 282, Annex 1.

21. *Ibid.*, No. 211, fn. 3.

22. *Ibid.*, No. 230.

23. *Ibid.*, No. 271. This blunder did not go unnoticed; the unfortunate attaché had to explain to the German Liaison Officer that no significance should be given to his use of this percentage. *Ibid.*, Nos. 280 and 285.

24. *Ibid.*, No. 304.

25. See Gordon A. Craig, "The German Foreign Office from Neurath to Ribbentrop," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., *The Diplomats: Vol. II, The Thirties* (New York: Atheneum, 1965).

26. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 289.

27. *Ibid.*, No. 304. Emphasis in original.

28. Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin: A Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 827.

29. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 135.

30. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 311.

31. *Ibid.*, No. 329.

32. *Ibid.*, No. 348, Annex.

33. *Ibid.*, No. 311.

34. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 148.

35. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 172.

36. "The conclusion of this agreement, which effectively destroyed the Stresa front, was Hitler's greatest victory to date, and it was one which redounded especially to Ribbentrop's credit. This was due less to the fact that he had negotiated the agreement personally—although that, of course, had its importance—than to the fact that he had done so after the professional diplomats had declared categorically that an agreement was impossible," Craig, p. 424.

37. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 161.

38. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 305, Annex.

39. *Ibid.*

40. Sir Robert Vansittart, *The Mist Procession: The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart* (London: Hutchinson, 1958). Nor is there much on the Agreement in Ian Colvin, *Vansittart in Office* (London: Gollancz, 1965).

41. Joachim von Ribbentrop, *The Ribbentrop Memoirs* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1954), pp. 42-44; Templewood, p. 145.

42. Valentine Lawford, *Bound for Diplomacy* (London: John Murray, 1963), p. 262.

43. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Vol. V, 1922-1939* (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 655.

44. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy*, p. 166.

45. Sir John Simon, *Retrospect: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Viscount Simon* (London: Hutchinson, 1952); Templewood.

46. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 328; *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1935, v. 1, Hull to Bingham, 11 June 1935, p. 165. (Hereafter cited as *FRUS*.)

47. *FRUS*, 1935, v. I, Hull to Bullitt, 7 May 1935, p. 162.

48. *Ibid.*, Bullitt to Hull, 28 June 1935, p. 168. The Soviet attitude was also conveyed directly to the British; see *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 359.

49. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 158-159.

50. See *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. XIII, No. 345.

51. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," p. 173.

52. See Templewood, p. 145.

53. *The Times* (London), 6 July 1935, p. 11; also Fletcher Pratt, *Sea Power and Today's War* (New York: Harriman Hilton Books, 1939), pp. 107-108.

54. Quoted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 126.

55. 303 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 25 June 1935, cols. 948-949.

56. *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, May 1935, p. 407; August 1935, p. 627.

57. D.C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Negotiations on the Eve of the Second World War," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, May 1958, p. 203.

58. Insufficient appreciation of the capabilities of submarines was not limited to British admirals; Raeder had a similar lack of confidence in his submarines. He was dilatory in carrying our Hitler's orders for increased submarine construction and, partially for this reason, was eventually replaced by Admiral Dönitz, the head of the German Navy's submarine force. See D.C. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Negotiations on the Eve of the Second World War," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution*, August 1958, pp. 386-391.

59. Sir Ernle Chatfield, *It Might Happen Again* (London: Heinemann, 1947), p. 75.

60. Quoted in Pelz, p. 153.

61. Templewood, pp. 135-148.

62. Watt, "Anglo-German Naval Agreement," pp. 171-173. In 1938, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, wrote in a cable to the Ambassador in Berlin, "At the time of the conclusion of the Agreement, the German Government were well aware that 35 per cent of our navy was probably the most that they could hope to achieve for a considerable period of years." *DBFP*, Ser. 3, v. III, Appendix VII.

63. *DGFP*, Ser. C., v. IV, No. 275.

64. Hitler's interest in an alliance with Britain (which apparently did not die until after Munich) is described in Klaus Hilderbrand, *The Foreign Policy of the Third Reich* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970).

65. *DBFP*, Ser. 2, v. III, Appendix VII.

66. *Ibid.*, v. II, No. 1228, Appendix.

67. 338 H.C. Deb. 5 s., 26 July 1938, cols. 2959-2960.

68. Churchill, p. 128.



SET AND DRIFT

SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE: WHY MOST HAVE FAILED

by

F.J. West, Jr.*

Of the 14 Secretaries of Defense, six were fired and five others dismissed after Presidential elections. It is a post that has been called "the graveyard of political ambitions." This paper explains the pitfalls of the office in terms of the conflicting roles a Secretary must play. Despite their impressive prior experiences, Defense Secretaries tend to confuse priorities among their roles and spend too much time and energy on the wrong issues. More than any other Cabinet member, a Defense Secretary is bushwhacked—caught off balance by a crisis that pertains to one role while he is concentrating on another role. The Pentagon staffs unwittingly abet this unpreparedness by demanding that the Secretary devote himself to rhe role of internal management. No Secretary has come to grief directly through charges of mismanagement; it is the other roles of the Secretary, as this paper will show in a brief history, that can and do result in failure.

History of Defense Seeretaries

JAMES VINCENT FORRESTAL
Age: 55
Tour: 18 months (September 1947-March 1949)

Perhaps humorless and too intense, Forrestal had an understanding of the nature of the cold war that was more realistic than was Truman's. The problem was that he could not secure fiscal or policy agreement among the Chiefs nor could he persuade Truman to give DOD anywhere near adequare funding. Truman lost confidence in Forrestal, on personal and domestic political grounds (Forrestal played footsie with Dewey), and fired him after the 1948 Presidential election. Forrestal, who committed suicide, has been held as a model and a warning to all his successors. His gloomy portrait is the centerpiece of the Secretary's office. He saw his duty; he knew the threat; he lost the confidence of his President.

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LOUIS ARTHUR JOHNSON
Age: 58
Tour: 18 months (March 1949-September 1950)

Depicted as tough, inexperienced and poorly staffed, Johnson antagonized the military. He lost control of the Pentagon when he cancelled the Navy's supercarrier and provoked "the revolt of the admirals." The Navy in turn attacked the concept of U.S. Air Force power in a nuclear war. More serious still, Johnson endorsed Truman's pell-mell demobilization. Historians depict Johnson as the worst Secretary of Defense because he claimed he was eliminating fat when he was cutting muscle. Although in early 1950 Truman ordered less spending for Defense, he made Johnson the scapegoat for our tragic unpreparedness when the Korean war broke out. Consequently, Johnson was fired just as MacArthur was seizing Inchon.

GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL
Age: 70
Tour: 12 months (September 1950-September 1951)

Brought in to restore DOD morale and public image, General Marshall saw the Defense budget tripled in one congressional session. Marshall endorsed Truman's decision to fire MacArthur and led the effort on the Hill to explain the decision.

ROBERT A. LOVETT
Age: 56
Tour: 15 months (September 1951-January 1953)

Well qualified and groomed by Marshall (as his Undersecretary of State and then Deputy Secretary of Defense), Lovett viewed his job as a holding action, with Democrats seeming sure losers in the upcoming Presidential elections. Lovett, a master of negotiation, liked the Chiefs and was able to strike short-term fiscal bargains acceptable to all parties.

CHARLES E. WILSON
Age: 62
Tour: About 5 years (January 1953-October 1957)

Master of the malapropos statement—what was good for General Motors was good for the country—Wilson was only the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Procurement. Eisenhower believed that as President he needed no advice on military strategy and policy, while Dulles ran foreign policy. Wilson was supposed to look after weapons systems, but he couldn't convince Congress that he could do that job. While Ike's policy of the "New Look" relied upon airpower and nuclear retaliation, the "Bomber Gap" hearings and the Bison "fly-by" in the 1955 Moscow May Day parade hurt Wilson's credibility. "Massive Retaliation" frustrated the Army and Navy, who argued their cases in the press. Ridgway was especially outspoken and alienated from Wilson and Eisenhower. Wilson did not know how to whet the proper organizational incentives when there was no profit and loss statement against which to measure investment in different Services, policies, and weapons. He was pressured to resign.

NEIL H. McELROY
Age: 53
Tour: 26 months (October 1957-December 1959)

The Proctor and Gamble man served under the shadow of *sputnik*, his tour dominated by fearful public perceptions of the strategic arms race and by congressional insistence that any successful Soviet test flight proved the existence of a full-blown weapon system. His first priority was Congress, which pushed more money at him than Eisenhower would allow him to spend. With the Services engaged in missile rivalry, McElroy tried to manage by constraining systems and parameters (e.g., an Army missile could not exceed a 200-mile range). Frustrated by the Services'

effort to overcome his strictures, he came, like Wilson, to long for the simplicity of business management. He could neither understand nor really control the Services. Although his procurement decisions were later proven to be sound, Congress and the public had scant faith in him. As Forrestal had said: "You not only have to do a good job, but the public has to be convinced you are doing a good job."

THOMAS GATES
Age: 53
Tour: 14 months (December 1959-January 1961)

Gates felt comfortable, drawing on 6 years' experience in the Navy Secretariat, with the Chiefs and worked hard to persuade them to pull together. He was, however, unable to knock down the politically inspired "missile gap" allegation in the 1960 election. Eisenhower did not permit Nixon even a token increase in Defense. Gates was a better Secretary than John F. Kennedy could publicly admit.

ROBERT STRANGE McNAMARA
Age: 44
Tour: Almost 7 years (January 1961-November 1967)

McNamara centralized peacetime control of defense. He tightened managerial control despite the hostility of the JCS because the fiscal environment was benign: Congress was appropriating successively higher budgets and the readiness of general-purpose forces improved. His procurement practices ran to mixed reviews. While he cancelled the nuclear aircraft, *Snark* and *Skybolt*, his assumption that centralization meant efficiency met disaster in the TFX. The notion of total package procurement, partially the fault of Congress, was ultimately shown to be wasteful. He enjoyed a fine press, legitimacy in academia, and extraordinary relations with JFK and liberal Democrats, a power position that enabled him to influence foreign policy and national security strategy. During the Vietnam War, he lost faith in the methods and purposes that he had initiated. When he lost the trust of the military, the Congress and the White House, he ceased to be Secretary of Defense. In an accidental act of mercy, President Johnson fired him.

CLARK CLIFFORD
Age: 62
Tour: 13 months (December 1967-December 1968)

Chosen for his political skills and counsel to LBJ, Clifford delegated to his subordinates all DOD matters save Vietnam. After Tet of 1968, he was convinced that the war was lost and devoted himself to convincing LBJ in order to minimize the political damage to the Democratic Party.

MELVIN R. LAIRD
Age: 47
Tour: 4 years (January 1969-December 1972)

During Laird's tenure, the public image of the military was at its nadir with My Lai, the Lavelle case, the secret Cambodian bombings and Kent State. The Administration was slashing military manpower, and Congress was growing more hostile each year. But by returning to the Services considerable voice in allocating their shares of the budget, and by assuring them that he was warding off a voracious Congress, Laird succeeded in reducing DOD without provoking disgruntlement—a considerable feat. Intellectually uninterested in strategic or managerial matters, Laird allowed his Deputy to run the building while he concentrated upon politics and withdrawal from Vietnam. In this latter task, because he had an independent power base, he was moderately able to pressure and to disagree with Nixon and Kissinger. Laird understood how to use power and influence.

ELLIOT RICHARDSON
Age: 53
Tour: 4 months (January 1973-April 1973)

Richardson had no effect upon the Department of Defense.

JAMES RODNEY SCHLESINGER
Age: 44
Tour: 29 months (May 1973-October 1975)

Well prepared by intellect and experience (RAND, OMB, AEC, CIA), he modified strategic nuclear doctrine and bolstered general-purpose forces. He dealt well with the Chiefs, using organizational incenrives to induce change (16 divisions vice headquarters, the F-16 vice the F-15). Schlesinger's focus was outside the Pentagon, as both Vietnam and Cambodia were falling. His main concern was the trend in rhe worldwide balance between the Soviets and the United States. Singleminded in his determination to turn around 8 years of reductions in the Defense program, he clashed with Kissinger and he was cut off from communication with President Ford and lost his trust. He was fired, owing to personalities and the impending Presidential elections.

DONALD R. RUMSFELD
Age: 47
Tour: 13 months (November 1975-December 1976)

Ambitious and shrewd, Rumsfeld moved from being Chief of Staff in the White House to the Pentagon. He had the President's trust and was able to resrore funding lost under Schlesinger. Although his tenure was overshadowed by the Presidential election and by the media focus on Kissinger, his greatest achievement was preventing an unequal SALT II.

HAROLD BROWN
Age: 52
Tour: 4 years (January 1977-December 1980)

Acclaimed as intelligent and shy, Brown understood fully Defense programs. However, he was caught in an impossible dilemma: remaining steadfastly loyal to a President who did not believe force should be a major component of international relations, while trying to strengthen U.S. forces. DOD followed the budget and the budget followed domestic politics. Gradually Brown lost considerable support within the military as well as within the Congress. In accordance with Mr. Carter's campaign promise, he initially reduced the Ford defense budget and imposed major cuts in naval forces in favor of land forces for the NATO Central Front. After the Soviers invaded Afghanistan, however, he changed force priorities in favor of non-NATO forces.

Roles of the Secretary of Defense. Even this brief history reveals five key requiremenrs and roles of a Secretary:

1. Retain the confidence of rhe President and the Congress.
2. Manage in war or severe crises.
3. Set policy.
4. Procure adequate resources/dollars.
5. Manage the Department of Defense.

Retaining Confidence. It would seem superfluous to say thar a Defense Secretary must retain the confidence of the President, the Congress and the public. Yet four Secretaries were fired when a President lost faith in them, while three others incurred the severe displeasure of the Congress.

The problem is not resrricted to the capture of a Cabinet officer by parochial special-interest groups. There is an institutional tension between the White House expectation of Cabinet loyalty to the President as a politician and the Defense/military expectation of the Secretary's integrity as the "Keeper of National Security." Clifford was determined to persuade Johnson that the Vietnam War was wrong for the

Democratic Party and for the country. Laird, Packard, Scheslinger, Rumsfeld and Clements—strange bedfellows—had in common opposition to Kissinger's SALT terms and public promises. This opposition was not just about power and personalities; at base the issue was about national security.

Although Defense-White House relations are essential to the job of Secretary of Defense, very few members of the Secretary's staff are involved. Consequently, there are few channels of information and of two-way communications. Too often a Defense Secretary has been blindsided by the White House, because there have been inadequate signals and inadequate dialogue. Therefore, the Reagan administration's proposed increase in White House-Cabinet interaction is of as much benefit to the Defense Secretary as to the President. It will, of course, entail reorganization of the Secretary's staff.

A Secretary must also retain the faith of the Congress. Wilson and McElroy failed to do so because such Soviet spectaculars as *sputnik* evoked no White House agreement with Congress to raise Defense spending even by a token amount. McNamara and Brown also lost the confidence of the Congress.

Crisis/War Management. The second role of the Defense Secretary is as the manager of crises or wars. Eight Secretaries have served during wars. Louis Johnson and Robert McNamara failed in this role, while Marshall, Lovett, Laird and Schlesinger did well. From a management perspective, this role merits a note of caution. Most often, wars and crises involving the United States are not occurring. Therefore, there is a tendency on rhe part of staffs to press for Secretarial decisions on important but rather routine matters. For the past two decades, for instance, most Secretaries have devoted their summers to reviewing OSD budgetary issue papers. Yet whenever a crisis came along, whoever was the Secretary quickly passed the issue paper review to his deputy. Indeed, Clifford's performance in 1968 showed how many tasks could be handled by an able deputy (as Paul Nitze was). A Defense Secretary should, then, insure that there are institutional mechanisms that relieve him of routine decisionmaking yet allow him to intervene on managerial matters of overriding importance.

Set Policy. In the 1950s, Eisenhower and Dulles determined military and foreign policy, while the Secretary of Defense was expected only to look after procurement. The arrangement was not to the benefit of national security nor of the Secretary of Defense. In the sixties, McNamara executed the "Flexible Response" strategy and concocted his one-sided policy/theory of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In the seventies, Defense and State fought each other. Laird struggled against Kissinger, as did Schlesinger. The latter dismantled MAD, while Kissinger stressed détente, negotiations and "linkage," seeking China as a counterweight. Over the past 4 years, friction between State and Defense has grown, especially as regards Southwest Asia and the Middle East.

It would be a mistake to reapply the Eisenhower model to the 1980s. Even given good will among key personalities (which has not existed for a decade), State and Defense represent different interests that are bound to conflict on many occasions. The first task of State, today, is to regain allied confidence and cooperation. The first role of Defense is to strengthen deterrence in the Persian Gulf. The danger is that a rush to SALT would deemphasize both priorities. In the longer run, Defense must articulate a coherent overarching security policy, as Massive Retaliation was to the fifties, Flexible Response was to the sixties and Strategic Retreat was to the seventies. Defense cannot abdicate to State responsibility for security policy, although it will be tempting to do so.

Secure Resources. This role brought to grief Wilson, McElroy, Gates and Schlesinger. For the next few years, money should not be a major issue, provided the Services will agree and provided military pay is a firm Secretarial priority. Laird kept the loyalty of the Chiefs on a decreasing budget; SecDef concern and honesty about the limits to Republican (and national) largesse can prevent stories about "hollow" armies and "unready" navies. This is not meant to be either Rafshoonian or Pollyannaish. Unless there is a remarkable change in our allies, within 4 years some tough, radical policy options will be needed for determining the type, missions and deployments of U.S. forces. For this reason, Defense must establish a respected policymaking role. If rhe international security environment does continue to deteriorate, the Secretary must eventually be able to speak out on the basis of a reputation for thoughtful policymaking.

Manage DoD. Forrestal said: "The peacetime mission of the Armed Services is to destroy the Secretary of Defense." Drucker, in his book *Management,* claims DoD is "unmanageable" because of its size and complexity. According to polls, the public believes the poor state of military readiness is caused by inefficiency, not by a lack of funds. Obviously, Defense suffers from a severe image problem.

But it is not evident that Defense is less efficient now than it was, say, 20 years ago; or that it is less efficient than other areas of the public sector or the military establishments of other nations. Lacking such evidence, it would be a mistake for the Secretary to place internal management as his rop priority. That is the full-time task of one of his Deputy Secreraries. Moreover, there is no profit goal or share of the market against which to measure progress. "Reducing cosr overruns" is a dubious and long-run measure; (e.g., the F-18 cost overruns became a major problem 5 years after the initial development decision).

Still, routine management is seductive. An examination of the records of one Defense Secretary showed that his allocation of time closely paralleled that of a Chief Executive Officer of a large corporarion. See Table 1.

Note that the time period of the sample of the Secretary is 1975. That was during the srewardship of James Schlesinger, hardly a hero to American management theory. Presumably the

TABLE I—ALLOCATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS' CONTACT TIME

	SecDef[1]	U.S. CEOs[2]	
Congress	14%	Directors	7%
Cabinet Level Peers	21%	Peers	16%
Military	16%		
Own Staff[3]	32%	Subordinates	48%
Press	6%	Clients	20%
Self	11%	Other	8%
	100%		99%

[1]*Source:* 1242 hours in SecDef "In/Out" log for 1975.

[2]Harvard Business School article on *The Manager's Job,* by H. Mintzberg, July, 1975.

[3]Includes military on OSD staff end SecDef military assistants.

records of other Defense Secretaries, more prone to internal management, would show more time devoted to discussions with line subordinates.

Hazarding Predictions About the Pivotal SecDef Issues, 1980-84.

Role 1. *Confidence of the President.* Does not present a problem.

Role 2. *Managing Crises/War.* This may emerge as the most serious issue. Our physical and economic security is affected by conflicts around the globe; allied solidarity does not exist; the effective use of American power has waned.

Role 3. *Setting Policy.* An absolute must. Our nuclear doctrine, especially in regard to extended deterrence and the nuclear umbrella for NATO, needs clarification. Equally as critical is a coherent military strategy, in a global context, for Southwest Asia.

Role 4. *Procuring Resources.* Dollars will not be the major problem, provided the military and the Secretary agree from the very start on a set of reasonable, mutual expectations and provided the Secretary is strong on military pay.

Role 5. *Internal Management.* Manpower, not procurement, will be the issue in 1982 or 1983. How to draft—or not to draft—will be the question that will challenge the Secretary's ability to retain credibility and confidence on the Hill, with the President and with the military. This issue could well be dramatized by a serious crisis or conflict.

Heretical though it seems, there is probably too much emphasis upon the role of Secretary as internal manager. Several of his other roles loom as more critical in the 1980s; Defense does not lack for managers throughout the Secretary's staff and the military; and history shows that no Secretary has failed for poor management, while many have failed because they neglected other roles.

NAVAL TACTICS: EXAMPLES AND ANALOGIES

by

Frank Uhlig, Jr.*

> The naval neglect of tactical study, the absence of tactical textbooks, and the secrecy which by custom had enshrouded the meagre instructions, have ever been a source of wonder to soldiers, who know from history and experience that good and flexible tactics in an army are essentially the product of ceaseless reflection and discussion by many minds.
>
> B.H. Liddell Hart,
> *The Real War 1914-1918,* 1930

Naval tactics consist of the actions taken by a commander to seek battle or avoid it, to continue battle or break it off, and, when engaged, to bring the optimum amount of fire possible upon the enemy as quickly as possible for as long as necessary to achieve his purpose.

The tactics a commander will employ will depend largely on his given task and that he believes to be the enemy's; on the nature and number, or "capabilities," of the sensors and weapons he has and believes his opponents to have; and on the prevailing natural conditions.

Naval tactics are said by some to be in disarray, by others to be stagnant. Either way, the reasons given for the condition usually arise from the vast changes that have taken place in the last generation or so in naval sensors and weapons. Indeed, some observers even have questioned whether there any longer is such a thing as naval tactics.

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The point of this inquiry is to structure the tasks of the naval tactician and to describe the means by which he accomplishes them. Both examples from the past and suppositions for the present are employed to illustrate the various categories of these tasks and means.

Two tables are included, one showing the nature of naval sensors and weapons from the time of galley fleets to our own time and the other showing the ranges of these sensors and weapons. Also listed are the tactical situations likely to occur in naval war and the natural conditions likely to affect or perhaps even govern those tactics. In each case at least one example, usually from a 20th-century war, occasionally from an earlier one, is provided. Finally, analogies are made between the tactics of the past and those of the present.

The tactical tasks a naval commander is likely to face appear to number six: to protect a valuable entity, afloat or ashore; to thwart an enemy purpose or harm a valuable entity, afloat or ashore; to seek out and engage an enemy force; to avoid an enemy force; to break off a battle; and to mislead an enemy. Of these, the first two are of greatest importance. To accomplish them, a commander usually must employ one or more of the other four. In contrast, a commander may pursue one of the lesser four without concerning himself about valuable entities, friendly or hostile. The battles of Santiago in 1898 and Jutland in 1916 provide examples of the latter.

Some examples of the former: first, to protect a valuable entity. This can be done by avoiding battle, by protecting without battle (though making no effort to avoid battle), and by engaging in battle. An example of the first might be found in the action of any convoy escort commander in any war who, in contact with an enemy, changes course when darkness falls in order to get the convoy out of danger. This happened, or it was attempted, frequently enough in the North Atlantic in World War II. Two examples from that same war in the Pacific, rather different because in both cases the foe, though near, never was in contact and never sensed what was happening, were the Japanese evacuations of Guadalcanal early in 1943 and later that same year of Kiska in the Aleutians. At Guadalcanal all the Japanese efforts took place at night. Despite the presence nearby of American troops, aircraft, and ships, every living Japanese soldier on Guadalcanal was removed to safety by the Imperial Navy.

At Kiska there were no American troops on the island, but American airbases were close and American ships were conducting a blockade. But the evacuation was a complete success, largely through the use of cover provided by dense fog.

To protect without either engaging in battle or attempting to avoid it implies that contact, at least, occurs between the opposing forces. After their initial action in the spring of 1862, both *Monitor* and *Virginia* protected valuable entities without action. Behind the shield provided by *Monitor*, General McClellan was able to land his army on the Peninsula and carry out his long, if eventually unsuccessful, campaign to capture Richmond. At the same time, *Virginia* protected the rear of the Confederate forces, and Richmond itself, from an attack by McClellan up the James.

A more recent example occurred in the winter of 1941 when the slow but heavily armed battleship *Ramillies*, by her mere presence, frustrated an attack by the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* on the convoy under her care. A month later another old battleship, *Malaya*, performed the same service for the convoy under her protection when those same German ships approached. In both cases as a result of the inferior speed of their ships the

TABLE I—NATURE OF WEAPONS AND SENSORS

	Weapons	Sensors
Galley fleets:	Ram ship (to cut oars) Bows and arrows Catapults (for launching rocks or fire pots) Boarders	Eyes and ears
Sail fleets:	Gun Boarders Fire ships	Eyes and ears
19th-century steam:	Gun Mine	Eyes and ears
Early 20th-century steam:	Gun Mine	Eyes and ears Torpedo
WWI:	Torpedo (sub and surface) Mine Gun Depth charge	Eyes and ears Radio intercept (ashore)
WWII:	Torpedo (sub, air, surface) Bomb (air) Mine (sub, air, surface) Gun (surface, air) Rocket (air) Depth charge (surface, air) Thrown ASW weapon (surface)	Eyes and ears Radio intercept (ashore) Sonar Radar (afloat, aloft, and ashore)
Present:	Ballistic missile (sub, shore) Guided missile (sub-surface, surface-surface, surface-air, air-surface, air-air) Torpedo (sub-sub, sub-surface, surface-sub, surface-surface, air-sub air-surface) Depth charge (air-sub, surface-sub) Gun (surface-surface, surface-air, air-surface, surface-shore, air-air) Rocket (air-surface) Bomb (air-surface) Nuclear weapons Electronic measures, ECM, ECCM	Eyes and ears Electronic intercept Radar Sonar Photography Infrared and laser (Fixed undersea and ashore, afloat, aloft, and in satellites)

TABLE II—WEAPON AND SENSOR RANGES

Galley fleets:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	a few hundred feet or vessels touching.
Sail fleets:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted to horizon.
Weapons:	half mile or less, often vessels touching.
19th-century steam:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	3 miles or less, sometimes vessels touching.
Early 20th-century steam:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon.
Weapons:	3 miles or less, to a few hundred yards for torpedoes.
WWI:	
Sensors:	as surface visibility permitted, to horizon. Some air. Radio intercepts: hundreds of miles.
Weapons:	guns 7 or 8 miles; torpedoes, 1 mile; depth charges, right over.
WWII:	
Sensors:	radar to horizon independent of surface visibility, to 100 miles to or from air. Sonar: one-half mile or less. Radio intercept: thousands of miles.
Weapons:	airborne, 100-200 miles; guns, 12 miles or less; torpedoes, 12 miles or less; depth charges, right over; ahead-thrown ASW, one-quarter mile or less.
Present:	
Sensors:	Eyes and ears; radio intercept thousands of miles; radar, to surface horizon, to air over 200 miles; sonar, to 10 miles or less (sometimes more, often less); airborne radar, to hundreds of miles fixed undersea unknown; satellite to thousands of miles from force.
Weapons:	ballistic missiles, hundreds, more commonly thousands, of miles; SSM to horizon and, with help, hundreds of miles; Sub-SSM, to 60 miles; SAM, 3 to 40 miles; ASM, 3 to 150 miles; AAM, 3 to 75 miles; torpedoes, to 10 miles; depth charges, to 5 miles; guns, to 8 or 9 miles; bombs and rockets, near; All airborne, to hundreds of miles from base or force; EM, ECM, ECCM to hundreds of miles.

defending captains had to be content with their pacific achievements. Though strategically, and in every other way, it would have been desirable to sink the swift raiders, tactically the results were satisfactory, for the convoys the old battleships were sent to protect were indeed protected.

Whether the decision to protect a beach or a harbor entrance with coastal fortifications or with a minefield is a tactical decision may be debated. But certainly the result intended is tactical: to prevent an enemy from landing here, from bombarding that place, or from using this harbor. The German minefields off Normandy had such purpose, and failed. The strong coastal fortifications at Malta and Gibraltar, though untested, may be said to have succeeded because they were not tested. The 15-inch guns protecting the entrance to Singapore succeeded, for no enemy fleet attempted invasion, bombardment, or entry into the harbor. The Japanese invasion was carried out successfully elsewhere and it was the other elements of defense that failed. The same could be said of the coastal defenses at Corregidor which, without firing a shot, kept Japanese ships out of Manila Bay until long after the shores of the Bay had been taken from the landside.

Of course, except in the case of the minefields and coastal forts, one doesn't often expect to defend without battle. That certainly was not the desire of the commanding officers of *Ramillies* and *Malaya*. It was simply the best they could do with the instruments at hand, and for their immediate purposes it was good enough. But the pacific defense succeeded because the instruments, if not fast enough to force an action on an unwilling foe, clearly were powerful enough to sink an enemy who dared to come within range of their weapons.

But when his foe is prepared to risk damage to his force—as Admiral Lütjens, commanding *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, was not—the defender must then fight. His purpose, of course, is defensive—to protect the entity—be it ships or a city within his care. Any convoy in any war will illustrate that.

In 1794 Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse was sent out from Brest with 26 ships of the line to cover the passage of a convoy of 117 ships filled with grain for the starving millions of revolutionary France. His instructions were "to avoid a battle unless it were necessary to save the convoy." Villaret-Joyeuse did find it necessary to fight and he did lose against Admiral Howe's more skillful officers and seamen, also in 26 ships of the line. But the convoy got through.

On most occasions in the Civil War Confederate warships had a similar tactical purpose, although the entity to be protected was a port or city rather than a convoy. For example, in 1864 the ironclad ram *Tennessee* and her accompanying gunboats at Mobile Bay, in conjunction with the harbor defense forts, fought to defend the port of Mobile from Farragut's fleet. In the event they proved unsuccessful, but first Farragut had to build up his squadron to a size he thought sufficient for success. In the meantime the port was available to those fast cargo ships that could evade the Federal blockade.

For more recent examples, one may look at the Japanese invasion of Java at the end of February 1942. When the Allies, under Dutch Admiral Doorman, sailed to intercept the invasion convoys, though they were strategically on the defensive, tactically they were on the offensive. Japanese Admiral Takagi, defending the convoys, intercepted the Allies, defeated them soundly, and the invasion transports went forward to land their troops on Java. Later that same year, at Guadalcanal, the Japanese began shelling the American airbase on the island, Henderson Field. To defend that airfield the American Fleet met the Japanese in three fierce night actions, Cape Esperance and the two battles of Guadalcanal.

In June 1944 when the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Ozawa responded to the American invasion of Saipan, Admiral Spruance, even though he had greater power than his opponent, fought a defensive action for he felt that his primary requirement was to protect the troops and invasion shipping which were placed in his care.

Later that same year, after the American invasion of Leyte and rhe ensuing Japanese response which, strategically, was defensive, the American destroyers and destroyer escorts screening Admiral Sprague's escort carriers found themselves in a desperate defensive battle against Admiral Kurita's battleships and heavy cruisers. Kurita's ships threarened to wipe out the escort carriers and those amphibious ships that had nor yet left the invasion beaches. Between the airplanes of the escort carriers and the destroyers and DEs, the defense was successful.

So much for the tactical defensive. But each defense, whether successful or not, presupposes an attack by someone else. Offensively, there is not so clear-cut a trio of roles. It is hard to thwart or harm without fighting, much less by avoiding a bartle, as Lütjen's example suggests. It is not impossible, but usually this is a matter of srrategy—the imposition of a blockade, for example—rather than something within the tactical reach of a commander at sea. The surface raider of past wars who found a merchant ship sailing singly and, after removing her crew, sank her or perhaps sent her into port as a prize, might be said to have destroyed or seized an entity without battle. And the same might be said of the cruiser or gunboat who captured a blockade runner. Once such actions were a commonplace in naval warfare, but no longer.

It might be said that a minefield, such as that laid off Haiphong in 1972, was an example of deterrence without destruction, but the decision to lay that field was not taken by a tactical commander. Rather it was a strategic decision and, though it did serve its purpose in deterring the enemy's ships from attempting passage into Haiphong with the goods of war, it does not qualify in this search for tactical deterrence withour destruction. A better case might be made for the surveillance of the South Viernamese coast by ships, boats, and airplanes of the U.S. and South Vietnamese Navies. True enough, the decision to conduct such surveillance was a strategic one, taken in order to foil the supply of arms to enemy forces in South Vietnam. And, no doubt, it was on a strategic plane that the surveillance was most effective. But on occasion trawlers did attempt to run the surveillance forces. Those that attempted the run but were prevented from entering a forbidden zone off the South Vietnamese coasr by the presence nearby of patrolling vessels or aircraft may be said to have been deterred tactically from achieving their purpose.

Another interesting example, clear in its effect, took place as a result of the Battle of the Komandorski Islands in March 1943 when an American squadron attacked a Japanese convoy destined for the garrisons on Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians. As it turned out, the Japanese escort was too strong for the American attackers. Even so, the eventual result, without any ships sunk, was that the Japanese were deterred from their purpose because their admiral turned around and brought his convoy home. Thereafter the Japanese attempted no more supply convoys to the Aleutians. But this nearly bloodless Japanese frustration turned out that way as a result of an American attempt to destroy the convoy, not because the Americans attempted to deter the Japanese without fighting.

A similar example of much greater importance occurred off the Chesapeake Capes in 1781 when Admiral de Grasse, with 24 ships of the line, foiled an attempt by Admiral Graves, with 21

ships, to enter the Chesapeake and bring support to the British Army besieged at Yorktown. A battle occurred. No ships were sunk. But when it was over, Graves was headed back to New York and de Grasse was still at the mouth of the Chesapeake. Cornwallis' surrender soon followed.

In both cases, the Komandorski Islands and the Chesapeake Capes, though one side frustrated the efforts of the other without having either sunk or lost any ships, a battle was fought. It was a matter of determination, or rather the absence of determination, that decided the result. It is difficult to see how in either case the successful commander could have achieved the result he did without offering battle.

In the main, it seems clear, the tactical effort to deter an enemy, or to destroy, disable, or seize an entity, will lead to battle. The convoy battles mentioned, whether the attackers were submarines, surface ships, or airplanes (for example, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in March 1943 when U.S. Army light bombers sank all eight transports and four of eight escorts bound for New Guinea), depended on the attacker forcing a battle. When Admiral Kurita engaged American destroyers and DEs at Samar, he did so in order to get at the escort carriers in the distance (which he mistook for fleet carriers) and at the transports over the horizon. The same is true if the entity is ashore, as was Henderson Field. The only way the Japanese could harm that field tactically was to attack it. Because American warships placed themselves in the way, a battle first had to be fought. In short, almost invariably, the tactical offensive, unlike the tactical defensive, requires battle in order to be successful.

There are other situations in which the objective is the enemy's force, irrespective of whether there is an entity to be attacked or defended. Sometimes there is nothing but the enemy's force, as at Jutland in 1916. In such cases the foe must be sought out, lured if necessary, as Beatty sought out and engaged Hipper, as Hipper then lured Beatty into the range of Scheer's guns, and as Beatty, in turn, lured both unsuspecting German commanders into the trap Jellicoe was setting.

More examples of cases in which the objective was the enemy's force come easily: Howe against Villaret-Joyeuse in 1794, Spruance at Midway with his deadly strike at Nagumo's carriers, Mikawa against the American cruisers at Savo Island, Halsey with his pursuit of Ozawa's carriers at Cape Engano, and the Allied air and surface sweeps against U-boats at sea in World War II.

In the strategic sense not all of these were as successful as they might have been. An argument can be made that Howe should have sought out the grain convoy rather than spend time destroying Villaret-Joyeuse's command, that Mikawa should have gone on to sink the American transports after disposing of the cruisers. Such questions are after-the-battle critiques, but they really address the basic issue most tactical commanders should consider before they engage: whether they should seek out the enemy's fighting ships or the entity those fighting ships so often are at sea to protect. Does destruction of the enemy's fighting ships mean that the entities they had been protecting would inevitably be destroyed eventually by the successful attacker? Or should the attacker, if at all possible, bypass the defending fighting forces and go straight for the valuable entity?

In both World Wars the German U-boats sought to get at the entities directly. There is no question of that being the role of today's ballistic missile submarines.

On the other hand, Spruance's attack on the enemy's fighting ships did halt the invasion of Midway even though he did not sink a single Japanese transport. Halsey's similar attack on what he took to be the enemy's primary fighting

ships did nothing for the safety of the invasion force he was trying to protect. He sought the tactical offensive when his proper role was the tactical defensive. Likewise the air and surface sweeps against U-boats, more strategic than tactical in nature (they found few submarines against which to bring tactics to bear), were by and large a failure—not one of the spirit, for it is right to seek out an enemy, but of the mind, for it is wrong to seek out an enemy where he is not when at the same time he is sinking ships at other places.

It is common enough to avoid the enemy when his force is much more powerful than one's own. To avoid him, however, and still seek to do him harm, is difficult. One example: Somerville's effort in April 1942 off Ceylon to avoid getting in range of Nagumo's five carriers and 300 airplanes during the day, and closing with his two carriers at night so that his 80 antiquated airplanes could strike. He succeeded in his first aim, but not in his second.

Suppose one finds oneself in a battle he has sought and then discovers his foe is far stronger than he, as indeed Scheer did at Jutland when he found himself under the guns of the entire Grand Fleet, or as the American McMorris did at the Komandorski Islands when he found his opponent not to be a weakly defended convoy but one guarded by an enemy twice as powerful as he?

His tactical task, then, suddenly changes from an offensive effort to crush a weak foe into an effort to break off from a powerful one. These examples, and many another—Iachino at Cape Matapan, the surprised Goto at Cape Esperance, Kinkaid at Santa Cruz, Omori at Empress Augusta Bay in 1943, and Ozawa at the Philippine Sea in 1944—show that breaking off can be done, and the frequency of such events suggests it is in the tactical commander's interest to have the skill to do so.

One other tactical situation remains to be examined: that of misleading an enemy. Already mentioned is the best known example in the 20th century, the occasion when Ozawa with his four toothless carriers ostentatiously sailed south toward the Philippines, luring Halsey's powerful carrier force away from the invasion shipping he was supposed to protect. This afforded Kurita's battleships and cruisers the freedom to fall upon the American ships who imagined they were being shielded by Halsey. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the stout American defense by the escort carriers and their screen foiled Kurita's tactical offensive. Another example of a successful effort at misleading the enemy occurred in April 1940 when the German battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* lured Admiral Whitworth and his force, built around the battle cruiser *Renown*, away from the entrance to Narvik for long enough to permit 10 German destroyers bearing troops for the capture of that port to reach their destination unmolested.

What are the natural elements that can affect, and may even govern, the tactics of naval forces? Are they the same as in times past? Are there more of them? Or fewer of them?

There now appear to be eight, a number substantially higher than in the days of the galley, the square rigger, or the early steamer. They are: the presence of land nearby, the depth of water, the force and direction of the wind, the sea state, the visibility from the surface, the visibility from aloft, the electronic conditions, and the sonic (water condition for sonar) conditions.

Of these one can go back as far as the Battle of Salamis and find how the presence of land shaped the tactics of the opposing commanders, and he can come right up through World War II. For example, in the Solomons, Japanese destroyers could steam close enough to the many islands as to be invisible to the

American lookouts while their radar returns on American scopes were masked by the returns of the island. In the dash up the English Channel by *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* in February 1942, the presence of land meant not only that the ships could be provided air cover the entire distance by shore-based German fighters but that they could also be attacked by shore-based British aircraft and by motor torpedo boats. Equally, it meant that they were not likely to be attacked by any of the more powerful British battleships, which preferred to operate far from land.

The depth of water has always been a concern to a naval commander, for where he cannot go he cannot fight. More than that, if the foe's ships are bigger, one can escape by fleeing into water too shallow for the enemy to enter. The Federal blockade of the southern ports in the Civil War provides examples of this for, at the beginning of the war, most Federal warships were of too deep draft to maintain a close blockade, and commercial ships did not have a hard time passing in and out of those harbors. Similarly in the Vietnam war, in order to control coastal and inshore shipping off South Vietnam, such seagoing ships as destroyers, destroyer escorts, and minesweepers proved unsatisfactory. It was only after small Coast Guard cutters, drawing 6 feet, and even smaller Swift boats, drawing 4½ feet, came onto the scene that the coastal surveillance became effective. And even those boats were too deep draft for control of river traffic. That had to wait until the coming of the PBRs, which drew only 18 inches.

The Civil War example and that in Vietnam are not different from those of the days of galleys and square riggers. But now the depth of water is even more important to the tactician than it was in olden times, for now it influences where submarines and mines can be found. Generally the deeper the water the more likely the presence of the submarine, the shallower the more likely the presence of the mine. Most of the Channel dash took place in shallow water and on that occasion the mines of both sides had a major influence on events. During the Korean war the American fast carriers supporting troops ashore eschewed the shallow, easily mined Yellow Sea, taking their chance in the deep Sea of Japan where neutral Soviet submarines (and, for that matter, airplanes and surface ships) might intervene, but didn't. Even there, the carriers chose to avoid crossing inside the 100-fathom curve where mines might be lying.

The Allied debacle at the Java Sea in 1942 was followed by attempts by the surviving Allied warships to escape. Four American destroyers slid through a shallow passage between Bali and Java and reached safety. But the cruisers, too deep draft for that, all perished under the fire of superior Japanese forces while attempting to make it to safety via the Sunda Strait.

The modern antisubmarine ship equipped with a large, low-frequency sonar will probably find it easier to detect a lurking submarine in deep water than she will where the water is shallow. Because of her great size, the modern submarine will also probably prefer to be in deep water than in shallow.

The force and direction of the wind, important to the oar-driven galleys, continued to dominate fighting during the age of sail. After the coming of steam, this factor appeared to be in eclipse as a consideration for the tactician. But even at Jutland, where there was little wind, it was important, for when one's own funnel and gun smoke rolled between one's own ships and those of the enemy, it became impossible for the gunners to see. Under the same circumstances it also made escape possible under cover of a smoke screen. In our own time the carrier, if not nearly so beholden to the

force and direction of the wind as was the square rigger, still finds her movements during launch and recovery of aircraft dictated by the wind. Though it took place nearly 40 years ago, the Battle of the Philippine Sea between two carrier forces makes this point clear: When the Americans wanted to launch or recover aircraft, they had to turn and steam rapidly away from their enemy because the wind they needed was from the east. But the Japanese could keep right on going while launching and recovering, for east was where they were going anyway. While airplanes and their carriers have changed a lot since 1944, these facts haven't.

Sea state is closely associated with the force and direction of the wind. If the sea is rough it is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to fight. When surprised in very heavy weather by a lone British destroyer, the German destroyers en route to Narvik in 1940 found it almost impossible to shoot their guns; it was not until a cruiser showed up that the lone enemy was sunk. Later on, while the German destroyers were slipping into the fjord, the state of the sea prevented British destroyers with *Renown* from raking an effective part in the action with *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* when those German ships lured *Renown* force away from the entrance to Narvik.

And at Coronel in 1914 it was the rough sea off the Chilean coast that prevented Cradock's cruisers from firing their low, casemated guns and made even worse their inferiority to Graf Spee's ships.

The visibility at the surface usually decided whether there would be a battle at all, for if there was no enemy to be seen, there was no enemy to be fought. Jutland, of course, even though fought by steam-driven ships armed with long-range guns, was an example. The mist, compounded by the smoke of funnels and guns, meant that ships seldom were able to shoot at the ranges they could fire in clear weather. It meant, also, that the commander of the British Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe, seldom saw his opponents and then only fleetingly, three or four ships at a time.

Nearly 30 years later, at Samar, the surprised American escort carriers successfully made use of every patch of rain they could find in order to hide from the Japanese gunners, while the destroyers and destroyer escorts further reduced the visibility artificially with smoke screens, protecting both themselves and the carriers from Japanese fire.

The foregoing natural factors have been important since men began fighting at sea. The next three are new to this century. The first of these is visibility from aloft. Rain clouds made themselves useful in the Coral Sea in 1942, this time against attackers from the air. The Japanese *Zuikaku*, ducking under a cloud, made herself invisible to American torpedo planes and dive bombers and so saved herself from attack. At Jutland more than half a century ago it was the low-lying cloud that made the German scouting zeppelins useless to Scheer. It also made useless the lone British seaplane that took part in the battle, for when the airplane was aloft in the action it had to get above the clouds to be high enough to see both fleets. And, of course, when it was above the clouds it could see nothing at all.

At Midway it was the opposite condition, excellent visibility, that permitted the searching American dive bombers to find the Japanese carriers when they proved not to be in their anticipated position, and quickly led to the destruction of three of them.

Nowadays darkness, heavy cloud, and rain will keep all aircraft on the ground or flight deck except those that are truly "all-weather."

Even more recent a natural influence on the naval tactician than visibility from aloft is that of electronic conditions in the atmosphere. Normally the atmosphere has little influence on what

is seen on the radar scope. But there are times when it will cause scopes to show what is not there or fail to show what is there. The best known example of this is the "Battle of the Pips" that took place off the Aleutians in 1943. A powerful American force fired for hours during the darkness at targets that, at dawn proved to be totally imaginary. More than 30 years later, in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1964, even though something showed on the scopes of one American destroyer, the conditions were such that there is no certainty, even to this day, whether there really was a second attack, at night, by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against the American destroyers. Of the first attack, which took place by day, there is no question.

The final natural condition, also a fairly new one for the tactician to consider, is that of sonic conditions. No great battle so far has been won or lost because of sonic conditions in a particular place at a particular time. But when conditions were good, as often in the North Atlantic, an otherwise suitable antisubmarine escort had a good chance of prospering. When conditions were bad, as often in the Mediterranean, a similar escort might fail when confronted by submarines.

It would be hard to believe that the tasks enumerated and the natural influences listed will not be part of the tactical scene in the future. Who is to say that never will he have to protect some important place ashore or, perhaps, have to evade some more powerful foe? Who is to deny that submarine captains often find it useful to see the enemy they are about to engage and that, when they do, surface and aerial lookouts have an opportunity to see them if the visibility is good enough?

But, in an age of instant long-distance communications, satellite-borne sensors, missiles launched from afar, and nuclear weapons, do naval tactics really have a place? Do they exist? Have these material advances abolished naval tactics? Or have they simply provided new instruments that the tactician must learn how to use and, when they are in the enemy's hands, to overcome?

Tactically, the long-distance communications from some headquarters or capital can be useful to the commander at sea if they inform him of developments affecting his situation: friendly forces or enemy entering or leaving his area of concern, for example. This is no different from the radio signals Jellicoe received in 1916 or the cables sent Sampson by his scouts in 1898. Indeed, satellites are to be seen in the same way as Sampson's auxiliary cruisers were—far distant, perhaps useful in providing information, but sometimes subject to delay and mistake. The distance of the source of information appears immaterial. Jellicoe was ill-served both by his cruiser commander, Beatty, when the latter was only 5 or 6 miles away and by the Admiralty in London, hundreds of miles away which, not long before contact was made with Scheer, informed Jellicoe that the German Fleet was still in harbor. The tactical leader of the future should be prepared for more of the same, whether the source be satellites, radio intercepts, or whatever.

And just as Scheer could do little about British intelligence of his movements to sea, neither can the modern commander protect himself against satellites. He can be grateful for what cover clouds and darkness provide, and for the inefficiencies and delays perhaps inherent in satellite systems, and he can be hopeful that some other commander is either destroying those satellites or in some way ruining their communications. Be that as it may, he, just as Scheer, will have to face whatever the foe sends his way.

The main things about modern naval warfare as they affect the tactician appear to be the range of sensors and weapons, their variety, their destructive power (especially if nuclear), and the

speeds at which they can be used by him or against him. Modern naval weapons also are largely independent of the launching ship's course and speed. True enough, for their aircraft to become airborne (and ro be recovered), carriers must usually turn into the wind. But once rhe aircraft are airborne, they have their own tacrics that are independent of the launching ship's movements. Missiles have even greater independence of the launching ship's course and speed than do airplanes, for they can be launched regardless of ship's heading and can also maneuver to meet the situation at the target. The essence of this seems to be that tactics revolves about sensors and weapons, rather than about the ships bearing them. The main advantage or threat they offer, stemming from their range, speed, destructive power, and variety, is surprise. Concentration there must be, of course, but it is a concentration of weapons arriving at the target, not a concentration of weapon-bearing ships.

The ranges at which battles likely will be fought may have made the speed of ships less important tactically than formerly: While one may still wish to close a distant enemy or open out on him rapidly, there is no need for a burst of high speed so one can cap the T of an enemy 5 miles away.

It is clear that the surface force commander armed with long-range missiles has been provided with some of the qualities carrier and other aviation commanders have long enjoyed. His tactics should begin to resemble those of the carrier commander, for not only does he now have some of the advantages of range, speed, and variety, but he also has the disadvantages of having only a few launching platforms and, per platform, only a few weapons. His weapons are expensive and, if some of them have nuclear warheads, there may be military, political, or scientific considerations that bar their use, thus reducing further the number of weapons readily available.

The convoy escort commander is faced with an invisible, quiet foe, often faster than he is, but one who has become expensive (hence, scarce), large (hence, less willing than ever to enter shallow water), and perhaps harder to replace than many of his porential victims (hence, perhaps inclined to caution). The submarine's main weapon, if a torpedo, has a range of a few miles; if a missile launched from a submerged position, a range from below the horizon; and if a missile launched from the surface, a range of 100 miles or more. The escort commander may not know which of these, or how many of each, oppose him. But against the torpedo-armed submarine he has a sonar and usually a rocket-assisted torpedo of range similar to that of the submarine's torpedo. Against a submarine able to fire from below the horizon, he has helicopters to bear his sensors and weapons. And against a submarine firing from hundreds of miles distant, he has his short and medium-range weapons for use against the enemy's source of target information that must not be far distant. He is also being provided with weapons to aim at incoming missiles themselves which, unlike shells and bombs, are large enough, slow enough, expensive enough, and scarce enough to warrant the effort. Moreover, he, like his foe, might well have access to distant sources of information with which best to employ his weapons.

Tactical analogies with the past exist in profusion. For example, the modern tactician using chaff to protect his force from radar-homing missiles is doing the same thing as the destroyer commanders at Jutland and Samar did when they threw up a smoke screen to protect friendly forces from the fire of a powerful enemy. Indeed, smoke itself could still be useful against TV-guided or other optically dependent missiles.

The electronically active destroyers who lure the enemy's airplanes in their direction while the convoy they are protecting proceeds silently and safely under EmCon are performing the same service Ozawa provided Kurita in 1944. The submarine commander who takes advantage of the protective layers of water while he prepares to launch his weapon against a carrier is doing the same thing as the Japanese destroyer captains in the Solomons who launched their torpedoes in darkness against American cruisers from beyond the effective range of the cruisers' guns. The fleet commander who brings to bear simultaneously on an enemy squadron the aircraft of a couple of widely separated carriers, or the missiles from half a dozen widely separated submarines, is performing the same task as Togo did when, with his concentrated battleline, he capped Rozhestvensky's T.

In brief, what the tactician of today must do is to widen his horizons to those of his sensors and his weapons. It is they, more often than his ships, that he must manipulate. Assuming forces of similar power, the commander who best does this is the one most likely to win. Tactics live!





PROFESSIONAL READING

BOOK REVIEWS

Berman, Ronald, ed. *Solzhenitsyn at Harvard: The Address, Twelve Early Responses, and Six Later Reflections.* Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1980. 143pp.

Solzhenitsyn's Harvard commencement address in 1978 was sufficiently big to create a new elephant for exploration by those groping for support for their own predilections, such as the tail is a rope, etc. This book is an attempt to reinterpret the speech and early "journalistic" responses by compiling them with six "new interpretive" essays. The book is organized into three sections; the speech, early responses and later reflections. Ronald Berman is both editor and contributor, and because his is the overarching view and voice, it is tempting to zoom past Solzhenitsyn to Berman. However, it seems essential at least to read the speech and, at the start, to accept what the speaker says to the letter and in the spirit of his major concern—the purpose of life. In this respect, it might be best to start at the end—the 17th part of the speech—then go back to the beginning. In the end, Solzhenitsyn is pleading for a spiritual life and even provides a way, "Only by the voluntary nurturing in ourselves of freely accepted and serene self-restraint can mankind rise above the world stream of materialism" and it is clear that he is a believer in God and man's responsibility to God and to society as the source of spirituality with which to oppose technological materialistic emptiness and legalistic selfishness.

The second part of the book, the early responses, mainly demonstrates the natural defensive tendencies of those who represent the groups directly connected with the aspects of Western life most criticized, e.g., the press. The criticism in these 12 pieces may be hasty, but is not entirely superficial. Olga Andreyev Carlisle's "Solzhenitsyn's Invisible Audience" coincides with a similar point made in the *Naval War College Review* article, "Solzhenitsyn in Harvard Yard: An Old Believer Spoke from the New World" (February 1979). Without referring to Solzhenitsyn's 5 September 1973 "Letter to the Soviet Leaders," which provides rich detail, she identifies him with the new Russian nationists, the *Russity*, their fear of China and contempt for Marxism, etc. Ms. Carlisle is an artist and writer who helped in the publication of two of Solzhenitsyn's books in the West before he was exiled. The thrust of her thought (and mine expressed in the *Review* article) is at odds with Berman's "Through Western Eyes."

In part three, Berman says,

> . . . The most important single thing that can be said of "A World Split Apart" is that it is a reading of the West through Western eyes. The early commentators had one reaction in common: they found the speech to be different from

their expectations. Having done so, they were ready to think that it was outside their experience and traditions. But to read his speech in scholarly tranquility is to be aware of its intellectual familiarity. Any basic library of Western thought will contain its ideas; dozens of writers from St. Augustine on would find in it some of their own thoughts . . . . But the common reader will find even more. We recognize in "A World Split Apart" the literature of our own century . . . . It is not particularly the Slavophile movement but modernism that has shown us the great artistic themes of conflict within the human mind, hollowness in our social and political ideas, and the responsibility that has been thrust on every mind capable of consciousness . . . . There are then two levels of discourse in this speech, and for the most part only one has engaged its critics. To identify Solzhenitsyn only with Russian Orthodoxy and its intellectual disabilities is to dismiss the likelihood that he participates in another tradition as well. It may be that we have confused the two kinds of criticism of the West . . . . It is critical of the West but not mordant . . . . The heart of the speech is about the nature of freedom, the constraints on freedom, and the value of freedom. Its form and some of its incidental remarks brought it more criticism than its central message warrants. Perhaps Solzhenitsyn could have learned from Auden, who thought art should teach the free man how to praise. And perhaps his adversaries should have thought of Yeats, who warned us that an intellectual hatred is the worst.

Berman's field is literature. He demonstrates extensive knowledge and versatility in his essay and I think he is right about everything except his conclusions. To prove that someone in the Western World said similar things first is to miss the major point entirely. Berman wants to coopt Solzhenitsyn on the basis of shared problems that Western thinkers have addressed and, therefore, to give him "Western eyes." He may have universal eyes—maybe all eyes are the same—but he does not have a Western view. It seems strange—even dangerous—to assess a moral and political work on a general literary basis. This was not the basis for the viewpoints of Richard Pikes in his essay "In the Russian Intellectual Tradition." His observations reflect the major points recorded in both *Naval War College Review* articles in February 1979, particularly that of William R.D. Jones, "Solzhenitsyn and the Quest for the Holy Grail." The essays by the philosopher Sidney Hook, the historian William H. McNeil and the religious view of Michael Novak are all compelling and excellent works in and of themselves; and we owe Solzhenitsyn some thanks for providing an audience for these men by his bold words at Harvard,

The early publication of articles on Solzhenitsyn's Harvard speech by the *Naval War College Review* is vindicated by this book and other serious attentions to this major event. The big question, however, is, "Should this book be recommended?" Today there are too many books, too many comments, altogether too many words making strident demands for attention. Why should anyone, particularly a military professional, read this book in which no identifiable military mind participated?

There are, I believe, three reasons to take the hour or so required to read this book—the first time, at least. First: it is good for Americans to get acquainted with a real Russian, divorced from the emotional aura of communism (for which read Marxism, because there are many communal ideas, traditions and experiences, particularly in Russia, not

associated with a politicized Marx). Solzhenitsyn is a respectable (even venerated) Russian, persecuted and exiled by Communists. Yet, he does not choose—does not love—the "free" world. Second and related: A non-Communist Russia may not be a comfort to the Western World, if Solzhenitsyn and the right wing surging *Russity* throw off Marxism (which they view as an outmoded Western conception—foreign to Russia, and therefore, antipathetical). There can be little expectation of a lessening of tensions. In fact, antagonism to the West is essential to their existence. And finally: perhaps those who suffer as has Solzhenitsyn (and Admiral Stockdale) reach moral conclusions and dimensions beyond communication to any but their peers—of which there are only a few alive in any epoch. However, even if we cannot probe their depths, it is useful to learn that the deep is not destrucrive of every human spirit—quite the contrary.

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Clausewitz, Carl von. *Vom Kriege. Neunzehnte Auflage . . . von Prof. Dr. Werner Hahlweg*. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. 1406pp.

Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, May-June 1980, containing the proceedings of an international Clausewitz symposium held in Hamburg in 1980.

Clausewitz-Gesellschaft, ed. *Freiheit ohne Krieg? Beitraege zur Strategie-Diskussion der Gegenwart im Spiegel der Theorie von Carl von Clausewitz*. Bonn: Duemmler, 1980. 412pp.

The three items under review dominate the literature, both policy-oriented and historical, occasioned by the 1980 bicentennial of the birth of Clausewitz.

From 1853 to 1952 the real Clausewirz was hidden from view by the serious corruption of all editions of *On War* on the crucial point of civil-military relations. After World War I Rothfels supplied the firsr intellectual biography of Clausewitz; this was reprinted in 1980 with an epilogue by J. Niemeyer. The interwar period produced numerous examinations of the philosophical, political, and strategic aspects of *On War*. In 1952, finally, Professor Hahlweg's massive 16th edition restored the original text and signaled the start of the contemporary Clausewitz renaissance.

Hahlweg's 19th edition cited above begins with a brief new preface and acknowledgments; the preface of the 18th edition (1973) is reproduced together with its very substantial study of Clausewitz' interpretation past and present. This study examined the life and personality of Clausewitz, the genesis and emphases of *On War*, its reception by contemporaries, Moltke, Ludendorff, Seeckt, Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin and his critics. A section on World War II contrasts General Beck with Hitler, touches on American attitudes, and compares the German defeats of 1918 and 1945 in Clausewitzian rerms. A brief description of the firsr 15 editions of *On War* (1832-1937) is followed by an account of its reception before and after the two world wars in Europe including Russia, Japan, and the English-speaking world. A section on the conremporary relevance of Clausewitz ranges from guerrilla warfare to strategic theory, and surveys American, Chinese, English, German and Vietnamese analysrs and commentarors. Some pages on textual and editorial problems conclude rhis introduction of 1973.

The story is then brought up to dare in another 100 pages showing the progress of Clausewitz' scholarship with respect to contemporary international relations, socialism, revolurionary movements, and Soviet perceptions. Hahlweg takes into account practically all American writings including the works of

Paret and valuable essays in the journals of our senior service institutions. Similarly, British authors (Howard, Mason, Trythall) and Danish, Dutch, and Italian contributions are covered. The chief concentrations of extant scholarship are identified and the philosophical foundations and aspects of the work of Clausewitz are emphasized. The most recent scholarship on Clausewitz from around the world is surveyed; this includes Hahlweg's own most meritorious edition of the unpublished (and, in part, previously unrecognized) memoranda, studies, and correspondence of Clausewitz. An assessment of the Clausewitz renaissance to date touches on the relevance of Clausewitz to peace research and concludes with a research agenda. There follows a bibliography of writings by Clausewitz and a selective bibliography of the most important literature about him and his work. An international list of editions of *On War* covers the years from 1832 to 1980. Finally, the index refers to the 19th edition sandwiched between the introductory study of 1973 and the study of 1980 just described. The advantage of this arrangement is that page references to the text of Clausewitz are the same for the 18th and the 19th editions. All in all, Hahlweg's 19th edition ranks with, complements, and updates the Howard-Paret edition of *On War* (discussed in the Fall 1977 issue of this journal).

Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau records the remarks of General de Maizière, president of the Clausewitz Society, at the opening of an international symposium. General J. Brandt, chief of staff of the Bundeswehr, then discusses the military contribution to the securing of peace. Professor Arndt (Heidelberg) examines maritime and economic aspects of security policy. The West German defense minister, H. Apel, reflects on the principles of contemporary international security, stressing the fundamental differences between the contemporary European state system and the concert of Europe in the days of Clausewitz. Apel specifies German perceptions of a deteriorating international environment and the required Western responses. Professor Wallach (Tel Aviv) concentrates on the economic and political aspects of military assistance, while Professor Paret (Stanford) compares the balance of power as a peacekeeping device in the days of Clausewitz and at present. Finally, Professor Hahlweg (Muenster) highlights recent major research on Clausewitzian topics by Aron, Gembruch, Kitchen, Marwedel, Paret, Tuerpe, and others. He concludes by emphasizing the two major desiderata, namely a critical edition of the complete works of Clausewitz and a comprehensive and thorough biography.

The Clausewitz Society, founded in 1961, sponsored a notable anthology of defense studies in 1971 (*Clausewitz in unserer Zeit*, ed. R. Elble). In *Freiheit ohne Krieg* the Society has produced an even more commendable volume. This book begins with a brief introduction by Maizière and eight pages by Apel on West German security policy. Major General Wagemann, lately commandant of the *Führungsakademie* of the Bundeswehr, then juxtaposes the conceptual resources of Clausewitz and the intellectual needs of the contemporary defense analyst. The remainder of the book is devoted equally to politico-military subjects and to the dimensions of contemporary strategy. Only the concluding 80 pages study Clausewitz with respect to his conception of theory (Hahlweg), his political views (Paret), guerrilla warfare (Hahlweg), and his reception in the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and in Japan since the Meiji Restoration.

The section on politicomilitary matters contains essays by Aron on political strategy and on coalitions. Maizière then compares civil-military relations in communist and noncommunist systems, discussing some of the

most sensitive aspects of national command authorities. Dr. Pauls, the West German permanent representative to NATO, examines the political environment, structure, deterrent philosophy, and strategic problems of NATO, concluding with references to the Warsaw Pact and the prospects for the eighties. Major General Pilster rounds off this part of the volume with a very incisive picture of policy and strategy in the Warsaw Pact.

In part two Dr. Woerner, chairman of the defense committee of the West German legislature, places the current concern with theater nuclear weapons into its historical context and outlines a general American-European consensus in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. Professor Arndt makes a contribution of particular interest to devotees of Corbett: he confronts head-on the apparent contradiction between the claim of Clausewitzian theory to have grasped the whole of war and the indisputably continental limitations of its empirical foundations. The essay presents the deepest and most acute statement of the issue known to the reviewer. As Clausewitz also failed to treat airpower for obvious reasons, the examination of "the validity of Clausewitz' judgments for the sphere of air and space war" by Lieutenant General Furlong, USAF, provides an extreme test of the longevity of the Clausewitzian constellation of insights. An equally contemporary perspective underlies the chapter by Colonel F.J. Wissing on the technological variable in strategy: this concentrates on the era from flexible response and the Harmel Report to the current intricacies of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability. The very different but concomitant dimension of civic support is examined by L. Ruehl. Professor Wallach presents Israel as an example of the importance of spiritual and moral factors emphasized by Clausewitz, tracing his theme back to the "haganah," the illegal underground army in Palestine during the British mandate. A very knowledgeable point of view finds expression in Dr. Kurz' exposition of the congruence between Swiss security concepts and Clausewitzian axioms. Finally Colonel E. Sobik delineates politicomilitary control in the Soviet Union and the concomitant training of military forces.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to suggest that the Clausewitz renaissance girdles the globe and fans out into all major functional specialties. The American reader will be struck by the new circumstance that American contributions are now part of the mainstream of Clausewitz' scholarship. The harvest has begun from the seeds of postwar scholarship.

JOHN TASHJEAN

Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, Vol. 2, The Germans*. Translated by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1980. 505pp.

Walter Renfroe has now reached the midpoint in his valuable work of translating *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*. The first volume has already been reviewed in this journal with a general comment on Delbrück's work (*NWCR*, Winter 1979, pp. 104-5).

In the second volume, Delbrück continues his work in attempting to explain the broad course of military developments while relating them to the major developments in general European history. His subject is *The Germans* in the period between the first century A.D. to the ninth century. Of the four volumes that spanned the ages from ancient history to Napoleon, Delbrück believed that the second volume was the most important for its contribution to our understanding. In his preface, he stated,

> This volume affects most deeply of all four our inherited concepts of world history, through its elimination of the legendary ideas on the fall of the ancient world and on the migration of peoples as well as its positive contributions, especially those concerning the substantiation of the alliance between Constantine and the Christian Church as postulate of the changing military system and institutions, and the clarification of the system of feudal institutions and knighthood.

Delbrück, himself, valued more highly the explanation he offered for the ways in which military affairs developed in history, rather than the concepts of strategy that he has offered in his first and fourth volumes. His aim was the larger quarry: knowledge of man's development. In searching for this end, he suggested that military accomplishment stems from two roots of very different types. The first is the courage and physical capacity of individual warriors. The second is the formation of individual warriors into a cohesive, tactical body. Analyzing in detail the fragmented evidence of military affairs at the end of the Roman Empire, Delbrück argued that the Roman Army gradually became Germanic. The Roman legions were not defeated and overthrown by the barbarians in battle, but the individual Roman soldiers were slowly replaced by Germanic mercenaries. This development led to the migration of a large number of Germans, with their wives, children and possessions, into the Roman Empire. This was the basis for the great "Barbarian invasion" that led to the downfall of Rome, Delbrück declared. The new peoples came in search of military service "for war, pay, booty and domination." The new breed stressed their individual and natural warlike tendency that served to break down the organized tactical discipline of the old Roman legions. The entry of complete tribes into Roman service, Delbrück believed, was the decisive factor that determined the decline of the ancient world and the formulation of new, unique political systems. As the Germanic mercenaries gained power as provincial military commanders, the Empire began to split into separate kingdoms. Along with this outward change, the Germanic political system, with its legal and social concepts, gradually was integrated into or replaced the old Roman organization. These new changes that stressed the individual warrior and the tactical ability of the individual were maximized by mounting warriors on horseback. With this development, the way was opened for rhe military system and tactics of knighthood.

The translation of Delbrück's work will undoubtedly revive the academic disputes that raged half a century ago among German historians. Modern research has brought forward new details that may well show more faults in his explanations. Today, we may find that his arguments are too narrowly defined. We have become accustomed to seeing a complex group of forces at work behind any development and we will not be entirely convinced by the stress laid on one factor as a determining force. Despite those obvious faults, Delbrück's work remains important. His stress on the rise and fall of tactical organizations and their relationship to more general political organization is an important concept. Delbrück was the first to attempt to trace systematically this thread through history. His interest was not in detail, although there is much of it in his study. Feeling deeply the need to understand the past, he valued detail for its illustration of general ideas and reflections of broad tendencies. In this sense, he used detail in an attempt to understand the past in conceptual terms. In our time, when historians have become increasingly devoted to more detailed studies of smaller and smaller

subjects, Delbrück's work is a timely antidote. It reminds us of the work that needs to be done in grappling with the meaning and broad effect of warfare and military institutions in human history. Renfroe has done a great service in making this early study more readily available to the English speaking community.

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Gabriel, Richard A. *The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 246pp. and *The New Red Legions: A Survey Data Source Book*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980. 252pp.

It appears that these two books are being marketed, separately and together, although they would more properly be considered two volumes of one work. The price for the source book alone, $40.00, reflects the cost of the research and publication, I would assume, but not its value to the reader for reasons explained below. This volume contains the questionnaire on which the study is based and the statistical manipulations of the responses as well as an introduction. (It largely duplicates what is said in the *Attitudinal Portrait*.) While the statistical work seems perfectly competent, considering the formidable obstacles to research of this sort, and while this reviewer and the great majority of readers of this journal will only wish for a continuation of this kind of project, it is a fact that the data were collected from only 134 respondents recalling their military experiences over a 45-year span. With all good will, one still must face the fact that the sample has a very limited validity, not because it is composed of immigrants and not because they are largely Jews, but because they are a tiny fraction of the population being discussed.

Nevertheless, 134 responses can be significant in other ways depending upon the insights they give and this is the subject of the far more interesting volume of the pair of books, *An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier*. Here, Professor Gabriel makes use of his experiences with the U.S. Army—he comes across as an enthusiastic reservist—for comparison with Soviet ways as well as displaying his knowledge of the Sovier system and the scholarly literature. His method is to put such subjects as morale, fighting spirit, combat effectiveness, etc., into a useful context that draws heavily on generally received conceptions. Then he presents the data from his questionnaire with commentary, and finally draws conclusions that, more often than not, repeat the ideas of the introductory remarks, but with variations.

The importance of Gabriel's work is that it comes towards the end of an orgy in American military thought of concentration on capabilities and neglect of intentions, a concept the implications of which I am convinced even the JCS has at times only vaguely comprehended. That we are out of that phase signifies that the lessons of Vietnam have finally been understood, lessons the Soviets have never needed to learn, that a superior force can be defeated by an inferior force regardless of capabilities. In any case, there has been a painfully, slowly growing awareness in Washington and at the war colleges, accelerated by the conquest of Afghanistan, that we have not understood Soviet intentions. This has magnified the importance of questions that were only halfheartedly considered in the past about the human element in war. The human element is Gabriel's critical subject.

The great strength of this study is that it is, as far as I know, an original work in a very complex field. It is true, as the author says, that with the raw data all around them in the form of, by now, some 250,000 émigrés from the

Soviet Union, our analysts continued to be dazzled by numbers and by the printed word, by *Pravda* and *Red Star*, largely to the exclusion of the human information available to them. Why that happened in itself would make a fascinating study. We can speculate that it is because of a cultural infatuation with the printed material that carried more weight than human experience. We have deserved, I suppose, the manipulation by Soviet propaganda organs to which we have been so massively subjected. (I no longer even feel the anguish I used to when I read another "authoritative" statement about the Soviet Union referring to the steady improvement in the standard of life in a country where even in Moscow for the last few years there has been an extreme scarcity of meat, eggs, medicine and toilet paper.) In any case, Professor Gabriel's work is evidence of our military sector emerging from the thralldom of some of its preconceptions.

This transformation was reflected in the comment by Colonel Bartos on the jacket (Colonel Bartos is an experienced Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Division for the Army) that the study "makes a unique contribution to Western scholarship on the Soviet Union and affords fresh insights into areas previously masked by Soviet propaganda and counterintelligence efforts." I think he exaggerates, especially when he calls this a "remarkable book," but it is certainly a useful book and, I hope, the beginning of a much larger undertaking. But remarkable is a very strong word. Gabriel's conclusions correspond with the evidence from other sources, from Goldhamer's *The Soviet Soldier* (also researched almost entirely in English) and from what we can read in Soviet and Russian war memoirs and historical documents and records. There has long been plenty of evidence, as Gabriel found, that food, sex and drunkenness are severe problems, that discipline is doubtful and that political control is a first priority. The picture he paints, derived from his questionnaire, leads one to think that his book should not be entitled *The New Red Legions*, for legions they are not, but perhaps *The Scruff of the Russian Bear*. (One cannot but regret sensationalism of his title, for this is not another of "the Russians are coming" kind of book.)

Professor Gabriel set out on a very ambitious project—he clearly likes the grand scale—posing and proposing to answer some of the most important and elusive military questions of our day: in a war, how well would the Soviet forces fight? Had he come up with a definitive answer, he would, indeed, have marked himself for glory. He deserves some of that for even trying.

He set for himself the most difficult of all conceivable questions, involving history, culture, psychology—the entire gamut of epistemology and of the social sciences—and this without, as I understand it, a knowledge of the Russian language. He proposed to describe "the attitudinal dimensions of the mind of the Soviet soldier." He claimed that his was the "first attempt to 'get inside the Soviet soldier's head' and it is the first study in which a research has been able to arrange a body of empirical data dealing with the subject longitudinally over time." (I will return to his use of the word "longitudinal.") When one talks about getting inside anyone's head, one is obviously talking about perceptions of reality. I think that involves many more complexities than Gabriel's study has attended to.

First, there is the "longitudinal" problem. Gabriel, with that phrase, apparently means that his sample contains responses from different periods of Soviet history. Such longitudinal computations make enormous demands upon both the statistical sample and the "attitudinal" comparison. For example, is the group of the decade of the seventies comparable in all other variables but age, when he discusses

combat effectiveness, perhaps, with the sample from the fifties, or sixties? I do not believe so.

That leads to the second problem of the gross sample itself. When I began reading *The New Red Legions*, I promised myself that I would not quarrel with the statistics. Professor Gabriel was quite right in asserting that the interview technique was nearly the only way (with all of its admitted shortcomings) to deal with a subject that had been egregiously, if not almost criminally considering its importance, neglected. (The government has spent millions of dollars on much less useful research based upon the contents of largely propaganda organs of the Soviet state while rhis magnificent resource, the émigrés, dwindled and evaporated.)

Gabriel made much of the fact that 30,000 émigrés had left the Soviet Union per year since the Helsinki Agreement. There are now over 250,000 in exile. But he was able to mail his questionnaire to only 1,059 and only 134 responded. Thus, he is talking about a very minute sample of the millions of Soviets (probably over 50 million) who have served in the armed forces during the period of his inquiry. When he writes that 11.5 percent of his respondents served since 1973, he is talking about 15 or 16 individuals! His data base for the period between 1964 and 1973 is only 44. Fifty-six percent of his sample, or 75 men, served prior to 1964.

My unsolicited advice, given these small numbers, would have been to rely very little on statistical manipulation of the data and very much more on the evidence from interviews. That way, he could have discussed more interestingly the different periods of ideological indoctrination, the variations in diet, and most importantly, the quintessential nationality problem that his statistics seem to me only to confuse. As it is, Professor Gabriel is tied to his data even when discussing the most contradictory problems of fact and spirit. Like anyone else's, his oil and water do not mix. He is frequently forced into extreme positions to use his questionnaire.

For example, he points out that "The NCO corps of the Soviet Army as described so far is likely to be addicted to avoiding responsibility." (p. 141) That is undoubtedly true on some level. But what does it mean? In all armies, NCOs are expected to avoid some responsibilities. That is what separates them from the officers, normally. Gabriel's data show that the men also have a low opinion of the officers, longitudinally, no doubt. But isn't that true also of most armies? It is difficult in isolation to know what such statements mean.

A similar confusion develops in the discussion, and this is very critical, of the fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers. He writes that "An examination of Soviet military doctrine makes it very clear that the Soviets regard combat effectiveness as rooted in motivation and cohesion, which in turn is rooted in ideology and ideological indoctrination." From this he concludes that "Soviet units may have some grave weaknesses in the level of cohesion" because answers to the questionnaire showed that ideology was not considered important. The implication is, of course, that there is an Ideology and that if that is not strongly believed, then there is nothing. That is certainly far from possible.

There are many other subjects about which the questionnaire was illuminating and Professor Gabriel's comments are often intriguing. One, which I wished he had discussed more fully, was his notion that the Soviet military is prevented from becoming a modern organizarion because the Soviet state has not been transformed into a post-industrial society. This idea, which he refers to again and again, deserved some very systematic treatment. As I understood it, the whole point of the Russian revolution was to transform the Soviet state without imitating the "post-

industrial" societies of the West. But an important question is whether or not because it is more sophisticated, or more "post-industrial," a state fights better. Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Stalin thought not, and proved it.

Gabriel has tackled this vast, intractable subject with courage and daring. We must be grateful to him for doing it at all, and apparently with little assistance. He deserved better support from his respondents and greater access to the émigré community. As all ex-Soviet citizens whom I have met bitterly criticize the naiveté of Americans in the face of the Soviet threat—"You are acting like fools and you will die a fool's death," said one ominously—it is surprising that more of them did not step forward to help in a study that would document their cause. We are reminded of even Lenin's complaint that it was the Russian nature to talk endlessly and not to act.

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Gottlieb, David, *Babes in Arms: Youth in the Army*. Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980. 173pp.

Babes in Arms presents results of individual interviews with 115 first-term Army enlistees conducted at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in June 1978. David Gottlieb and four associates questioned members of the group regarding why they enlisted, whether they would reenlist, how they felt about their own combat readiness and that of their peers, their artitude toward their Army job assignment and whether that assignment measured up to their prior expectations, their assessments of their social life in the Army, and their attitudes and opinions on a variety of other aspects of their military experience. The sample included 103 men and 12 women. Forty five of the respondents were nonwhite. While all were in their first term of enlistment, some interviewees had been in the service for only a few days, while others had served for several years. The author specifically disclaims that his sample is representative of all firsr termers, although he does state the belief that "these young enlistees are not dissimilar to their counterparts in other Army units."

In large part, the author lets the interviews speak for themselves. All the interviews were tape recorded, and quotations are verbatim, with each speaker identified by age, sex, and race. There is relatively little text apart from the quotations. Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the sample. Chapter 9 presents some conclusions and policy recommendations. The intervening chapters typically contain a short introduction and a short summary section. Otherwise, they present as many as 70 quotations, with text intruding only to introduce a series of quotations concerning a particular topic.

Gottlieb's interviews lead him to conclude that there is considerable job dissatisfaction among enlistees and a widespread feeling among them that they have been misled by recruiters. He also finds that many believe that their Army experience has resulted in personal growth and maturity. Many expressed the view that they are better off than friends who did not join. Accordingly, he recommends that rhe military should place less emphasis on advertising specific vocational training in its recruiting and, conversely, more emphasis on the maturity that enlistees are likely to gain. He also suggests 2-year enlistments, a restructuring of recruiter incentives, a "cooling off period" before induction in which enlistees have an opportunity to change their mind about their enlistment decision, expansion in the availability of education and training opportunities, and other policies that he believes will reduce the extent of job dissatisfaction.

Babes in Arms is an interesting, indeed entertaining, volume. Unless

one can generalize the impressions one gets from reading it, however, the work is of little value except as entertainment. The author cautions that his sample may not be representative, yet he does generalize, and in my view, rightly so, in drawing conclusions and making policy recommendations. Still, I would be more comfortable with the generalizations and with the validity of my impressions about first-term enlistees if the author had provided more information.

First, it would have been helpful to provide the reader with the interview protocol. This was promised (p. 16) as an appendix, but unfortunately it was omitted.

Second, one would like more information about the sample as a whole and about the speakers of individual quotations. For example, one knows that the sample includes people at various stages of their enlistments but one is not told the mix. More important, one does not know if a particular statement is that of a person viewing the Army after 2 weeks of experience or after 3 years, unless that information happens to be revealed in the quoted passage. Knowing the duration of Army experience is important in evaluating a quotation on such matters as attitude toward combat or on the probability of reenlistment.

Third, one would like to know more specifically how many interviewees expressed certain opinions. Instead the reader is told that a "significant number" do not feel that racial conflict is a major problem, that "most" tend in retrospect to perceive their recruiters as having been hustlers and con artists, that there is a "substantial consensus" that training is inadequate for combat, that "the majority" experience serious dissatisfaction with work training and job assignments. The reader is left to speculate whether the "significant number" who note the absence of racial tension is, say, 35 of the 115 respondents, or perhaps 100 of them. Only at the end of Chapter 4, which concerns reactions to basic training, did the author provide a frequency distribution of any of the responses. I wish he had done this more often. Such information could have been included in appendixes to avoid interrupting the flow of the book.

Finally, a major purpose of collecting and presenting in-depth interview data is to complement studies using larger data samples containing narrower ranges in information. The book would have been improved with references to relevant theoretical and empirical literature. There is no bibliography, nor any footnotes. Reference to at least a few key statistics would also have helped. For example, about half of Gottlieb's respondents say they might reenlist. It would have been useful to point out that in fact the first-term Army reenlistment rate for fiscal 1978 was 36 percent. (Department of Defense, *Defense/80*, p. 21)

One other point that relates to the validity of the impressions the reader gets from the quotations should be mentioned. Although it is somewhat difficult to be sure inasmuch as speakers are identified only by age, sex, and race, it appears that some respondents are quoted far more often than are others. This is certainly true of the 12 women, who are quoted more often than their proportion of the total sample in all chapters except Chapter 6 on combat readiness, in which no women are quoted at all. One woman, a chaplain's assistant, is quoted at least once in every chapter except Chapter 6. The reader knows her story quite well by the end of the book. It is not necessarily invalid to quote the women disproportionately often, of course. The differences in attitudes between the women and the men are certainly of interest. However, when 60 percent of the quotations in the chapter on recruiters and the recruiting process are from the female respondents,

one wonders whether the impression one gets regarding feelings about recruiters is really the way most first termers feel. One might also wonder whether 12 women is a large enough sample from which to generalize about women's attitudes.

In sum, *Babes in Arms* provides some interesting anecdotal evidence on the attitudes of first term enlistees. The conclusions drawn, while perhaps valid for first term enlistees in general, need further confirmation from other sources.

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International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 1980-1981* and *Strategic Survey 1979*. London 1980. 119pp. and 139pp.

Military Balance presents, in easily usable form, survey statistics of military forces around the world. Figures are provided for armaments, manpower and defense expenditures for U.S., Soviet Union, NATO and Warsaw Pact States, as well as for some 100 others with standing defense forces. The types and quantities of specific weapons systems and the organization and strength of defense elements are listed. This year there is also a map of Soviet military districts and groups of forces, and charts showing French and Chinese divisional organization. Treaties, agreements and other regional arrangements are described succinctly for each major geographic region of the world, and some activities resulting from these alignments are reported. Additionally, for countries that have forces operating or stationed out-of-country, the location and size of deployed forces are indicated.

In the tables published in Section Two of this edition are data showing comparative strengths and characteristics of nuclear delivery vehicles; also, defense expenditures and military manpower statistics for the 1975-1980 period for some 65 countries are tabulated, and a summary of major arms agreements made between July 1979 and June 1980 is provided. Particularly topical for the American reader is the table of NATO defense expenditures, by NATO country, for the past 20 years, and the two analytical essays in Section Three on the East-West conventional and theater nuclear balance in Europe. An assessment of the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union introduces the force level statistics sections for the two superpowers.

In sum, *Military Balance* very nicely fills the need for a concise, unclassified ready-reference source of information on military forces around the world.

Strategic Survey 1979 recapitulates that year's security-related events in an analytical style that gives new insight to the significance of the events themselves. A chronology of events is presented by geographic area, but most information is provided in a concise but comprehensive and highly readable text. The world's security-related actions and interactions are analyzed and brought into perspective in terms of their objectives, political and economic factors and repercussions, and results. Prospects or possible outcomes are offered for issues that were unresolved at year's end.

The 1979 edition, published in mid-1980, includes elucidations of new factors in security, such as the challenges to nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia, the expanding Soviet naval forward deployment policy, and uncertainty and insecurity of international oil supplies. The phenomenon of détente is examined in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, normalization of U.S./Chinese relations, and conflicts occurring outside of Europe.

Arms-control issues are discussed in several of the articles; in addition, an 11-page section treats SALT and other arms-control negotiations exclusively. An arms-control chronology lists the

major arms-control conferences and proclamations made during the year.

Reflecting the degree of inrernational concern with events in Asia and Africa, *Strategic Survey* devotes over one-third of its pages to background and analysis of the situations in these parts of the world. The discussions of Iran, Afghanisran, and the Maghreb are particularly useful to an understanding of the events occurring now and will aid in interprering the reports of affairs still in store.

The conclusion presented in *Strategic Survey 1979* is that Third-World crises will occur increasingly in the 1980s, and that these crises will be less soluble by military power than the traditional challenges to international order and stability have been. The prescription is for political resolutions—negotiation and compromise—to remove the irritants to peaceful coexistence among neighboring states. But *Strategic Survey 1979* provides much more than this and merits a cover-to-cover reading by both serious and casual students of international security affairs.

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Keliher, John G. *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe.* Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980. 203pp.

This book describes recent efforts to reduce armed forces in central Europe by international agreement. Specifically, it deals with negotiations with the official title of Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, but known in the West as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions or MBFR. The book details the proposals and counterproposals of the major parties involved from the start of preparatory consultations in January 1973 through the formal negotiations of October 1973 to December 1979. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a decade of intensive East-West arms conrrol negotiations came to an end, so in a sense the book is complete.

The proposals are nor only described, but are summarized and explained in tabular form, and clear references to public sources of information are provided for each. There are also brief essays discussing problems of finding a common data base for negotiarions, building confidence in this kind of arms control agreement, verification of compliance with a treaty once negotiated, and the special role of nuclear weapons.

The author has strong credentials for writing this book. He is a career officer, a colonel in the U.S. Army. His research and academic writing earned him a Ph.D. degree. He has studied and taught Soviet military strategy. And most important are his 4 years of work directly on MBFR, including service on the U.S. delegation at Vienna.

The strong point of the book is its explanation of the proposals made at the negotiating table by both sides. The mechanics of attempted mutual force reductions in Europe are tedious for even the most interested of laymen. Thus, Colonel Keliher's lists and tables, not only summarizing negotiating positions but projecting their effects on the balance of forces, are welcome tools for analysis.

At the root of the technical side of MBFR is the arcane business of comparing armies. Such comparisons are of broader interest than to only military professionals and those associated with arms control. They figure in critical policy decisions, in the assessment of a nation's political influence as well as its military capabilities in a region, and in budgetary considerations. Yet armies, with their numerous variations in organization, equipment, and skills of their personnel, are intractable subjects for quantitative analysis, even in today's world of computers and mathematical

models. Much more quantifiable are strategic nuclear forces. With all of its problems, measuring the strategic balance is much simpler. That is probably a major factor in the popularity of assessing the strategic balance while neglecting analysis of land forces.

The author's discussion of the technical problems associated with MBFR addresses these issues directly. He goes further in explaining some new approaches that might be taken in future negotiations and the necessary conditions for the success of each. In this respect he presents the reader with the problems and some alternative solutions as well.

In spite of these strong points, there are important deficiencies. With the author's background in mind, his book turns out to be somewhat of a disappointment. As a participant in the talks, the author might be expected to provide some insights into what went on at the negotiating table. Colonel Keliher obviously wrote under constraints imposed by convention on any official who has participated in negotiations that are still under way, but he concentrates too much on press coverage instead of recounting what happened and why. This is partly a matter of style, but it is prominent enough that the reader must continually remind himself that Soviet proposals were actually made at the negotiating table and not just released in pieces to the Eastern bloc press. On the other side of the table, there is not nearly enough on Western proposals and negotiating options. The author discusses "Option III," but not in his section on negotiations, and the reader is given no idea about what the other options were.

Another disappointment is that there is not much new in the way of analysis presented here. The final chapters on problem areas and alternative approaches are particularly clear and useful, but they merely present the thinking of Frederick Wyle, Joseph Coffey, Steven Canby, and others. This the author is careful to acknowledge, but more is to be expected than even good summaries of what is already in print.

For those unfamiliar with MBFR, the book is slow to put the problem into geopolitical perspective. It is not until well into the fourth chapter that we are told that an offensive into Western Europe remains unattractive for the Soviets. There is more than a small chance that such an offensive could bog down, and a stalemate could precipitate the dissolution of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, if not over national minorities within the Soviet Union as well. The important threat, Keliher tells us, is from political influence over West European governments that will accrue to the Soviets when there is a gross disparity of military power in Europe. The geographical facts of proximity of the Soviet Union and remoteness of the United States are mentioned but not given the discussion they deserve. The fact that large numbers of Soviet troops are necessary to retain control over Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, East Germans, and Hungarians is mentioned only incidentally. These are fundamental parts of the MBFR problem. They should be explained and discussed at the outset. Instead, the first chapter is an essay on why Marx and Lenin thought Germany was important to socialist revolution.

This book is worthwhile for its summaries of the various negotiating positions at MBFR. It brings together some thought-provoking ideas on arms control in Europe. Its footnotes and bibliography are particularly useful. What it lacks is overall balance in presentation and discussion of the problem it addresses.

KARL LAUTENSCHLÄGER
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory

Klessig, Lowell L, and Strite, Victor L. *The ELF Odyssey: National Security*

Versus Environmental Protection. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980. 310pp.

The development of the FBM (Fleet Ballistic Missile) submarine in the late 1950s provided the impetus for the Navy to develop a way to communicate with these submarines while on station without requiting them to come near the sutface. One promising method of communicating with submerged submarines is based on ELF (extremely low frequency) radiowaves that have rhe capability to penettate seawater to great depths. Prototype ELF systems opetated in North Carolina (1963-1970) and at Clam Lake, Wisconsin (1970-present) have demonsttated that the concept is technically feasible. However, a full-sized system that would provide near-global coverage would require at least 10 megawatts of input power driven into a large (ftom 200 to 3,000 square miles) grid of insulated copper cables, grounded at each end, in order to radiate an ELF signal. Measures would need to be taken to protect telephone lines from interference and fence wires from induced currents. Communication would be one way to the submarine. Data rates at such low frequencies would be very slow and the primary use of this system would probably be to send a "bellringer" message to the submarine to position itself to receive another message at a particular time and place.

In *ELF Odyssey* Professots Klessig and Strite review the stormy histoty of the Navy's attempts to build a large-scale ELF system from the point of view of environmentalists concetned about the effect of prolonged low levels of ELF radiation on both people and the environment where the ELF antenna would be constructed. To their credit they declare rheir position at the start: "Our personal histories of opposition to ELF are acknowledged, but chiefly, we are advocates of active citizen involvement *per se*." Indeed, the book uses the "ELF Odyssey," as they call it, primarily as a case study to demonstrate how citizen involvement, primarily at the grass roots level, can be employed to stop major projects with potentially undesirable environmental effects. It does an excellent job of this. Indeed, as a Michigan resident as well as a Naval Reserve officer, I have long followed the controversy over proposals to build an ELF antenna system in Michigan. The book accurately describes how the public outcry against *Seafarer* (as the project was then named) reached a peak in 1976 when then Presidential candidate Jimmy Catter promised Governor Milliken that *Seafarer* would not be built in Michigan against the wishes of its residents. To date it hasn't bur the ELF issue probably has not been finally resolved as yet.

Readers seeking to leatn the principles of ELF communication system operation won't find them in this book. Only the first of five approximately equal parts of the book is devoted to explaining the principles of ELF communication in general terms and the national security needs it would fulfill if consttucted. The material given is informative, but not complete, perhaps a reflection that neither author apparently has a scientific background and that both authors, as they clearly state, have a primary interest in the environmental aspects of the ELF controversy. Valuable references omitted include the *IEEE Transactions on Communications, Volume Comm-22* of April 1974 (the entire issue is devoted to unclassified technical papers on ELF) and the *Seafarer Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) Submarine Command and Control System*, printed by the Special Communications Project Office of the Naval Electronics Systems Command. Greater depth in the technical material, perhaps in the form of an appendix, would have been useful to teaders with as great an intetest in national security matters as in environmental affairs.

The remainder of the book provides valuable insights into the working of local voluntary action groups opposed to ELF in Wisconsin, Texas and Michigan, each at one time the Navy's preferred location for building the ELF antenna system. In each of these states voluntary action groups opposed to ELF came into being and successfully opposed the construction of ELF in their state. Klessig and Strite's conclusion is worth repeating to understand their intent in writing *ELF Odyssey*

> Ultimately the Navy, or any other federal agency, is only responsive to Congress and the President. Ultimately the only power of citizens is political pressure applied to elected officials in the context of representative and constitutional government. That power can be shared most efficiently at the ballot box. It can be used most effectively if applied on election day, reapplied when public participation programs provide a formal opportunity and reapplied in every available informal setting.

It is important for those readers who may have supported the construction of the ELF system to note that all means of expressing opposition put forth by Klessig and Srrite are entirely legal and appropriate in our system of government.

Throughout the book the authors urge citizens interested in environmental affairs to learn from the ELF experience how to organize to oppose other large projects with potentially undesirable environmental effects. Presumably these could be nonmilitary in nature as well, such as proposals to build large dams or drill for oil on public lands. But there is another side to this coin. The Navy and other agencies can also learn from *ELF Odyssey* how better to promote projects they feel are in the national interest. The authors note that, "Unlike some other agencies, the Navy was not accustomed to explaining its operations or soliciting comments on them from citizens." I feel this is an accurate assessment of the Navy's overall approach to ELF, at least in Michigan. The Navy never really accepted the concept that local citizens should have much of a say on matters relating to national security. In the future, if the Navy and other governmental agencies can take deliberate steps to solicit and answer questions of interest to concerned local citizen groups, it will increase the likelihood of local acceptance of such projects as ELF. Indeed, the Department of Defense itself may not have to wait long to apply the lessons put forth in *ELF Odyssey*. The proposed land-based MX missile system will certainly arouse the concerted interest, if not outright opposition, of citizen and environmental action groups in whatever state is ultimately selected for its construction.

In summary, this is a useful book because it draws together in one volume a detailed history of the Navy's ELF programs, including an extensive set of references. It also shows what can be accomplished when highly motivated, well-organized local citizen action groups apply to elected officials through the legitimate means at their disposal.

HENRY H. BEAM
Western Michigan University

Love, Robert William, Jr., *et al.*, eds. *Changing Interpretations and New Sources of Naval History; Papers from the Third United States Naval Academy Naval History Symposium*. New York: Garland, 1980. 471pp.

The Naval History Symposium at the Naval Academy are justly famous for their fanfare. These 37 papers assembled by Professor Love and his coeditors clearly demonstrate, however, that the Third Naval History Symposium was a good deal more than outward show. For the most part avoiding strictly battle history, the

contributors directed their attention to "those 'conditions' which define navies" and thus often dictate victory or defeat at sea. Somewhat less than half wrote on the U.S. Navy. To this reviewer, the more rewarding papers were commonly those dealing with non-American navies. Institutional history is especially well represented. Happily, most contributions are commendably short, straightforward, and fresh.

This review can only suggest the variety of materials in the volume by pointing to a few representative essays, necessarily omitting many of considerable merit. The tone is established by the fine initial essays by J. Richard Sheffley on Greek ship construction as revealed in nautical archeology and by Laurence Evans on the maritime logistics that provided the food essential to support the urban populations of the Roman Empire. A half dozen pieces deal with British and French naval institutional operations during the early modern period. Joel Best is enlightening on three types of English piracy 1550-1750. Peter G. Cornwell's research on training in the Japanese Navy and Daniel C. Evans' observations on recruitment of Japanese naval officers during the Meiji Period are important both for what they reveal about the Japanese Navy and for the comparisons that readers will inevitably draw with 19th century Western practices. Among the American chapters, Robert Seager's elucidation of Alfred Thayer Mahan's difficulties with Nelson's morals is an entertaining reading as it was hearing. Whereas Jeffrey Dorwart's appreciation of American naval intelligence in the New Navy includes a deft critique of Peter Karsten's *Naval Aristocracy*, John C. Reilly enthusiastically invites research in the little used naval attaché reports at the National Archives, and William Heimdahl and Geraldine Roberts review the recently opened records of the Pearl Harbor Liaison Office as sources on the Pearl Harbor investigations. There are also authoritative observations on the influence of radio intelligence on the Battle of the Atlantic from British (Patrick Beesley), German (Jürgen Rohwer), and American (Kenneth A. Knowles) points of view.

Professor Love and his associates see the essays as a "benchmark" demonstrating the breadth and professionalism of naval historians today. They confirm that naval history is alive with new approaches and interpretations. Moreover, the variety of the materials notwithstanding, the essays often interplay with each other, providing sources of comparison, contrast, and continuity between the various naval services of different ages.

WILLIAM R. BRAISTED
University of Texas at Austin

Rothenberg, Morris. *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (AISI Monographs on International Affairs)*. Washington: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980. 288pp.

Considering the intensive and persistent pattern of activities conducted by the Soviet Union and its surrogates across the vast African continent beginning with the Angolan conflict of 1975-1976, this work has particular value as a timely and incisive assessment of Soviet strategic goals and interests focused on that resource-rich and politically volatile region. A former U.S. Foreign Service Officer with diplomatic experience both in the U.S.S.R. and at Third World posts, Rothenberg contends that these post-1975 Soviet efforts in Africa represent the most sophisticated and multifaceted campaign mounted to date in futherance of its global strategy to minimize or deny U.S. and Western interests in the Third World, while simultaneously accruing influence and advantage for its own policies among the world's lesser-developed countries. Just

as Soviet pronouncements have consistently portrayed the oil-rich Middle East as a "strategic backdoor" to secure advantage over the industrial West, he argues that post-1975 Soviet initiatives on the African continent, also with a vast wealth of resources, stand as yet another variation of that indirect, though potent, challenge to the politicoeconomic well-being of Western Europe and the United States. As an end-game objective in Africa, Rothenberg also maintains that the ultimate Soviet goal is the neutralization and eventual elimination of the Republic of South Africa as a key regional anti-Soviet bastion in the broader fabric of the East-West struggle.

In his comprehensive introduction, AISI Director Mose Harvey takes note of a recent Soviet work on contemporary national liberation movements in which Karen Brutents, a leading CPSU theoretician, characterizes the ongoing Soviet ventures in Africa since 1975 as "a total offensive against imperialism and world capitalism as a whole in order to do away with them" (pp. vii-viii). Both Harvey and Rothenberg furnish succinct outlines for the structure and dynamics of this broad, multifaceted Soviet thrust into Africa's regional and internal affairs in their respective introductions. For his part, Rothenberg perceives post-1975 Soviet/surrogate efforts in Africa as a qualitatively refined campaign that both differs from, and, yet furthers, the U.S.S.R.'s Third World policies already underway since the immediate post-Stalinist period, and his 11 chapters progressively develop the specific goals of these recent efforts. Successive chapters in the inirial section (Chapters II-V) cover the Soviet/Cuban interventions in the Angolan conflict of 1975-1976 and the Ethiopian-Somali clash on the strategic Horn of Africa from early 1977, the Soviet/Cuban-assisted incursions into Zaire's Shaba Province in both 1977 and 1978, along with the continent-wide array of Soviet-led programs and activities over the latter half of the 1970s. In assessing their cumulative effect, Rothenberg clearly indicates that the U.S.S.R. has achieved a firm strategic foothold, with the potential for further gains, throughout Africa.

In the following section (Chapters VI and VII), the author examines the nature of "consolidation" measures that the Soviet Union and its surrogates have planned and executed to guarantee their presence in those African LDCs where a foothold has been gained and, conversely, to preclude any recurrence of the reversals suffered in earlier Soviet relationships with Egypt, Somalia, Ghana and Mali. Chapter VI, for example, features a number of somewhat cautionary Soviet writings of recent vintage that openly admit to inherent risks and hazards in its ongoing relations with various types of Third World political regimes while also suggesting a fair combination of possible political, economic and military programs designed to assure continued Soviet influence with these young nations. Recent applications of these consolidation activities are then discussed in the following chapter with respect to Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. Rothenberg next explores further horizons of the Soviet Union's African campaign, particularly Rhodesia in its perspectives on Zimbabwe, Namibia and the Republic of South Africa, in his final section (Chapters VIII-X) as he emphasizes that the RSA marks the final Soviet target for conquest on the African continent in the years ahead.

Assessing Soviet advances in Africa as a "challenge of new dimensions," Rothenberg presents an excellent case in his concluding chapter for the meaningful viewpoint that the U.S.S.R. no longer perceives its Third World activities, especially its firm and consistent support for radical political regimes and national liberation movements, as anything less than a righteous, all-out

offensive against the West. In highlighting the predominant post-1975 Soviet propensity to intervene in the internal and regional affairs of African and other Third World states with large contingents of surrogate military forces that are underwritten with considerable amounts of Soviet arms aid under the dubious guise of "proletarian internationalism," the author clearly sets forth the broadest possible bounds for this new Soviet challenge to both the West and the young nations of Africa. If he does stop short of offering any policy options, it becomes obvious that the United States and the nations of both Western Europe and Africa must cooperatively generate an innovative, dynamic set of programs that assure African development, while meeting and defeating this huge and sophisticated Soviet campaign. With extensive Soviet and regional source materials along with a strong array of useful tabular data, this volume is at once a timely and valuable analysis that deserves both careful reading and thoughtful consideration for its treatment of the massive Soviet offensive now underway against both the young and older narions of the free world.

JOSEPH E. THACH, JR.
OASD (PA)

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *The Soviet Navy, 1941-1978: A Guide to Sources in English*, The War/Peace Bibliography Series, R.D. Burns, ed. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1980. 211pp.

Bibliographers, like translators, are insufficiently honored in our land. Both crafts involve a large measure of art and intellect; both perform an inestimable service; but both are, for the most part, taken for granted.

That I have bracketed the two together may seem curious as they require widely different talents, but the bibliographer, Myron Smith inevitably reminds us of the material in Russian that we probably have not read.

The work at hand is exceptionally fine. A bibliography should be judged on completeness, accuracy, organization and usefulness. This one, on all counts, belongs in the first rank. In a random way of checking, I have not thought of a single article that is not listed and I have noticed several translations from Russian that I did not know were available in English; and there are many, many entries for articles that I did not know (some with titles I cannot understand such as "Castration Round and Tattletale Ships: Big Russian Cruisers Beefing Up Carriers," entry number 1371).

This bibliography, then, inspires confidence, which is a necessary function of bibliographies. As to the other functions, being handy and well organized, it also wins top honors. The entries are numbered so that they are easily found. They are organized into chaprers with sensible subheadings so that no one can look up specific subjects, and they are indexed according to author so that one can look up one's friends. (In saying so, I just noticed that Leon Martel is missing, perhaps justified on the grounds that he wrote about the merchant fleet.)

Certainly rhat is all that a bibliography is required to do unless it is a critical bibliography, containing commentary by the author on the value and relevance of the entries. But in a book of this scope, that would be an impossible, and unwelcome, addition. This book, however, contains several delightful surprises. There is an article by Steve Kime at the beginning, written with his usual brilliance and insight, "The Soviet Navy, Present and Future." There is also a very helpful guide to research containing the most standard reference works for this sort of study. Each section is introduced nicely and briefly and there are appendixes, one of which contains a very useful brief listing of naval biographies. The latter is very helpful to those of us who need

reassurance that Gorshkov really is 70 years old.

This is, altogether, a very competent job resulting in an admirable and very useful book that will certainly be needed in every library where research on military matters is performed. It will be valuable for many years to come and then we hope that Myron Smith will bring it up to date again for at the rate the articles and books are proliferating, we need someone keeping track. The author of this book has proved himself equal to the task.

ROBERT B. BATHURST
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Till, Geoffrey, *Air Power and the Royal Navy, 1914-1945: A Historical Survey*. London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1979. 224pp.

There have been a number of operational histories of the Fleet Air Arm, but this is not one of them. Written by a faculty member at the British counterpart of the Naval War College, the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, this study is a serious historical analysis of the influence of aviation on the Royal Navy. Dr. Till's work is the result of careful research and expresses a balanced judgment based on a deep understanding of both technical matters and the broad strategic issues of the period. The basic problems that the author examines are centered around the questions why the Royal Navy was unable to develop fully her initial innovations in naval aviation and why her lead in this field was shortly overtaken by the American and Japanese Navies. In dealing with these questions, one can see the manner in which airpower affected the role of the navy in the defense of Britain, and in those terms one can see some of the fundamental issues in British defense policy.

In approaching his subject, Till has analyzed six broad subject areas: people, ships, aircraft, bureaucracy, battle doctrine and war experience. He shows that the shortage of men in the Fleet Air Arm as compared to the U.S. Navy symbolized the extent to which Britain's war resources had been surpassed by 1945. In other areas, he sees a similar relationship. For example, the British carrier construction program and aircraft production emphasize the industrial disparity between Britain and America. In terms of bureaucracy, he shows that there was too little coordination among those responsible. The division of responsibility for naval aviation between the Air Ministry and the Admiralty created competition without the means to plan, to direct and to administer the development of aviation at sea. In the same period, British battle doctrine tended to be based on the traditional assumption that sea battles would be decided by the concentration of battleships. Tactics were developed for the Fleet Air Arm that emphasized the role of the carrier in this situation. The use of aircraft in other roles was not fully worked out in terms of tactics and training. Tactical manuals dealing with such alternatives were not fully completed or made available to pilots. Till's discussion of the development of naval aviation in combat is the shortest of his chapters. This is understandable in view of his desire to avoid an operational history. However, given the experience of the U.S. Navy in this area, one might have expected a longer discussion here. Certainly, the U.S. Navy's carrier tactics were largely developed in actual war operations, not during the interwar period. One gleans from his remarks that this was also true of British naval aviation, in its rapid development between the Norwegian campaign of 1940 and its performance later in the war. This aspect of development could have been more fully explored. The author opens with a detailed discussion of the naval and air aspects of the Norwegian campaign to show the effect of interwar planning on wartime

operations. What he has to say here is most interesting and useful, but in light of his ultimate conclusion, it might have been even more appropriate to examine all aspects of that campaign, including the military side and the coordination of high command. It is a campaign that still wants an unbiased historian, but in its broad aspects it presents some of the very fundamental issues in which Dr. Till deals.

In his final chapter, Till concludes that the Royal Navy yielded the race in developing airpower at sea by 1939. The tendency to underrate the performance and potential of naval aviation, as well as to deny it appropriate resources, was the result of many factors. Among them was the lack of a bureaucratic organization to support progress and expansion. Another factor was the economic climate of the times which required cutbacks. Simultaneously, there was a lack of vision and leadership for naval aviation. Perhaps this in itself was because of the Fleet Air Arm's position as a hybrid between the advocates of seapower and those of airpower. It was caught in the rivalry and friction between two views that were attempting to exclude the other. Moreover, the struggle between air and naval advocates was as much a conflict between prophetic views as it was a struggle for scarce national resources. This was Britain's particular dilemma. She lacked resources for defense on land, at sea and in the air, but she needed all three. The battle for priority among the three was a partisan struggle that missed the essential point.

Dr. Till's analysis of this topic is an excellent contribution to naval history. By effectively breaking out of the narrow mold of naval historians, one can find here a valuable case study in some of the most basic issues in defense policy.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Valle, James E. *Rocks and Shoals: Order and Discipline in the Old Navy, 1800-1861.* Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980, 341pp.

During the past decade the study of naval history has expanded into several areas not previously examined to any degree. Since Harold Langley's path-breaking *Social Reform in the United States Navy, 1798-1862* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967) historians have increasingly studied not just ships, their commanders, and their battles, but also the enlisted men of the Navy. This work is a welcome addition to this trend.

In it Valle examines the nascent years of the American Navy, a time during which it was "a singular military organizarion characterized by smallness, scattered deployment, and peculiar values and ethos." His opening chapters sketch the Navy's system of administration, "among the [world's] most backward and poorly organized," and examine its judicial system that was not designed to dispense justice but to maintain discipline.

Valle next analyzes the provisions of the Articles of War of 1800, which served the Navy relatively unchanged from their passage until 1950, when they were replaced by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In many cases the "Rocks and Shoals," as they were known, were nebulous, leaving much to the discretion of the enforcer. As in so many other ways, Commodore Edward Preble set the standard for their implementation. He disliked formal courts-martial and courts of inquiry because he believed that too many resulted from trivial matters, that they wasted time, but most importantly, that they gave the defendant too favorable an opportunity of either being acquitted or of receiving a light sentence. Thus he avoided formal proceedings whenever possible by such expedients as breaking major offenses down into a series of subjudicial charges that could be tried at captain's mast or imposing combined modes of

punishment, e.g., lashes and time in irons, so as not to exceed permitted maximums in any one category.

The pattern was similar for officers. If an offense was grave Preble would seek an officer's resignation rather than formally try him. Even if found guilty few officers suffered harsh penalties for their transgressions and political influence was regularly used to reduce or overturn guilty verdicts and sentences. Enlisted men generally lacked political connections to obtain such favors and sentences given were almost invariably carried out unless the death penalty was involved, in which case it was usually reduced to a number of years at hard labor. Flogging was accepted by officers and seamen and preferred to other forms of punishment inasmuch as it meant quick justice which once endured was over.

"Preble's Boys" accepted these practices and followed his example thus establishing an unwritten and basically *illegal* system of naval justice, but one that was effective and accepted by persons in authority both inside and outside of the Navy as being in the best interest of both the service and the nation. These early sections are basically sound, though Valle has an annoying habit of linking the views of officers on discipline to the views of the major political parties in incorrect ways. For example, he says that "like the Federalists in Congress, Preble believed in different treatment for officers and enlisted men." Such an attitude was certainly shared by Jeffersonian Republicans as well.

The remainder of the book is devoted to an examination by category of offenses committed, trials conducted, and the sentences meted out. Most interesting were the capital offenses. Valle shows that charges of mutiny were often used to cover lesser offenses which threatened officers. It is ironic that the closer an incident came to real mutiny, i.e., to endangering the safety of a ship, the more reluctant officers were to identify it as such. Murder was an enlisted man's crime and like true mutiny, quite rare, while desertion was so common that death was an impractical penalty and rarely imposed except during the period from 1812 to 1819.

In chapters examining all cases of homo- and hetrosexual misconduct that came to trial and the more nebulous crimes of disobedience and disrespect, Valle again shows that a double standard of punishment existed for officers and enlisted men.

That the author has made an important contribution to our understanding of the Old Navy cannot be doubted, but his work does suffer from serious weaknesses. Some of his conclusions, e.g., "that the navy's use of the death penalty was arbitrary, capricious, occasionally irregular, and almost always justified by the 'good of the service' rather than the merits of the cases," may be true, but they are not convincingly supported by the evidence presented.

More importantly, indeed his fatal flaw, is the shallowness of his research. After explaining how officers took careful pains to avoid formal legal proceedings, Valle goes on to base almost his entire analysis of misconduct and discipline on records of those formal proceedings as contained in the "Records of General Courts-Martial and Courts of Inquiry of the Navy Department, 1799-1867," in the National Archives. In his introduction he notes that "one can tap a rich body of manuscript material" including "old logbooks and accounts of voyages and expeditions . . . letters, diaries, books, pamphlets, and even novels." It is unfortunate that he has made so little use of these sources, as they would reveal much about the subjudicial proceedings and the levying of combinations of punishments used by officers to avoid formal proceedings. It is also of note that the novel he makes most use of as a source material is *White Jacket*, Herman

Melville's propagandistic attack on flogging, a practice that Valle says was generally supported by enlisted men and officers alike.

Valle's main contribution is his careful analysis of the formal judicial proceedings and his extraction from them of a great deal of information. It remains for him, or someone else, to broaden the research and to place the naval judicial system in the context of its times. Until then his conclusions must be considered tentative as applied to the Navy as a whole.

JAMES C. BRADFORD
U.S. Naval Academy

Von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Baron Burkhard. *Battleship Bismarck: A Survivor's Story*. Trans. by Jack Sweetman. Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1980. 290pp.

In the words of Admiral Sir John Tovey, Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, as the British closed in on *Bismarck*, "the sinking of the *Bismarck* may have an effect on the war as a whole out of all proportion to the loss of the enemy of one battleship." In retrospect, it is not surprising that the sinking of *Bismarck* took on more significance than the loss of one battleship—small as the German Fleet in 1941 was—or that the story continues to attract popular and scholarly interest. Before *Exercise Rhine* was over, the British had lost its largest warship and deployed four battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, ten light cruisers and twenty-one destroyers in a chase that covered an area of more than a million square nautical miles. *Bismarck* demonstrated the technical achievements of German naval architecture and the culmination of German naval gunnery in its duel with *Hood* and *Prince of Wales*. In the final 90-minute action, *Bismarck*, unable to defend herself, demonstrated almost unbelievable staying power absorbing 2,876 hits before the crew set the scuttling charges and opened the seacocks. Another facet of this phase of the Anglo-German Atlantic battle, which has intrigued students of modern naval warfare, is the role of naval intelligence. Fueled by the publications beginning in 1974 about ULTRA and the British success in breaking the German naval code, there was speculation that Admiral Tovey's forces had substantial, if not decisive, aid from this source in tracking *Bismarck*.

As the senior survivor and fourth gunnery officer of *Bismarck* during her training period and first and final sortie, Baron Burkhard von Müllenheim-Rechberg provides an entirely new perspective to the ship's 8-day operation. The author's account, written 40 years after the sinking of *Bismarck*, represents the first and only detailed account of the battle from the German side.

Supplemented by new archival sources and the author's vivid recreation of events and the morale of the officers and crew, he has made a major contribution to this chapter of World War II and naval history in general. Not only does Müllenheim demonstrate his objectivity and scholarship but his writing holds the reader in suspense throughout the chase. His description of the ship's fitting-out and training period and the photographs provide a rare opportunity to experience what life was like on board *Bismarck*.

The book also presents Müllenheim with an opportunity to provide some counterinterpretations and necessary corrections to the various battle reports in the *Bismarck* literature. Müllenheim's *Battleship Bismarck* thereby joins Russell Granfell's *The Bismarck Episode* and Brian Schofield's *Loss of the Bismarck* as the classic accounts of the pursuit and destruction of *Bismarck*.

Müllenheim poses the difficult questions that Lütjens, the Fleet Commander, had to face at each critical

phase. He contends that, viewed strategically, *Exercise Rhine* was a failure from the moment the ship left Norway inasmuch as the British had detected the breakout of *Bismarck* and her companion, *Prinz Eugen*. Commerce raiding was the primary objective of German surface forces in the Atlantic, not the destruction of enemy warships.

The contact with *Suffolk* on 23 May, the *Hood* action off Iceland and the persistent shadowing of British cruisers created the most likely reason for Lütjen's pessimism that became so noticeable in his tactical decisions and dispatches. As Müllenheim suggests, Lütjens may have been influenced by what the admiral regarded as superior British radar which, as Lütjens radioed to Group West on 25 May, "has a strong adverse effect on operations in Atlantic."

Lütjen's decisions not to close with the British cruisers, not to pursue the damaged *Prince of Wales*, his precipitate order to break off the mission and reach port and then to steer for St. Nazaire by the shortest route and, perhaps most significant, his failure to realize that *Bismarck* had managed to break away from its pursuers on 25 May are all symptoms of a larger issue that is somewhat outside the scope of this book. The weight of German naval tradition, the failure of the High Seas Fleet in World War I, placed a heavy burden on the *Seekriegsleitung* and Admiral Raeder whose conception of German naval strategy and planning went beyond the resources available to them. Although they maintained the goal of achieving command of the sea in the North Atlantic, even the admonition of the *Seekriegsleitung* to strive for "local and temporary" command of the sea was unrealistic. In spite of its limited surface forces which, according to Raeder, could only show they knew how to die gallantly, it was imperative that those limited forces be used to demonstrate their value to Hitler and to atone for Germany's inactivity on the high seas in World War I. Lütjens had initially expressed reservations against deploying *Bismarck* alone without heavier surface forces but acceded to the position of the *Seekriegsleitung* and Raeder. In this light, Lütjens' 25 May "victory or death" speech with its deleterious effect on morale or his premature 26 May radio dispatch "we will fight to the last round" are expressions of resignation that did not appear justified by events at the time and may have prevented Lütjens from taking action such as the erection of the dummy smokestack designed to confuse enemy air attacks. As Müllenheim states, after 24 May immediate needs dictated most of the actions of the fleet staff and ship's command. In the end, it was Lütjens' two radio messages on the morning of 25 May that enabled the British to get a fix on *Bismarck* and direct Force H and its *Swordfish* to the target. Conventional methods of intelligence and reconnaissance and not ULTRA provided the British with their success against *Bismarck*. ULTRA and the *Bismarck* operation did, however, have a decisive effect on the war at sea because the British were able to destroy the German resupply organization in the Atlantic thereby making it impossible for surface forces to operate effectively in the Atlantic and forcing Dönitz to rely upon refueling his U-boats and U-boat tankers ("Milchcow").

In the final analysis, the German errors and failures doomed *Bismarck*. Not all the errors, however, were made by the Fleet Commander. Poor German aerial reconnaissance, the inaccurate report on 22 May that the British ships were at anchor in Scapa Flow and the encouragement by Group North marked the fateful beginnings of the voyage. Müllenheim is unwilling to ascribe the loss of *Bismarck* either to "unforeseeable fate" or a "fatal flaw" in Lütjens' character. No one can deny, of course, the role of the "fortunes of war" in the

misattack on *Sheffield* that caused *Ark Royal*'s airplanes to switch from the unreliable magnetic detonatots to contact detonators for the ctitical torpedo attack on *Bismarck*. As Müllenheim points out, the tudder damage and the inability to repait or steer the ship were only part of the teason *Bismarck* was left helpless in the Atlantic. Without U-boat or air support, *Bismarck* was, in Müllenheim's words, "consigned to a fate that she did not have the resources to avett."

Müllenheim does offer new insights into the actions and motivations of his supetiors, although he does not claim definitive answers. In fact, the loss of the War Diary and the few survivors (115) mean that we can never be certain of the command decisions made by Lütjens. The author's excellent portrayal of Lütjens does suggest more strongly than he is willing to do that the Fleet Commander was involved in an operation that he did not fully support and each setback simply confirmed this attitude. The description of *Bismarck*'s captain, Ernst Lindemann, and the differences between the two German officers does raise the question of whether another Fleet Commander might have acted otherwise. The failure of the German Navy to produce an outstanding naval commander of Hipper's caliber in World War II and the failure to develop and implement a viable naval strategy is a larger story of which the *Bismarck* episode is a significant and now clearer chapter.

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Whynes, David K. *The Economics of Third World Military Expenditures*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979. 165pp.

There was something distinctly Woodrow Wilsonish about President Carter's quest to achieve longrun goals that were cettifiably visionary to the "hardheaded realist." This was nevet more true than in his attempts to conttol arms sales to Third World nations. Reasonable men cannot but question the motality of abetting the diversion of scarce development resoutces into local arms rivalries. Yet as a practical mattet the net effect of Catter's policy appears to have been to have slowed such arms races little while causing the tanks of the world's arms suppliets to increase, at the expense of both U.S. atms sales and influence. Thus, at the advent of the Reagan administtation, arms sales policy is once again an open and nettlesome issue.

The Economics of Third World Military Expenditures is a timely and thought-provoking work. Whynes assumes that because defense expenditures inherently require diversion of resources that are more directly welfare-promoting, there is a clear benefit from minimizing their *net* cost. Net cost is the financial (accounting) cost minus the social value of whatever civil benefits arise from defense expenditures. Civil benefits arise both directly through effects on the civilian economy and indirectly as the military acts as a "modernizing" influence on both the economy and the polity. Whynes, by his admission, fails to prove entirely the case he is interested in arguing—that greater emphasis should be placed on policies of "military-social integration" to reduce the net cost of defense. But he does succeed in providing a broad-ranging and imaginative review of evidence and thinking on the role of the militaty in the nation-building process.

After stating the problem, Whynes deals with why military expenditures have grown, their costs and benefits to the civilian economy, arms imports and foreign aid, and whether defense spending rises under military regimes. The empirical evidence he reviews is notable equally for the insights it provides and the confirmations it fails to provide.

Regarding the latter, statistical analyses consistently fail to support the more commonsense suppositions about military spending. Specifically, it is found that:

—military expenditures do increase with GNP but the increase is not at the expense of nondefense expenditures; they increase also. Indeed, it appears military expenditures play the curious role of "leading" public expenditures, rising at times of crisis and causing the public's level of tolerance of taxation to go up and then receding as the crisis passes, creating room in the undiminished public expenditures for more nondefense expenditures;

—military burden (military expenditures as a percentage of GNP—typically in the 2 to 4 percent range) falls as income rises. This finding in part reflects the way the calculation was undertaken, the highly burdened U.S. and U.S.S.R. having been excluded from the analysis;

—military spending does not retard economic growth; on the contrary the evidence indicates highly burdened economies if anything have grown more rapidly than others;

—military spending does not increase significantly after military takeovers.

These findings do not suggest so much that Third World military expenditures are less burdensome than suspected as that the issues are more complex than can be captured by simple analytical models. In any given case, quantitative analyses are useful to frame the issue but can hardly substitute for professional, multidisciplinary judgment in suggesting policy conclusions.

Whynes' final chapters are the least successful. In them and drawing on the experiences of India, Burma, China, Tanzania, and North Vietnam, he argues the case for increased emphasis on arms control, civic action, "military-social integration," and nonmilitary mobilization for defense as ways to lessen the net cost of defense. Though he provides a useful review of experience and thinking in these areas, he fails to come to grips with the issue in quantitative terms. Granted the lack of relevant data, the discussion might have been couched in terms of suggestive relative magnitudes. Instead Whynes presents an essentially conceptual discussion that provides no basis for gauging what cost savings might be realized if such policies were pursued.

The discussion of the economic benefits of military expenditures is one of the more provocative sections of the book. Viewing the military as an economic sector, "spillover benefits" of three types are considered: stimulus to industrial growth from military hardware manufacture and repair; regional multiplier from military expenditures, which tend to be geographically dispersed; and positive influence on human aspects of economic development, especially on employment, skills training, formal education, and manpower development in general. The latter produces significant "bridging effects"—the enhancing of the quality of a nation's people technically and organizationally as the military draws broadly from the populace, exposes individuals to modernizing influences at all levels of organization, and eventually returns them to the civilian labor force and to society. These effects are considerably broader than those of simple "education and training" and are important dynamic effects of an expanding, modernizing military.

Whynes has provided a useful discussion of an issue that is likely to move increasingly to the fore in the 1980s. Third World nations are aspiring to increasingly capital-intensive defense establishments. They are requesting increased external support from competing supply nations for both the importation of arms and their coproduction. This short book is not the definitive work on the subject. Yet it is the only comprehensive discussion available and

sets the stage nicely for further inquiry. U.S. arms sales policy will be the more coherent, and persuasive, the more it reflects the range of issues suggested by Whynes, including in particular innovative deterrent strategies, the overall "productivity" of alternative weapons systems, and the bridging effects of military programs.

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Zartman, I. William, ed. *Elites in the Middle East*. New York: Praeger, 1980. 252pp.

One of the most unfair things that a reviewer might do is to wish that the author had written a different book (which is not at all the same as wishing for a better book). So as not to be accused of falling into this trap, let it be said at the onset that *Elites in the Middle East* is *not* an up-to-date descriptive treatment of those in power in the Middle East. Instead this is a book expressly intended for political scientists dealing with Middle Eastern politics. Its foci are largely theoretical and conceptual, and its explicit object is to take stock of the present state of elite studies and to indicate or intimate new directions that might be taken by the academic specialist. Of its seven chapters, four are more likely to hold interest for the scholar than the informed layman. However, three of the chapters are of wider appeal, and it is those chapters that will be highlighted in this review.

Charles Butterworth provides a competent overview that contrasts the normative underpinnings of Western and Middle Eastern philosophies of government. While readers are not likely to be surprised by the author's treatment of such well-known luminaries as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, his discussion of the work of Alfarabi (A.D., 870-950), Averroes (1126-1198), Nizām al-Mulk (1018-1092), and Kai Ka'us may provide a unique introduction ro the work of these Islamic philosophers. Butterworth clearly shows that while the Western philosophers of politics concerned themselves with the form of governance (e.g., democracy vs. autocracy), their Middle Eastern counterparts were more likely to concern themselves with the relative goodness of a government as measured by the quality of its goals rather than its form (although it must be added that their view of politics as an art capable of mastery by few led them to conclude—or assume—that rule by the one or the few was preferable). Accordingly, what we encounter is an emphasis upon the proper behavior and skills of rulers. This is all of more than passing interest as the work of these Moslem thinkers is, according to Butterworth, often standard fare in the universities and secondary schools of the Middle East. The only criticism that might be made of Butterworth is that his 38-page chapter only mentions the work of one of the greatest of Arab philosophers, Ibn Khaldun, but he is still to be applauded for introducing his readers to the work of men who are likely to be obscure for many.

The centerpiece chapter of *Elites in the Middle East* is a provocative theoretical statement by I. William Zartman, a well-known scholar of Middle Eastern (and especially North African) politics. "Toward a Theory of Elite Circulation" treats the absorption, cooptation and exclusion of those who aspire to positions in the elite strata. While fair treatment of Zartman's work is not possible in a short review, it may be suggestive to nore that he sees elite circulation as a developmental process that tests the incumbent's ability to cope with the continuing realignment ("bunching") of aspiring elites brought about by the political decisions (and nondecisions) of the elite. Zartman's rich exposition treats the clusters of challenges that may lead to the

realignment of the political elite as a result of differing generational, regional, ideological and socioeconomic interests. These interests are in turn related to the natural history of independence enjoyed by a respective country. While Zartman's chapter is decidedly preliminary, he does offer a number of essential insights toward understanding the process of elite circulation. And after all, the smoothness with which elites move into power is at the very essence of political stability. We need not be reminded of the importance of the latter, especially in the Middle East.

The final chapter of concern is of considerable merit and appeal. Marvin G. Weinbaum's "Structure and Performance of Mediating Elites" is a superbly written discussion of that most typical Middle Eastern role—the mediator. In a society marked by stark distinction in statuses, omnipresent codes of modesty and honor, and widespread illiteracy, the performance of mediatory functions (*wasita*) is essential, and those that do so display a mark of elite status. The role of the mediator may range from arranging a marriage, acquiring routine or exceptional government assistance, interpreting or amplifying communications to a target audience (e.g., a village), or exercising control (e.g., collecting taxes). Weinbaum explains the functions of local, party and legislative, special interest, administrative, military and media elites with respect to their roles as intermediaries between the rulers and the ruled. Of particular note is his emphasis on the influence that mediating elites have upon societal change. For example, the ubiquitous transistor radio illustrates the potential significance of media elites for affecting the masses' attitudes towards government policies. Also there is the enhanced significance of local mediators who can interpret and amplify the news (and who often do so very subjectively). While the role of a given elite as mediator is not immutable, given the differing circumstances of the respective Middle East states, Weinbaum makes it quite clear that the mediation institution will endure because its "indispensability ultimately rests on the enduring material and psychological gap that exists between masses and elites in the Middle East."

While some readers may be put off by the academic wrappings, *Elites in the Middle East* does offer some rewarding nuggets for those who choose to persevere.

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RECENT BOOKS

Selected Accessions of the Naval War College Library

Annotated by

Doris Baginski, Stephen Maffeo, Jane Sanfilippo, and Mary Ann Varoutsos

Aldridge, Robert C. *The Counterforce Syndrome: A Guide to U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Doctrine*. Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1978. 86pp. $3.95

All three divisions of the Pentagon's "strategic triad" (land-based ICBMs, intercontinental bombers, and ICBM submarines) are being geared for first-strike capabilities. Contrary to what most Americans believe, or want to believe, "counterforce" has risen to replace "deterrence" as the prevailing

U.S. strategic doctrine. The topics of space warfare; counterforce missiles; antisubmarine warfare; ballistic missile and bomber defense; command, conrrol and communication; and rhe Russian threat are analyzed, relative to the concepr of a U.S. first-strike. The text is supported and illustrated by frequent footnotes, a glossary, and several charts, graphs, and tables.

Bennett, Bruce W. *How to Assess the Survivability of U.S. ICBMs*. R-2577-FF; R-2578-FF. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1980. 2v. paper $7.00; $5.00
The survivability of American ICBMs facing possible Soviet attack must be analyzed in four stages: the probability of target destruction from a single warhead arriving and detonating nearby; the results from several warheads arriving and detonating; the probability of warheads actually being able to arrive and detonate near the target; and the probability of warheads being able to survive fratricide (the detonation of other nuclear explosions in the same area). The author presents a highly detailed statistical study; his many calculations and formulations are clearly derived and displayed. Very complete references are provided in addition to a heavy use of graphs, figures, and tables. Volume 2 consists solely of appendixes.

The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 368pp. $25.00; paper $9.95
Edited by Akira Iriye, this work is a compilation of essays on Sino-Japanese relations written by scholars on the subject. These essays show that any study of East Asian history is not complete without some understanding of Sino-Japanese interactions; and, despite having common roots, each country's political and cultural development has as many differences as it has similarities with the other.

Defense Policy Formation: towards Comparative Analysis. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1980. 315pp. $14.95
The volume analyzes the defense policy processes in selected, strategically important, middle powers—Australia, South Africa, India, Japan, and France. The essays, contributed by a number of authors, provide a comparative, transnational analysis of the defense community in each of these countries based upon the participants, the channels, the constraints, and the functions necessary for the formulation of a national defense policy. James M. Roherty of the University of South Carolina's Government Departmenr edited the collection.

Encounter at Shimoda: Search for a New Pacific Partnership. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979. 257pp. $22.00
A collection of papers delivered at the Fourth Shimoda Conference, which was sponsored by the Japan Center for International Exchange and the Japan Society and held during the fall of 1977. The participants included a number of well-known elected officials representing various political positions in both countries, diplomats, leaders in business and labor, scholars, and journalists. Introductory chapters by coeditors Herbert Passin and Akira Iriye, emphasizing the changes that had taken place in Japanese-U.S. relations since the First Shimoda Conference in 1967 and the importance of cooperation and mutual understanding to meet successfully the challenges of global economic dislocations, new domestic priorities, and the changing international order, provide a useful frame of reference for the disparate views represented in this volume.

Green, Leslie C. *The Tehran Embassy Incident and International Law.* Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1980. 22pp. paper $.75

This pamphlet examines the embassy seizure from the international law point of view. Particular attention is focused on the activities of the United Nations, the role of the International Court of Justice, the American reaction, and possible lessons for the future. Persia/Iran has had a long history of disrespect and violence toward foreign diplomats. In this instance, and with historical precedent, all indications are that the Iranian's central intention was to reduce the influence and dignity of the United States. The failure of the U.N. to remedy the situation cannot be surprising; the U.N. was never intended to be a law-making or law-enforcing organization and should not be expected to act as such.

Harman, Nicholas. *Dunkirk: the Patriotic Myth.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980. 271pp. $12.95

In May 1940 the *Wehrmacht* slashed westward, routing the Belgians, the French, and the British Expeditionary Force. Against tremendous odds 220,000 British soldiers, 110,000 French, and a few Belgians were evacuated to Britain from the port of Dunkirk. Tales of the rescue immediately grew into legend; these myths fortified the British for the remainder of the war. The book blends background, overview, and day-by-day accounts together, illustrating, among other things, that the civilian effort in the operation was to very little effect and that the British deceitfully manipulated the Belgians and French to save the BEF. Photographs, maps, notes on sources, and excerpts of interviews and documents support the text.

Koopman, Bernard O. *Search and Screening: General Principles with Historical Applications.* Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1980. 369pp. $45.00

Targets cannot be attacked until they are found; indeed, tactical concealment has forced specialized search operations to become critical elements of battle. The operation of search in many phases, aspects, and under varying circumstances is utterly essential to modern warfare. Search operations have structures that require scientific analysis for true understanding and for their most effective performance. This volume is an updated, revised edition of an Operations Research Group report. Essentially a textbook, it presents a balance between the vital aspects of physics/engineering developments, mathematical theory, and practical recommendations/illustrations.

Kronmiller, Theodore G. *The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining.* New York: Oceana, 1980. 2v. $80.00

The natural resources of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are considered the "common heritage of mankind." But as nations realize the capability to exploit the rich mineral resources of the ocean floor, disagreement arises concerning the legal consequences of this concept. This extensive study presents a legal analysis of the debate concerning the permissibility of deep ocean mining under international law. Cases, treaties, legislative documents, and an extensive bibliography are included.

Malbin, Michael J. *Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government.* New York: Basic Books, 1980. 279pp. $15.95

Recently, substantial increases in committee staffs and legislative aides have resulted in the use of staff negotiations as substitutes for direct conversation and deliberation among our elected officials. Malbin argues that this limits the original intention of our constitutional scheme of government that considered direct communication essential to informed deliberation. While indirect staff mediation and communication by memorandum enables Congress to manage a heavier workload, it seriously limits the crucial representative role of direct deliberation on key issues.

Martin, Tyrone G. *A Most Fortunate Ship: a Narrative History of "Old Ironsides."* Chester, Conn.: Globe Pequot Press, 1980. 388pp. $17.95

The U.S.S. *Constitution* is regarded by many Americans as the most famous ship in the history of the U.S. Navy. She was launched in 1797, one of six original frigates authorized to defend the maritime interests of the United States. It was during the War of 1812 in battle with the British frigate *Guerriere* that she established her enduring reputation. Cannon fire from the British ship failed to penetrate the hull of *Constitution* and so the famed nickname "Old Ironsides" was born. She was never defeated in battle and remains today a commissioned unit of the U.S. Navy.

Navies and Arms Control. New York: Praeger, 1980. 212pp. $21.95

Contains a series of papers written for the Summer Workshop on Naval Arms Control in Aspen, Colorado in August 1979 and edited by George H. Quester. The authors, using the theme of naval armaments and their control, explore the present global naval situations together with the influence of today's weaponry upon future naval missions. The balance of U.S.-Soviet power seems to be of major concern.

Nimmo, Dan and Combs, James E. *Subliminal Politics: Myths and Mythmakers in America.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980. 256pp. $10.95

Myths may be true, false, neither, or both. The real significance of a myth is that it is the representation of events that people believe. The authors analyze what the public "thinks" it knows about American politics. In fact, myth has become so ingrained into the American political scene that the creation of myths, as well as their ready acceptance, is automatic and unconscious. The key "mythmakers" of American politics are evaluated, as are their techniques and their myths. Classical images, scholars, literature, politics, television, contemporary issues and figures, movies, and humor are drawn upon to provide example and illustration.

O'Leary, Greg. *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 302pp. $25.00

The author, an Australian, contends that China's foreign policy is based upon international developments using a "Sinified Marxist-Leninist yardstick." He discusses the rationale for the shift in China's foreign policy between the Ninth and Tenth Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party that were held in 1969 and 1973. The basis for this shift was the assumption that the Soviet

Union replaced the United States as the principal and most immediate threat facing China. The Chinese believed that the assaults of the Third World liberation movements, including the Vietnam conflict, had checked the expansion of American power.

Oxenfeldt, Alfred R. *Cost-Benefit Analysis for Executive Decision-Making: the Danger of Plain Common Sense.* New York: American Management Association, 1979. 432pp. $19.95

Cost-benefit analysis is an aid in evaluating the implications of alternative courses of action. The decisionmaking process is a method of selection that consists of matching the outcomes of alternatives against desirable objectives. An understanding of the common structure and characteristics of business decisions can help the executive formulate decisions in ways that will facilitate valid results. The author promises to provide the reader with the intellectual tools with which to better perform this function. The concepts, models, and procedures are derived partly from economic theory but essentially from behavioral science and decision theory.

Payne, Howard C., et al. *As the Storm Clouds Gathered: European Perceptions of American Foreign Policy in the 1930s.* Durham, N.C.: Moore, 1979. 173pp. paper $7.95

Three American historians have each contributed an essay to this work that addresses the policy perceptions of European statesmen prior to World War II. The assessments of American foreign policy that were made in London, Paris, and Moscow are considered independently and, in separate "Perspectives" sections, are discussed in relation to one another. The common theme that emerges is that sooner or later statesmen from each of the powers viewed the foreign policy objectives of the other nations with disillusionment and a lack of trust. Because most previous studies have been limited to the failures of France and Britain to contain Hitler or unite with Stalin to defeat Germany, this discussion is intended to direct attention to the role of perception in the origins of the Second World War.

Prittie, Terrence. *The Velvet Chancellors: a History of Post-War Germany.* London: Frederick Muller, 1979. 286pp. £8.95

An analysis, complete with historical, social, and political background, of the postwar West German chancellors: Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Kurt Kiesinger, Willy Brandt, and Helmut Schmidt. "Velvet" may be an overstatement; these men have been commanding, rough, and direct in their different ways. They have presented, however, a totally different German leadership from the "blood and iron" Bismarckian philosophy and the unrestrained, brutishness of the Nazis. These men have smoothed a path toward lasting freedom and a settled future for the West German citizen, for whom individual consideration is being given for the first time.

Rembe, Nasila S. *Africa and the International Law of the Sea.* Germantown, Md.: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1980. 251pp. $42.50

An analysis of the African contribution to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). International law is of considerable significance to newly independent nations; they perceive traditional international law in the context of colonization and imperialism

as being tesponsible fot the exploitation and opptession of many new states. Therefore, international law is viewed as both an obstacle to, and an oppottunity for, international development and realization of economic and social reconsttuction. Active patticipation in marine affairs is of growing interest to many African states, latgely because these affairs cannot be divorced ftom their basic national and intetnational ptoblems.

Schlee, Susan. *On Almost Any Wind: the Saga of the Oceanographic Research Vessel "Atlantis."* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cotnell University Ptess, 1978. 301pp. $15.00

A histotical study of the reseatch ship opetated by Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. The *Atlantis* was a large, double-ended, steel-hulled, ketch-rigged sailing ship; she made 299 cruises, covet ing 1,500,000 nautical miles, from 1931 to 1966. For many years she was the only, and then one of the few, vessels engaged in significant and extensive oceanographic investigations. Countless important discoveries were made on board; she was unrivaled in testing instrumentation and exploring uncharted tegions. The author intertwines the stoty of the ship, her crew, and the scientists involved together with various issues relative to oceanographic studies.

Shaffer, Stephen M. and Shaffer, Lisa Robock. *The Politics of International Cooperation: a Comparison of U.S. Experience in Space and in Security.* Denver, Colo.: University of Denvet. Graduate School of Intetnational Studies, 1980. 73pp. paper $3.90

This monograph is a study of how intetnational coopetation in the areas of space and technology and in politicomilitary affairs setves U.S. national foreign policy objectives. Through NASA, the United States offers an opportunity for collaboration with other nations in space technology and explotation. NATO is presented as a useful case study to illuminate U.S. methods and objectives in its cooperative defense undertakings. The authors examine the origins and principles guiding these efforts, pointing out similarities of goals as well as important differences that exist among the countries involved.

Shanor, Donald R. *The Soviet Traingle: Russia's Relations with China and the West in the 1980's.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980. 296pp. $13.95

Diplomatic relations as they exist today between the Soviet Union, the West, and China have been altered significantly by events of the past three decades—the oil struggle, the American defeat in Vietnam, the economic recovery of Western Europe, and the expansion of communism. As a result, a new diversity of international relationships exists throughout the world. Shanor urges the West to concentrate on working toward détente between the two Communist powers as a hopeful prescription for reducing tensions worldwide.

Small, Melvin. *Was War Necessary? National Security and U.S. Entry into War.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980. 311pp. $18.00; paper $8.95

Melvin Small, Professor of History at Wayne State Univetsity and coinvestigator in the "Correlates of War Project," examines the causes of war in this work aimed at the nonexpert. He identifies three types of threats ro national security that have been used to justify going to war: direct military threats,

economic threats, and threats to national honor. In light of these justifications, Small scrutinizes six wars the United States has fought between 1812 and 1950, concluding that American entry was largely unjustified. Intentionally controversial, the book is designed to encourage laymen to explore the issue further, and a useful bibliographic essay on each of the wars studied is appended.

Smith, Myron J., Jr. *War Story Guide: an Annotated Bibliography of Military Fiction.* Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1980. 437pp. $20.00

War stories are "novels or story collections about, or having significant passages devoted to, comabt," that are educationally useful in providing vicarious combat experience to the nonveteran. Following the foreword by General Mark W. Clark, (USA Ret.), the bibliography presents 3,916 titles written between 1878 and 1978 concerning fiction relevant to air and ground operations. (Naval operations are in a separate work: *Sea Fiction Guide.*) All titles are annotated, revealing something of plot, characters, wars, or experiences that make each volume unique. The bibliography is divided into historical periods and ranges of years within four major geographic areas. Additionally, there are author, author pseudonym, title, and war/battle indexes.

Wolfe, Alan. *The Rise and Fall of the "Soviet Threat": Domestic Sources of the Cold War Consensus.* Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1979. 94pp. paper $4.95

In this essay, the author argues that at certain times the presence of anti-Soviet hostility is advantageous to the specific interests of particular factions within the United States. He attempts to support this argument, by identifying what he sees as significant political similarities that have existed during the peak periods of strong anti-Communist consensus since 1945. It is his belief that opposition to the SALT II treaty and the new cold war militancy has more to do with domestic priorities than with the Soviet military buildup.

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1981—700-015/3